electricfistula

Karma: 19

electricfistula 31 Oct 2012 23:26 UTC
4 points
in reply to: Randy_M’s comment on: Proofs, Implications, and Models
Most poeple disagree with the premise “Being in a simulation is/can be made to be indistinguishable from reality from the point of view of the simulee.”

I am surprised to hear this. What is your basis for claiming that this is the premise most people object to?

Also, if you are aware of or familiar with this objection—would you mind explaining the following questions I have regarding it?
1. What reason is there to suspect that a simulated me would have a different/distinguishable experience from real me?
2. What reason is there to suspect that if there were differences between simulated and real life, that a simulated life would be aware of those differences? That is, even if it is distinguishable—I have only experienced one kind of life and can’t say if my totally distinguishable experience of life is that of a simulated life or a real one.
3. A magic super computer from the future will be able to simulate one atom with arbitrary accuracy—right? A super-enough computer will be able to simulate many atoms interacting with arbitrary accuracy. If this super computer is precisely simulating all the atoms of an empty room containing a single human being (brain included). If this simulation is happening—how could the simulated being possibly have a different experience than its real counterpart in an empty room? Atomically speaking everything is identical.
Maybe questions 1 and 3 are similar—but I’d appreciate if you (or someone else) could enlighten me regarding these issues.

electricfistula 9 Aug 2012 19:29 UTC
0 points
in reply to: pragmatist’s comment on: Glenn Beck discusses the Singularity, cites SI researchers
I think speculation as to the actual author of the above is entirely vacuous. There is a person out there named Glenn Beck who has a job in radio. There is also a personality out there named Glenn Beck who says extreme things and writes lots of books and cries on TV a lot. The Glenn Beck person and the Glenn Beck personality might be the same, or they might not be. I’ve seen no evidence toward either conclusion, more importantly there doesn’t seem to be any functional difference.

So, when someone says that the above is attributed to Glenn Beck they mean the Glenn Beck persona. Whether or not the human being who pressed the keys that caused that quote to exist had “Glenn Beck” printed on his license is unknown, but also entirely irrelevant. The one reasonable concern is that the Glenn Beck person didn’t write it, so he will be more likely to shift the mind of the Glenn Beck persona. But, if this is your concern then you should just express it simply and completely “This is atypical of the Glenn Beck persona. I hope it doesn’t change its mind about this” and leave it at that.

electricfistula 24 May 2012 17:38 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Jakinbandw’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

If you can’t explain what bad is, then I am unable to discuss this with you

Bad is causing harm to people who don’t deserve it. Convincing someone in the existence of hell is harmful—you are theatening them with the worst thing possible, convincing someone of a lie to compel them to serve the chruch through donations of time or money is harmful, convincing someone that they are innately sinful is harmful psychologically, convincing someone that morality is tied to religious institution is harmful. Children are least deserving of harm and so harming them is bad.

electricfistula 24 May 2012 7:00 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Jakinbandw’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

My entire point was that it might be possible to recognize these situations and then act in an appropriate manner.

I think this is called “behaving rationally”. I understand “rationality” as using reason to my benefit. If there comes a time when it would be beneficial for me to do something, and I arrive at that conclusion through reason, then I’d consider that a triumph of rationality. I think if you are able to anticipate an advantage that could be gained by a behavior then refusing to perform that behavior would be irrational.

Anecdotal evidence shouldn’t be a cause to say something is horrible.

You misunderstand me. It isn’t my anecdotal evidence that makes me think the church is horrible. I just pointed out that I had spent a lot of time in churches to show that I have more than the passing familiarity with them that you attributed to me. I think the church is horrible because it threatens children, promotes inaccurate material and takes money from the gullible.

The church that I go to most of the time has only 2 or three children in it and is mostly made up of members over 60

While this is good that your church isn’t abusing more children, it is still terrible to consign “2 or three children” to such mistreatment. Telling children that there is a hell and that they will go to it if they don’t believe in something which is obviously flawed is a terrible thing to do. It is psychological child abuse and I don’t think it says very much in your church’s favor that it only abuses two or three kids.

