Hmmmm. Depends how ingrained the memes are in the material. Oh, you’d certainly have awareness of the memes—but accepting them is a different story, and a certain skepticism in a student (or in a professor) can probably blunt that effect quite a bit.
Even if the memes are that thoroughly integrated, though, the only effect is to make the establishment of a parallel infrastructure that much more appropriate a solution.
I think missionaries are usually sent to particular places by organizations, and when one leaves another goes.
It’s not going to be perfect. Sometimes there will be more missionaries than established places to send them, and new missions can be opened—but sometimes a missionary will, through mischance or malice, die before he’s expected to do so and there will be no replacement ready to send.
I don’t actually know about specific incidences, but there should be enough data on what happens when a mission is abandoned to be able to tell how successful it can be.
You’re welcome to be (having had the facts pointed out to you) as surprised or unsurprised as you please; I remark that much the simplest explanation would seem to be that Christianity mostly spreads by military conquest.
That is a simple explanation, yes. Another simple explanation is that Christianity mostly spreads where language barriers don’t get in the way.
I don’t see either of these two explanations as being significantly simpler than the other.
… Oh, I thought of another way for Christianity to get into a new area that’s consistent with the “converting people is really ineffective” narrative. Again, no one claims that converting people is 100% ineffective. So, what you do is to find a place whose rulers are very much in control of the population, and send your missionaries to the royal court or whatever. They probably won’t convince the ruler, but if they do then bingo, you’ve got thousands or millions of new converts fairly immediately. I think this has happened once or twice. I bet it’s been attempted a lot more.
Hmmmm. That would be a sensible scenario. There have also been cases where non-Christian rulers, perhaps fearing the political power of the church, made practice of the religion illegal, with severe punishments for doing so. Taking the two together, it seems fairly clear that converting the ruler would be a very important step for many successful missionaries.
Huh.
Okay. In this particular real-life example, though, it is clear that the politicisation is in the infrastructure around the science, not in the science itself. That is to say, learning climate science is not memetically dangerous—it is simply difficult to get a paper published that does not agree with certain politics. And that is bad, but it is not the worst possibility—it means that someone merely studying climate science is safe in so doing.
So, in this particular case, the solution of studying climate science oneself, becoming an expert, and then forming a suitable opinion is a viable strategy (albeit one that takes some significant time).
(An alternative solution—which will also be a hard thing to do—is to create some form of parallel infrastructure for climate science; another magazine in which to publish, another source of funding, and so on. There will likely be serious attempts to politicise this infrastructure as well, of course, and fending off such attempts will doubtless take some effort).
But “amateurs should defer to experts”, in reference to Christianity, doesn’t mean “amateurs should accept the experts’ word about Christianity,” it means “amateurs should accept the claims presented by Christianity”. There’s nothing comparable for Shakespeare. In this sense, neither experts nor schools teach Shakespeare at all.
Um.
Going back to the comment that started this all—over here—shows that the quote originally comes from this page, which is an essay written from the atheist perspective on how to go about arguing the historicity of Jesus. The ‘experts’ in question appear (to me) to be not theologists but historians, seeking whether or not a given person, referenced in certain historical documents, actually lived at one point or not, and the author bluntly states that he expects the odds of said existence, using his best estimate of requisite probabilities, to be about one in twelve thousand. (He then goes on to say that this is far from the least likely claim in the Christian faith; supernatural miracles are far more unlikely, and thus far better things to call into question).
So, no, the original context does not say that amateurs should accept the claims made by Christianity (and it does not define professionals by their religious leanings). It says that amateurs should not take a firm position on a question where the experts do not take that firm position. (It does not say that the amateurs have to agree with the experts when those experts do take a firm position, amateurs are allowed to remain uncertain).
Schools still teach Latin?
...mine didn’t. (It did teach Shakespeare, though).
If all experts are infected with meme plagues, and are able to prevent alternative views from being presented, then you have a problem. This implies that one of the following is true:
Studying the subject at all carries a strong risk of meme plague infection
Only those pre-infected with the meme plague have the interest and/or the ability to study the subject
You’re wrong about something—either the presence of the meme plague or its spread or… something.
You could attempt to study the subject to expert level yourself, taking appropriate anti-meme-plague precautions; but you have to be very careful that you’re not shutting your ears to something that’s really true (you don’t want to become a climate-change-denying weather expert, after all) so you’ll need to seriously consider all necessary data (maybe re-run some vital experiments). This would take significant time and effort.
I don’t know what other strategy could reasonably be followed...
I don’t think you need a careful effort to track their exact effectiveness. It would be fairly obvious in a couple of generations that peaceful missionaries would fall in one of two categories—either they have some success (as evidenced by some number of converts that they win over) or they have no success (as evidenced by every missionary outreach pretty much collapsing as soon as the missionary either leaves or dies).
