I think this means “indifference” isn’t really the right term any more, because the agent is not actually indifferent between the two sets of observations, and doesn’t really need to be.
So, how about
U(a1, o, a2) =
UN(a1, o, a2) + max_b(US(a1, o, b)), if o is not in Press
US(a1, o, a2) + max_b(UN(a1, o, b)), if o is in Press
or, in your notation, U(a1, o, a2) = g(a1, o) + UN(a1, o, a2) if o is in Press, or US(a1, o, a2) + f(a1, o) if o is in Press.
The deeper point is important, and I think you’re mistaken about the necessary and sufficient conditions for an isomorphism here.
If a human appears in a gnome’s cell, then that excludes the counterfactual world in which the human did not appear in the gnome’s cell. However, on UDT, the gnome’s decision does depend on the payoffs in that counterfactual world.
Thus, for the isomorphism argument to hold, the preferences of the human and gnome must align over counterfactual worlds as well as factual ones. It is not sufficient to have the same probabilities for payoffs given linked actions when you have to make a decision, you also have to have the same probabilities for payoffs given linked actions when you don’t have to make a decision.