Besides, if you look at it from a Christian point of view, is it wrong to teach children when they are young?

A child lacks the intellectual maturity to understand or evaluate complex ideas. A child is more trusting than an adult. If your parents tell you something is true, or that you should believe this minister when he talks about heaven, you are more likely to believe it. If your parents came to you now and told you about how they had just found out about Krishna and you should read the Bhagavad Gita you probably wouldn’t be very receptive. And yet, your parents managed to convince you that the Bible was true. Why was that? Was it because through random chance you were born into a family that already believed in the one true religion? Or was it just that you adopted the religion you were exposed to. Because, when you were young your mind wasn’t discriminating enough to realize that, wait a second, this isn’t making sense!

Would you advocate waiting till a person is 20 to start teaching them how to read, write and do math?

No, but the usefulness of reading is well established. Mathematics is axiomatic. Religion is, as the most polite thing I could say about it, highly suspect. I don’t think its right for adults to have sex with children, because children aren’t mature enough to make informed decisions about consent. Similarly, I don’t think its okay for people to teach religion to children because children aren’t mature enough to make informed decisions about ontology.

I respectfully disagree. I would appreciate it if you could be respectful in turn.

I apologize if you have found me disrespectful so far. It isn’t my intention to be disrespectful to you. That said, I have no intention of being respectful to a set of beliefs which I consider first to be wrong and second to be pernicious. If you have an argument which you think is compelling as to the truth of Christianity, please tell me. I promise that if I am swayed by your argument I will begin to show Christianity due deference.

Is it as bad as telling a child that if they play in traffic they could cease to exist?

This is a true statement that is designed to protect a child. Saying something like “You’ll writhe in agony for all time if you don’t believe in the truth of this thousands of years old document compiled over hundreds of years by an unknown but large number of authors” isn’t the same kind of statement. Even if you don’t explicitly say that to a child, convincing them to believe in Christianity is implicitly making that statement.

As far as “bad” goes, I don’t have a ready definition. I have to fall back on Justice Potter Stewart “I know it when I see it”. Threatening children and teaching them things that are at best highly suspect as if they were true is bad.

Not true for all churches. In fact I have yet to be in a single one that even suggests it

Tithing (giving a tenth) is explicitly recommended in the Bible. If the churches you are going to endorse the Bible then they are at least implicitly asking for 10%.

You know, kind of like what Eliezer is doing right now with the workshops he is setting up.

I don’t think Eliezer has a school for children where he teaches them that unless they grow up to believe in his set of rules that an Unfriendly AI will punish them for all time. I have less against evangelism to adults. If Eliezer asks for money like this, that is fair, because the people he is asking can evaluate whether or not they believe in the cause and donate accordingly. There is nothing wrong with that. There is something wrong with compelling donations through threats of damnation.

electricfistula 24 May 2012 5:12 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

If you knew this to be the case, the rational thing to do would be to avoid solving the puzzle :-)

Agreed, but there is at least one possible scenario (where I don’t know it is the case) where it would hurt me to be a superior rationalist.

Religious people would disagree with you here, I’d imagine.

I imagine they would. Because they would disagree with me, I’d like for my beliefs to challenge theirs to trial by combat. That way, the wrong beliefs might be destroyed by the truth.

This is another minor nitpick, but AFAIK not all Christian sects demand tithing (though some do).

Sure, 10% is not true of all Christian groups. To my knowledge though, all such groups run on donations from the faithful. If the number isn’t 10% it is still greater than zero. Arguments here are over scale and not moral righteousness.

electricfistula 24 May 2012 5:04 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

That said, does it really matter why I do nice things for people, as long as I do them ?

From an economics standpoint it doesn’t matter. From a morality standpoint I would say it is all that does matter.