A careful effort to track effectiveness could tell the difference between slight success and strong success, but I think that even with a merely cursory checkup people could tell the difference between some success and no success at all.
If you look at the places where there are a lot of Christians, they do seem to match up pretty well with (1) where the Roman Empire was plus (2) places colonized by countries that used to be part of the Roman Empire.
I’m not surprised. There are many possible explanations for this; a sufficient explanation might be that these are places that early (Latin-speaking) missionaries could be reasonably sure of finding Latin-speaking people, and thus were not required to face the additional hurdle of learning a new language first.
One obvious counterexample is Korea, which (I think) is evidence that missionaries can sometimes introduce Christianity to a new place with long-term success. But what others are there?
Hmmm… would Japan count?
(Incidentally, I think your analysis is incomplete. Another way to introduce Christianity to a new area would be immigration. I don’t know to what extent this has actually happened.)
That is true. I don’t know to what extent that has happened either, but I imagine it would be accompanied (if successful) by a very strong spread of the immigrant’s culture in other ways, as well. (Such as language).
A brief Google points me at this fellow. He was a medieval Fransiscan missionary to China, and established what appears to have been a reasonably successful church there that stayed around for about forty years after his death (until the Ming Dynasty arose in 1369 and expelled them from the country).
I’m pretty sure that the main modern transmission vector for Newtonian physics is schoolteacher-to-child (which is very similar to parent-to-child, except that the parent hires an intermediary). Mind you, I don’t have any stats or data handy to back that up, it’s just a general impression.
No, it just has to get big enough that Christians have enough other Christians around that the social structure becomes self-sustaining. Social ostracism is used to get rid of spontaneously appearing non-Christian individuals, not large groups.
Fair enough. A neighbourhood or other small community can be self-sustaining, then.
But it still needs to be started.
So don’t assume it’s an exhaustive list.
As soon as I don’t assume it’s an exhaustive list, your point collapses. Yes, it does spread as a meme system, This is because it is a meme system.
Newtonian physics is also a meme system. And Newtonian physics can also spread as a meme system, in all three of the ways you describe. (I don’t think anyone ever has tried to spread Newtonian physics by the sword, but it could be done in theory; but Newtonian physics has most certainly been spread by parent-to-child transmission and by social ostracisation).
Similarly for relativistic physics. Or, for that matter, any other descriptive model of the universe, including ones that are perfectly accurate and 100% true. Because any descriptive model of the universe is a meme system, and can therefore be spread as a meme system.
Your conclusion, in short, relies on the idea that Christianity is only spread by means that are not dependant on the truth of its ideas, and never spread by means that are dependant on the truth of those ideas. This you have not shown.
We know how religion spreads.
I’m not sure that you do.
From your previous post:
The predominant ways in which Christianity has spread are conversion by the sword, parent to child transmission, and social ostracism for people who refuse to believe it.
If this were true—and if it were an exhaustive list of the predominant ways—then I would expect to see the following:
Parent-to-child transmission only works if the parents are Christian. Social ostracisation only works if a majority of a given person’s possible social acquaintances are.
Thus, the only means on the list of introducing is into a new area is by the sword
Thus, I would expect missionaries to either have been abandoned, or to be given a sword as standard equipment on setting out. I do not see this.
Furthermore, I would expect to see, in countries where it is not a majority religion, it would slowly fade and die (as social ostracism is used against it by the majority)
Now, I am not saying that it is never spread by such means. (Fortunately, ‘by the sword’ appears to have been largely abandoned in recent history). But assuming it to be an exhaustive list does not appear to match reality—there seems to be a rather large gap where a single missionary, armed with nothing more than information and presumably a fairly persuasive tongue, can go into a large enough group of humans who have little or no previous knowledge of religion and end up persuading a number of them to join.
Hmmm. Could work. Or perhaps the first thing he’d conclude is that you are infected by the meme plague, and the second thing he’d do is suspect that you are trying to infect him with the meme plague.
He could respond to this in two ways; either by ending the debate, in the hope of immunising himself; or by arguing against you, in the hopes of curing you.
...huh. Actually, thinking about this, a lot of bad debate habits (ignoring the other person’s evidence, refusing to change your mind, etc.) actually make a lot of sense when seen as protective measures specifically to prevent infection by meme plagues.
Then I may have misunderstood the intention of the phrase.
As an observation about the limits of the maxim, I agree with it. And no, I’m not going to argue that a memetic plague never happens.
