I read that statement as implying that argument A is equivalent to argument B. (Not (1) and (2), which are statements about arguments A and B)
And, if A implies B and B implies A, then it seems to me that A and B have to be equivalent to each other.
CCC
Karma: 1,814
Let me rephrase: does the double crux method contains any improvement that is not already covered by tabooing terms? Or simply saying “why do you think this is the case?”
In this particular argument, no. (In fact, if both participants are willing to examine their own chain of reasoning and consider that they might be wrong, then asking “why do you think this is the case?” sounds like a perfect first step in the double crux method to me)
In cases where the disagreement is due to (say) Bob making a mathematical error, tabooing terms is unlikely to reveal the error, while double crux seems likely to do so. So, as a general disagreement-solving technique, it seems powerful as it can be applied to a wide variety of causes of disagreement, even without knowing what the cause of the disagreement actually is.
If I’m understanding correctly, I think you’ve made a mistake in your formal logic above—you equated “If B, then A” with “If A, then B” which is not at all the same.
No, he only inferred “If A, then B” from “If not B, then not A” which is a valid inference.
That is true. In a disagreement where the root of the disagreement is applying different meanings to the word ‘better’, properly defining that term would identify the true disagreement straight away. The double crux method, by seeking equivalent statements for each position, brings that disagreement in terminology to light almost immediately (where a word-by-word process of definitions might well get mired down in the definition of ‘steel’ and whether or not it includes small amounts of chromium—which might be interesting and informative on its own, but does nothing to resolve the disagreement).
This appears to suggest that double crux, applied properly, will work in every case where the true disagreement is a matter is inconsistent definition of terms (as above). I’d go further, and say that the double crux method will also work in cases where the disagreement is due to one of the debaters having made an error in a mathematical equation that he believes supports his argument. So, when you don’t know the root cause of the argument, double crux is probably at least as fast a route to finding that cause as a careful definition of all terms, and probably faster.
“Aluminium is better than steel!” cries Alice.
“Steel is better than aluminium!” counters Bob. Both of them continue to stubbornly hold these opinions, even in the face of vehement denials from the other.
It is not at once clear how to resolve this issue. However, both Alice and Bob have recently read the above article, and attempt to apply it to their disagreement.
“Aluminium is better than steel because aluminium does not rust,” says Alice. “The statement ‘aluminium does not rust, but steel does’ is an equivalent argument to ‘aluminium is better than steel’”.
“Steel is better than aluminium because steel is stronger than aluminium,” counters Bob. “Steel can hold more weight than aluminium without bending, which makes it a superior metal.”
“So the crux of our argument,” concludes Alice, “is really that we are disagreeing on what it is that makes a metal better; I am placing more importance on rustproofing, while you are showing a preference for strength?”
This set of strategies looks familiar. I’ve never called it double crux or anything like that, but I’ve used a similar line in internet arguments before.
Taking a statement that disagrees with me; assuming my opponent is sane and has reasons to insist that that statement is true; interrogating (politely) to try to find those reasons (and answering any similar interrogations if offered); trying to find common ground where possible, and work from there to the point of disagreement; eventually either come to agreement or find reasons why we do not agree that do not further dissolve.
I’ve found it works nicely, though it really helps to be polite at all points as well. Politeness is very, very important when using the weak version, and still very important while using the strong version—it reduces emotional arguments and makes it more likely that your debate partner will continue to debate with you (as opposed to shout at you, or go away and leave the question unresolved).
First get straight: good literally objectively does mean desirable.
It does not.
Wiktionary states that it means “Acting in the interest of good; ethical.” (There are a few other definitions, but I’m pretty sure this is the right one here). Looking through the definitions of ‘ethical’, I find “Morally approvable, when referring to an action that affects others; good. ” ‘Morally’ is defined as “In keeping of requirements of morality.”, and ‘morality’ is “Recognition of the distinction between good and evil or between right and wrong; respect for and obedience to the rules of right conduct; the mental disposition or characteristic of behaving in a manner intended to produce morally good results. ”
Nowhere in there do I see anything about “desirable”—it seems to simplify down to “following a moral code”. I therefore suspect that you’re implicitly assuming a moral code which equates “desirable” with “good”—I don’t think that this is the best choice of a moral code, but it is a moral code that I’ve seen arguments in favour of before.
But, importantly, it’s not the only moral code. Someone who follows a different moral code can easily find something that is good but not desirable; or desirable but not good.
Which individual? The might be some decision theory which promotes the interests of Joe Soap, against the interests of society, but there is no way i would call it morality.
Ah, I may have been unclear there.
To go into more detail, then; you appear to be suggesting that optimal morality can be approached as a society-wide optimisation problem; in the current situations, these moral strictures produce a more optimal society than those, and this optimisation problem can be solved with sufficient computational resources and information.
But now, let us consider an individual example. Let us say that I find a wallet full of money on the ground. There is no owner in sight. The optimal choice for the society as a whole is that I return the money to the original owner; the optimal choice for the individual making the decision is to keep the money and use it towards my aims, whatever those are. (I can be pretty sure that the man to whom I return the money will be putting it towards his aims, not mine, and if I’m sufficiently convinced that my aims are better for society than his then I can even rationalise this action).
By my current moral structures, I would have to return the money to its original owner. But I can easily see a superintelligent AI giving serious consideration to the possibility that it can do more good for the original owner with the money than the original owner could.