Consider, your friend asks you to get a cup of coffee—with sugar please! You go make the coffee and put in a healthy amount of the white powder. Unknown to you, this isn’t sugar, it is cyanide. Your friend drinks the coffee and falls down dead. What is your moral culpability here?

In a second instance, someone who thinks of you as a friend asks you for a cup of coffee—with sugar please! You actually aren’t this person’s friend though, you hate them. You make the cup of coffee, but instead of putting the sugar in it, you go to the back room, where you usually keep your cyanide powder. You find a bag of the white powder and put a large quantity into the coffee. Unknown to you, this isn’t cyanide, it has been switched with sugar. Your enemy drinks the coffee and enjoys it. What is your moral culpability here?

From the strict, bottom line, standpoint, you are a murderer in the first case and totally innocent in the second. And yet, that doesn’t feel right. Your intent in the first case was to help a friend. I would say that you have no moral culpability for his death. In the second case, your intent was to kill a person. I would say you bear the same moral culpability you would had you actually succeeded.

I think this example shows that what matters is not the consequences of your actions, but your intent when you take those actions. As such, if your intent on doing good is to benefit yourself I think it is fair to say that that is morally neutral (or at least less moral than it could be). If you intend simply to do good, then I think your actions are morally good, even if the consequences are not.

In my scenario, the answer is either “no”, or “not as effectively”.

I would say this is the light of truth shattering your illusion about being a good person then. Maybe that realization will drive you to overcome the akrasia and you can become a good person in fact as well in your desires.

Left to his own devices, he would’ve chosen restaurant Y—but you caused him to choose restaurant X, instead

What I hope is happening is that my friend’s preferences include a variable which account for the preferences of his friends. That way, when I tell him where I want to go, I am informing his decision making algorithm without actually changing his preferences. If I wanted to go to X less, then my friend would want to go to X less.

This action is not entirely analogous, … The more interesting question is...

Agreed. I don’t think this case would be moral though (though it would be a closer fit to the other situation). I think it still qualifies as a usurpation of another person’s free will and therefore is still immoral even if it makes people happy.

I can try again with another hypothetical. A girl wants to try ecstasy. She approaches a drug dealer, explains she has never tried it but would like to. The drug dealer supplies her with a pill which she takes. This isn’t ecstasy though, it is rohypnol. The girl blacks out and the drug dealer rapes her while she is unconscious, then cleans her up and leaves her on a couch. The girl comes to. Ecstasy wasn’t quite like it was described to her, but she is proud of herself for being adventurous and for trying new things. She isn’t some square who is too afraid to try recreational drugs and she will believe this about herself and attach a good feeling to this for the rest of her life. Has anyone done anything wrong here? The drug dealer was sexually gratified and the girl feels fulfilled in her experimentation. This feels like a case where every party is made happier and yet, I would still say that the drug dealer has done something immoral, even if he knew for sure how the girl would react.

electricfistula 24 May 2012 4:27 UTC
4 points
in reply to: Jakinbandw’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

I pose the question of what does being a superior rationalist do for you

In the aggregate of all possible worlds, I expect it will let me lead a happier and more fulfilling life. This isn’t to say that there aren’t situations where it will disadvantage me to be a rationalist (a killer locks me and one other person in a room with a logic puzzle. He will kill the one who completes the puzzle first...) but in general, I think it will be an advantage. Its like in the game of poker, sometimes, the correct play will result in losing. That is okay though, if players play enough hands eventually superior skill will tell and the better player will come out on top. Being a superior rationalist may not always be best in every situation, but when the other choice (inferior rationalist) is worse in even more situations… the choice seems obvious.

You start walking back to your car. You suspect that you aren’t going to make it.

Then I could stop walking, conserve my energy and try to suppress the blood loss. Or, I could activate my rationalist powers earlier and store a first aid kit in my car, or a fully charged cell phone in my pocket, or not venture out into the dangerous wild by myself...

Your misconceptions about Christianity are show that you have never done any real research into the subject of religion, and that you are just copying what you have heard from others.

