RogerS

• RogerSMar 29, 2013, 12:16 AM

  3 points

  in reply to: notsonewuser’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  So my objections aren’t aimed at you!

• RogerSMar 29, 2013, 12:11 AM

  2 points

  in reply to: buybuydandavis’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  I wasn’t intending to unless that’s what the Wiki definition characterizes it as, because I simply tried to re-express that definition without using the terms map and territory in ways that their definitions exclude.

  I think perhaps I can see the problem. My phrase “for the purposes of causal explanation” is ambiguous. I wasn’t meaning “as a way of explaining any particular behaviour” but rather “as a way of establishing the root causes underlying any behaviour”. Does that make it more acceptable/​less “greedy”?

  Another possible cause of misunderstanding is that I have never seen the point of essentialism, in other words I think the questions that matter are always “how can something be most usefully described (for some stated purpose)” rather than “what is the essence of that something”, so I instinctively avoided an essentialist definition. I’ll think about rewording my version in a way that essentialists will recognize, as the sort of reductionism we are talking about does seem to hinge on reality being a sort of Platonic essence...

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 11:10 PM

  3 points

  in reply to: fubarobfusco’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  I agree that’s a good distinction, though direct explanation of a higher level obviously works in some cases (e.g. the weight of the brain is a simple aggregate of the weight of the constituent atoms).

  “Can be explained in terms of..” seems a much less biased way of framing the definition to me than the one in the wiki. I’ll add it to my list of starting points for discussion!

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 10:58 PM

  4 points

  in reply to: Vaniver’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  The answer is in the rest of the sentence that you truncated! I imagine a dualist would say that there is something out there in the territory which you consider to be a manifestation of a model higher level, but they don’t. That isn’t the same.

  I don’t find the monist/​dualist distinction helpful. Computers have hardware and information: that’s a dualist model, and it has served very well as a model. At any given instant, the information is a state of the hardware, which requires a monist model, but it’s information that is downloaded etc. So is information “stuff”? Depends what you mean by “stuff”. In short it’s an argument about definitions in the bad sense of insisting about the “true” meaning.

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 10:53 PM

  2 points

  in reply to: AlexMennen’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  Sorry, I don’t understand. Are you saying that you don’t agree with my definition of reductionism (which was intended as a point of agreement, not a straw man at all)? I agree that an opinion about the likelihood that the standard model will continue to serve is a separate question.

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 10:52 PM

  4 points

  in reply to: notsonewuser’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  An “emergentist” would probably define their view in the same way. The question is, simpler for what purposes?

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 10:30 PM

  4 points

  in reply to: Vladimir_Nesov’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  Thanks! (Both of you)

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 10:11 PM

  3 points

  in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

  In the same way that it’s a very good exercise when having a rational debate to start by each side paraphrasing the view they oppose in a manner that is acceptable to holders of that view, otherwise the chances are you haven’t understood what is being said. Is “a dialogue of the deaf” really what you want?

• RogerSMar 27, 2013, 6:55 PM

  1 point

  on: [SEQ RERUN] What Do We Mean By “Ra­tion­al­ity”?

  The one useful purpose for discussion of “meanings” is to draw attention to distinctions between different usages that may get overlooked. The “epistemic” vs “instrumental” is one such distinction in this case.

  I suggest there is a third useful sense, which sort of links epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality.

  The example in the sequence post takes consistent Bayesian probability with Occam priors as an example of rational modelling of the world. But in what sense is it rational to believe that the world is an ordered place with rules that apply irrespective of location and time, that Occam’s razor is the right prior, and so on? The choice of such a method cannot be justified by appeals to evidence that assume the validity of the method.

  The only root justification that makes sense to me is by a game-theory type argument. If the world does continue to behave the way I broadly expect it to, that has huge implications—I can continue to behave in broadly the same way as I have been behaving. If the universe from this moment on is going to behave according to entirely different rules, I have no basis for as much as putting one foot in front of another. So assuming that a model which describes the past well will also have validity in future has great instrumental advantages. So it is ‘rational’ to do so, even though it can’t be justified by “scientific” reasoning.

  It can be fairly pointed out that the reasoning here is essentially that of Pascal’s Wager. However, there is nothing in that particular argument which justifies belief in any one version of “God” rather than another, and if somebody wants to use the word “God” exclusively for the fact that the universe makes sense, I see no reason to object!

Re­mov­ing Bias From the Defi­ni­tion of Reductionism

• RogerSMar 5, 2013, 11:38 PM

  0 points

  on: What Deon­tol­ogy gets right

  This is just a test because a previous comment vanished on submission....

• RogerSMar 5, 2013, 11:28 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: Ben_Welchner’s comment on: What Deon­tol­ogy gets right

  By my understanding, rule consequentialism means choosing rules according to the utility of the expected consequences, whereas deontology argues for a duty to follow a rule for reasons which may have nothing to do with the consequences. Kant’s “treat another person as an end in him/​herself, not as a means to an end” doesn’t mention consequences and the argument for it isn’t based on assessment of consequences. Admittedly both sorts of rule may lead to the same outcome in most cases, but in totally unprecedented moral dilemmas it helps to have an idea where the rule comes from. My prejudice is that rule consequentialism is the best basis for public policy, but deontology sometimes better captures the essence of what matters in cases of private morality.

• RogerSMar 5, 2013, 5:05 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: buybuydandavis’s comment on: What Deon­tol­ogy gets right

  To reverse your last point, Sam Harris (The Moral Landscape) defends RC on the grounds that only that which is experienced can be morally significant. While agreeing, I would reply that the motivation of acts is experienced, as well as the consequences. EG: Should you vote if you live in a safe seat? You could argue that the rule “vote anyway” has beneficial consequences, but then, so does the rule “vote, except in safe seats”. RC doesn’t actually invent the rules, it only tells you how to evaluate them once invented! However, I would vote anyway because I wish to be the sort of person who does. (NB, I didn’t say “become”). That’s an example of a D-ish argument that is based on conscious experience and, it seems to me, is a valid supplement to a generally RC-based outlook.

• RogerSMar 5, 2013, 4:43 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: OrphanWilde’s comment on: What Deon­tol­ogy gets right

  Or, more accurately, “Choose the action which you think will maximize utility” (Act Consequentialism) or “Follow the rule of action that you think will maximize utility” (Rule Consequentialism). The latter is more of a meta-rule, as it leaves you to derive action rules.

• RogerSFeb 28, 2013, 12:19 AM

  8 points

  on: Wel­come to Less Wrong! (2012)

  Retired Mechanical Engineer with the following interests/​prejudices.

  Longstanding interest in philosophy of science especially in the tradition of Karl Popper.

  Atheist to a first approximation but I can accept that some forms of religious belief can be regarded as “translations” of beliefs I hold and therefore not that keen on the “New Atheist” approach. Belong to a Humanist group in London (where I heard of LW). This has led me to revive an old interest in moral philosophy, especially as applied to political questions.

  Happy to be called a Rationalist so long as that encompasses a rational recognition of the limits of rationality.

  Regularly read New Scientist, but remain philosophically unconvinced by the repeated claim therein that Free Will is an illusion (at least as I understand the term).

  Recently discovered Bayes Theorem as explained by Nate Silver and can begin to see why LW is so keen on it.

  I’ve reached my own conclusions on a number of questions related to the above and am looking forward to discovering where they fit in and what I’ve missed!