I am, however, going to argue that a memetic plague is hard to identify, making this observation very difficult to actually apply with any reliability. It’s just too easy—if I see a bunch of experts in the subject all saying something that I disagree with—for me to think “they’re infected by a memetic plague”. It’s so much more comforting to think that than to think “maybe I’m wrong”—especially when I already have some evidence that seems to say that I am right. So, while this observation can be applied correctly, it would be far, far too easy to misapply. And if I were to misapply it—I would have no idea that I am, in fact, misapplying it.
As a general observation, then, I cautiously agree. As a specific argument in virtually any debate, I deeply mistrust it.
I hope that makes my position clearer.
Also, distinguish between “anyone can claim X” and “anyone can correctly claim X”. Creationists could claim that evolution spreads the same way—but they’d be wrong.
Assume a climate change denier or a creationist who (a) makes such an argument and (b) firmly believes it to be correct. How would he be best convinced that he is, in fact, wrong?
Interestingly, after looking over Wikipedia a bit, apparently there may have been a Paul Bon Jean on whom the earliest Paul Bunyan tales could have been based… a big lumberjack, but with “big” being more like six to seven foot and less like sixty to seventy foot.
I think this fails in the case where the experts are infected by a meme plague.
Isn’t this a Fully General Counterargument, though? Climate change deniers can claim that climate experts are ‘infected by a meme plague’. Creationists can claim anyone who accepts evolution is ‘infected by a meme plague’. So on and so forth.
Hmmm. To mess around with equations a bit… what can we say about P(Bunyan | stories about Bunyan) and P(!Bunyan | stories about Bunyan), given P(stories about Bunyan | Bunyan) > P(stories about Bunyan | !Bunyan)?
Let’s genaralise it a bit (and reduce typing). What can we say about P(A|B) and P(!A|B) when P(B|A) > P(B|!A)?
Consider Bayes’ Theorem: P(A|B) = [(P(B|A)*P(A)]/P(B). Thus, P(B) = [(P(B|A)*P(A)]/P(A|B)
Therefore, P(!A|B) = [(P(B|!A)*P(!A)]/P(B)
Now, P(!A) = 1-P(A). So:
P(!A|B) = [(P(B|!A)*{1-P(A)}]/P(B)
Solve for P(B):
P(B) = [(P(B|!A)*{1-P(A)}]/P(!A|B)
Since P(B) = [(P(B|A)*P(A)]/P(A|B):
[(P(B|A)*P(A)]/P(A|B) = [(P(B|!A)*{1-P(A)}]/P(!A|B)
Since P(B|A) > P(B|!A)
[(P(B|A)*P(A)]/P(A|B) > [(P(B|!A)*P(A)]/P(A|B)
Therefore:
[(P(B|!A)*{1-P(A)}]/P(!A|B) > [(P(B|!A)*P(A)]/P(A|B)
Since probabilities cannot be negative:
[{1-P(A)}]/P(!A|B) > [P(A)]/P(A|B)
.[1-P(A)]*P(A|B) > [P(A)]*P(!A|B)
...which means that either (1-P(A)) > P(A) or P(A|B) > P(!A|B), and quite possibly both; and whichever of these two inequalities is false (if either) the ratio between the two sides is closer than the inequality that is true.
To return to the original example; either P(Bunyan | stories about Bunyan) > P(!Bunyan | stories about Bunyan) OR P(!Bunyan) > P(Bunyan).
Also, if P(Bunyan | stories about Bunyan) > P(!Bunyan | stories about Bunyan) is false, then it must be true that P(Bunyan|stories about Bunyan) > P(Bunyan).
In a pure-logic kind of way, finding B where B is exactly equivalent to A means nothing, yes. However, in a human-communication kind of way, it’s often useful to stop and rephrase your argument in different words. (You’ll recognise when this is helpful if your debate partner says something along the lines of “Wait, is that what you meant? I had it all wrong!”)
This has nothing to do with formal logic; it’s merely a means of reducing the probability that your axioms have been misunderstood (which is a distressingly common problem).
What I’ve yet to glean from your comments is how ‘absolute truth’ is any different than ‘green sound’. They’re both short phrases but neither seems to refer to anything.
It’s kind of a side point, but there actually is such a thing as green noise (there’s actually four different definitions...)
Hmmm. I don’t know enough history to be able to name specific situations, but what about the other way round—countries that learned Latin without being conquered? (Perhaps for ease of trading?)
I believe the Roman Empire once tried to suppress it as well. It doesn’t appear to have worked then, either.
Yes; there seem to have been specific instances where missionary conversion worked, and specific instances where it did not.
Those conclusions do not seem unreasonable to me.
I think it also depends somewhat on the structure of the religion in question. Judaism doesn’t have missionaries, for example, and I don’t think there’s any way for a non-Jew to become a Jew (I may be wrong on that point, but if there is, the Jews certainly don’t advertise it).