I’ll freely admit to a hostile stance on religion, but I think it is a deserved one. Whatever misconceptions I may have about Christianity are gained from growing up with a religious family and attending services “religiously” for the first two decades of my life. I have more than a passing familiarity with it. I don’t think anything I said about religion is wrong though. Religious instruction is targeted predominantly towards children. The claims of the religious are false. Threatening a child with eternal damnation is bad. A consequence of being a Christian is giving 10% of your money to the church. Am I missing anything here?

electricfistula 24 May 2012 3:05 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

then belief in this kind of afterlife basically acts as a powerful anti-akrasia aid, motivating me to achieve this goal

This depends very much on what you mean by “better person”. Returning a lost wallet because you know the pain of losing things and because you understand the wallet’s owner is a sapient being who will experience similar pain is the kind of thing a good person would do. Returning a lost wallet because you expect a reward is more of a morally neutral thing to do. So, if you are doing good deeds because you expect a heavenly reward then you aren’t really being a good person (according to me) - you are just performing actions you expect to get a reward for. I think this belief actually prohibits you from being a good person, because as long as you believe in it you can never be sure whether you are acting out of a desire to be good or out of a desire to go to heaven.

In this scenario, would you say that taking this tool away from me would be the right thing to do ?

I would. If you use this belief to trick yourself into believing you are a better person (see above) then this is just doubling down for me. False beliefs should be destroyed by the truth. I should first destroy the belief in the heavenly reward for good deeds and then let the truth test you. Do you still do good things without hope of eternal reward? If yes, then you are a good person. If not, then you aren’t and you never were.

What do you mean by “free will” ?

By “free will” I mean a person’s ability to choose the option they most prefer. So, if I tell my friend I want to eat at restaurant X—I don’t think I’m inhibiting his free will. I do hope I’m influencing his preferences. I assume somewhere in his decision making algorithm is a routine that considers the strength of preferences of friends and that evaluation is used to modify his preference to eat at restaurant X. I do think I’d be inhibiting his free will if I were to say falsely that “Well, we can’t go to Y because it burned down” (or let him continue to believe this without correcting him). I am subverting free will by distorting the apparent available options. I think this also fits if you use threat of harm (“I’ll shoot you if we don’t go to X”) to remove an option from someone’s consideration.

by conning him), we aren’t just taking away his stuff—we are giving him happiness in return

I know a mentally handicapped person. I think its very likely I could trick this person out of their money. I could con him with a lie that is very liable to make him happy but would result in me getting all of his money and his stuff. What is your moral evaluation of this action?

It seems to me, if it is possible to trick Zuckerberg into paying my power bill then it is possible because he is gullible enough to believe my con. If it is possible for me to trick the mentally disabled, then it is possible because they are gullible enough for me to con. So, I don’t see why there should be any moral difference between tricking the mentally disabled out of their wealth and tricking Zuckerberg out of his. Nigerian email scams should be okay too, right?

I suppose there is some difference here in that Zuckerberg could afford to be conned out of a power bill or two whereas the average Nigerian scam victim cannot. I interpret this difference as being one of scale though. I think it would be worse to trick the elderly or the mentally disabled out of their life savings than it would to trick Zuckerberg out of the same number of dollars. This doesn’t mean that it is morally permissible to trick Zuckerberg out of any money though. Instead, I think it shows that each of these actions are immoral but of different magnitudes.

electricfistula 24 May 2012 0:36 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)

someone has to experience a loss (I pay extra for your power in addition to mine). Is there a loss in my scenario, and if so, to whom

The cost is to you. You are the one doing good deeds. I consider the time and effort (and money) you expend doing good deeds for other people to be the cost here.

Why do you think this would be immoral ?

My feeling is that this is an implicit corruption of your free will. You aren’t actually intending to pay my power, you are just doing it because you don’t realize you are. Similarly, in the religion example, what you actually intend to do is earn your way into heaven (or pay for your own power) but what you are actually doing is hard work to benefit others and you won’t go to heaven for it (paying for my electricity).