Its motivational system. We’re already assuming it’s motivated to make the deduction, we need to assume it’s motivated to implement.
This, right here, is the hard problem of Friendly AI. How do we make it motivated to implement? And, more importantly, how do we know that it is motivated to implement what we think it’s motivated to implement?
I am not bypassing the need for a goal driven AI to have appropriate goals, I am by passing the need for a detailed and accurate account of human ethics to be preprogrammed.
You’re suggesting that it can figure out the complicated day-to-day minutae and the difficult edge cases on its own, given a suitable algorithm for optimising morality.
My experience in software design suggests that that algorithm needs to be really, really good. And extremely thoroughly checked, from every possible angle, by a lot of people.
I’m not denying that such an algorithm potentially exists. I can just think of far, far too many ways for it to go very badly wrong.
I am not sayngn it necessarily does not. I am saying it does not necessarily.
...point taken. It may or may not share those values.
But then we must at least give serious consideration to the worst-case scenario.
So… what you’re suggesting, in short, is that a sufficiently intelligent AI can work out the set of morals which are most optimal in a given human society. (There’s the question of whether it would converge on the most optimal set of morals for the long-term benefit of the society as a whole, or the most optimal set of morals for the long-term benefit of the individual).
But let’s say the AI works out an optimal set of morals for its current society. What’s to stop the AI from metaphorically shrugging and ignoring those morals in order to rather build more paperclips? Especially given that it does not share those values.
Then again—there are Catholic moralists, including, I think, some Catholics I know personally, who firmly believe that (for example) stealing is wrong because stealing is wrong. Not for any other reason.
This sounds like deontological ethics. It’s not by any means unique to Catholicism; it’s just the general idea that being good involves following a (presumably carefully chosen) list of rules.
Not all Catholics are deontologists; not all deontologists are Catholic. And, I may be misreading here, but I think your worry is more about deontology than Catholicism; that is, it’s more about people who follow a list of rules instead of trying consequentialism or virtue ethics or something else along those lines. Is this accurate?
Atheists don’t hold that religions are mostly wrong. They hold that religious believers depend on untestable hypotheses and shield their beliefs from criticisms instead of engaging them.
I have come across atheists who hold—sometimes quite loudly—that all religions are completely wrong.
I have no doubt that some think as you describe, but most certainly not all.
Hi, Trent!
I’d love to be one of the first people on Mars. Not sure how realistic that goal is or what steps I should even take to make it happen beyond saving $500,000 for a supposed SpaceX ticket and mastering a useful skill (coding!), but it’s something to shoot for!
Have you heard of the Mars One project?
The way I see it is that evolution isn’t selecting for the genes that produce the most children.
Evolution is selecting for the genes that produce the most grandchildren.
Hmmm. I had to go back and re-read the story.
...I notice that, while they were not ignorant that they were causing pain and emotional distress, they did honestly believe that they were doing the best thing and, indeed, even made a genuine attempt to persuade humanity, from first principles, that this was the right and good thing to do.
So they were doing, at all times, the action which they believed to by most moral, and were apparently willing to at least hear out contrary arguments. I still maintain, therefore, that their actions were immoral but they themselves were not; they made a genuine attempt to be moral to the best of their ability.
What they did was clearly wrong… but, at the same time, they did not know it, and that has relevance.
Consider; you are given a device with a single button. You push the button and a hamburger appears. This is repeatable; every time you push the button, a hamburger appears. To the best of your knowledge, this is the only effect of pushing the button. Pushing the button therefore does not make you an immoral person; pushing the button several times to produce enough hamburgers to feed the hungry would, in fact, be the action of a moral person.
The above paragraph holds even if the device also causes lightning to strike a different person in China every time you press the button. (Although, in this case, creating the device was presumably an immoral act).
So, back to the babyeaters; some of their actions were immoral, but they themselves were not immoral, due to their ignorance.
“Morals” and “goals” are very different things. I might make it a goal to (say) steal an apple from a shop; this would be an example of an immoral goal. Or I might make a goal to (say) give some money to charity; this would be a moral goal. Or I might make a goal to buy a book; this would (usually) be a goal with little if any moral weight one way or another.
Morality cannot be the same as terminal goals, because a terminal goal can also be immoral, and someone can pursue a terminal goal while knowing it’s immoral.
AI morals are not a category error; if an AI deliberately kills someone, then that carries the same moral weight as if a person deliberately kills someone.
Observe the contents of RAM as it’s changing?
I’m not 100% sure of the mechanism of said observations, but I’m assuming a real AI would be able to do things on a computer that we can’t—much as we can easily recognise an object in an image.
(Wow, this was from a while back)
I wasn’t suggesting that the AI might try to calculate the reverse sequence of moves. I was suggesting that, if the cube-shuffling program is running on the same computer, then the AI might learn to cheat by, in effect, looking over the shoulder of the cube-shuffler and simply writing down all the moves in a list; then it can ‘solve’ the cube by simply running the list backwards.
(Apologies—accidentally double posted)
A: “Uniforms are good”
B: “Uniforms reduce bullying”
B->A: “If uniforms reduce bullying, then uniforms are good.”
~B->~A : “If uniforms do not reduce bullying, then uniforms are not good.”
“A is equivalent to B”: “The statement ‘uniforms are good’ is exactly as true as the statement ‘uniforms reduce bullying’.”
A->B: “If uniforms are good, then it is possible to deduce that uniforms reduce bullying.”
...does that help?