I don’t have the time to fully divulge my moral system here, but I think there is a class of actions which reduce the free will of other people. At the very extreme end of this class would be slavery “Do my work or I’ll hurt or kill you”. At the opposite end of the spectrum (but still a member of the same class) is something like letting people serve you, when they don’t intend to, because of a lie by omission.

One of the things I respect and value about human beings is their free will. By diminishing the free will of other people I would be diminishing the value of other human beings and I am calling that “immoral behavior”. This, I think, is why it is immoral to let you believe a lie which hurts you even if it helps me.

We might all benefit if we tricked Mark Zuckerburg into paying our power bills. He could afford to do so and to go on doing his thing and we would all be made better off. So, should we do so? If we should, why should we stop at the power bill? Why should we limit ourselves to tricking him? Why not just compel him through force?

electricfistula 23 May 2012 23:45 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Bugmaster’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)
Suppose we are neighbors. By some mixup, the power company is combining my electric bill to your own. You notice that your bill is unusually high, but you pay it anyway because you want electricity. In fact, you like electricity so much that you are happy to pay even the high bill to get continued power. Now, suppose that I knew all the details of the situation. Should I tell you about the error?

I think this case is pretty similar to the one you’ve described about the religion that makes you do good things. You pay my bill because you want a good for yourself. I am letting you incur a cost, that you may not want to, because it will benefit me.

I think in the electricity example I have some moral obligation to tell you our bills have been combined. I think this carries over to the religious example. There is a real benefit to me (and to society) to let you continue to labor under your false assumption that doing good deeds would result in magic rewards, but I still think it would be immoral to let this go on. I think the right thing to do would be to try and destroy your false belief with the truth and then try to convince you that altruism can be rewarding in and of itself. That way, you may still be an altruist, but you won’t be fooled into being one.

electricfistula 23 May 2012 22:36 UTC
5 points
in reply to: Jakinbandw’s comment on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)
Hi, I joined just to reply to this comment. I don’t think there is a lot of complexity hidden behind “whatever can be destroyed by truth should be”. If there is a false belief, we should try to replace it with a true one, or at least a less wrong one.

Your argument that goes “But what if you were being tortured to death” doesn’t really hold up because that argument can be used to reach any conclusion. What if you were experiencing perfect bliss, but then, your mind made up an elaborate fantasy which you believe to be your life… What if there were an evil and capricious deity who would torture you for eternity if you chose Frosted Flakes over Fruit Loops for breakfast? These kinds of “What if” statements followed by something of fundamentally unknowable probability are infinite in number and could be used to reach any conclusion you like and therefore, they don’t recomend any conclusion over any other conclusion. I don’t think it is more likely that I am being horribly tortured and fantasizing about writing this comment than I think it is likely that I am in perfect bliss and fantasizing about this, and so, this argument does nothing to recomend ignorance over knowledge.

In retrospect (say it turns out I am being tortured) I may be happier in ignorance, but I would be an inferior rationalist.

I think this applies to Christianity too. At the risk of being polemical, say I believed that Christianity is a scam whereby a select group of people convince the children of the faithful that they are in peril of eternal punishment if they don’t grow up to give 10% of their money to the church. Suppose I think that this is harmful to children and adults. Further, suppose I think the material claims of the religion are false. Now, you on the other hand suppose (I assume) that the material claims of the religion are true and that the children of the faithful are being improved by religious instruction.

Both of us can’t be right here. If we apply the saying “whatever can be destroyed by truth should be” then we should each try to rigorously expose our ideas to the truth. If one of our positions can be destroyed by the truth, it should be. This works no matter who is right (or if neither of us are right). If I am correct, then I destroy your idea, you stop believing in something false, stop assisting in the spread of false beliefs, stop contributing money to a scam, etc. If you are right then my belief will be destroyed, I can gain eternal salvation, stop trying to mislead people from the true faith, begin tithing etc.

In conclusion, I think the saying means exactly what it sounds like.