Good idea. Like, “My present utility function calls for my future utility function to be such and such”?
Amanojack
Karma: 406
I believe that there are some genetically hard-coded intuitions about how to approach and respond to other primates. Why would we want to wrap that into some confusing terminology like moral philosophy?
Why, to disguise it of course.
Great points! Was the final sentence intentional irony? :)
Edit to clarify: “And that’s okay” seems to slip back into objective morality (although of course it is hard to avoid such phrasing in English).
Sounds fairly close to what I think Jablonski is saying, yes.
Preference isn’t the best word choice. Ultimately it comes down to realizing that I want different things at different times, but in English future wanting is sometimes hard to distinguish from present wanting, which can easily result in a subtle equivocation. This semantic slippage is injecting confusion into the discussion.
Perhaps we have all had the experience of thinking something like, “When 11pm rolls around, I want to want to go to sleep.” And it makes sense to ask, “How can I make it so that I want to go to sleep when 11pm rolls around?” Sure, I presently want to go to sleep early tonight, but will I want to then? How can I make sure I will want to? Such questions of pure personal long-term utility seem to exemplify Jablonksi’s definition of morality.
Yet people seem to get a tremendous emotional kick out of not knowing something.
This emotional kick in response to mystical answers could be an adaptation to help people go along with the religious beliefs of the tribe. But don’t you get any kind of emotional kick from this:
Imagine a graph that shows both space and time, so that a straight line shows steady movement and a curved line shows acceleration. Then curve the graph paper itself.
Wow! Curve the graph paper itself, how fascinating! All that’s happened is the mysticism has been better hidden. Now we are to believe it is possible (or even meaningful) to bend nothing (empty space), that is, to bend a concept. :)
ETA: I knew this would be downvoted as it seems to disagree with what is regarded as established science, but can anyone articulate why this is wrong?
“This-moment preferences” are synonymous with “behavior,” or more precisely, “(attempted/wished-for) action.” In other words, in this moment, my current preferences = what I am currently striving for.
Jablonski seems to be using “morality” to mean something more like the general preferences that one exhibits on a recurring basis, not this-moment preferences. And this is a recurring theme: that morality is questions like, “What general preferences should I cultivate?” (to get more enjoyment out of life)
If the people arguing that morality is just preference answer: “Do what you prefer”, my next question is “What should I prefer?”
In order to accomplish what?
Should you prefer chocolate ice cream or vanilla? As far as ice cream flavors go, “What should I prefer” seems meaningless...unless you are looking for an answer like, “It’s better to cultivate a preference for vanilla because it is slightly healthier” (you will thereby achieve better health than if you let yourself keep on preferring chocolate).
This gets into the time structure of experience. In other words, I would be interpreting your, “What should I prefer?” as, “What things should I learn to like (in order to get more enjoyment out of life)?” To bring it to a more traditionally moral issue, “Should I learn to like a vegetarian diet (in order to feel less guilt about killing animals)?”
Is that more or less the kind of question you want to answer?
Define your terms, then you get a fair hearing. If you are just saying the terms could maybe someday be defined, this really isn’t the kind of thing that needs a response.
To put it in perspective, you are speculating that someday you will be able to define what the field you are talking about even is. And your best defense is that some people have made questionable arguments against this non-theory? Why should anyone care?
Ugg in 65,000 BC: Why water fire no mix? Why rock so hard? Why tree have shadow?
Eugine in 2011: What is the True Theory of Something-or-Other?
Your criticisms of “truth” are not so far off, but you’re essentially saying that parts of science are wrong so you can be wrong, too. No actually, you think it is OK to flounder around in the field when you’re just starting out. Sure, but not when you don’t even know what it is you’re supposed to be studying—if anything! This is not analogous to physics, where the general goal was clear from the very beginning: figure out what physical mechanisms underly macro-scale phenomena, such as the hardness of metal, conductivity, magnetic attraction, gravity, etc.
You’re just running around to whatever you can grab onto to avoid the main point that there is nothing close to a semblance of delineation of what this “field” is actually about, and it is getting tiresome.
That is sort of half true, but it feels like you’re just saying that to say it, as there have been criticisms of this same line of reasoning that you haven’t answered.
How about the fact that beliefs about physics actually pay rent? Do moral ones?
Example? I prefer not to stay up late, but here I am doing it. It’s not that I’m acting against my preferences, because my current preference is to continue typing this sentence. It’s simply that English doesn’t differentiate very well between “current preferences”= “my preferences right this moment” and “current preferences”= “preferences I have generally these days.”
Seinfeld said it best.
Though Bongo is surely right there would be moral sentiments even without language, now we are dealing with something identified: specific emotions like empathy, sense of justice, disgust, indignation, pity. Yeah those would exist without language. And yes, language has made things much more complicated, and the preoccupation with analyzing sentences makes it even even worse.
If people can realize all that without looking at the very nature of communication, that would be great, but in my experience most people feel hesitant about scrapping so many centuries of philosophy and need to see how the language makes such a mess of things before they can truly feel comfortable with it. If Bongo is ready to scrap language analysis now and drop all the silly -isms, I’m preaching to the choir.
Ethics is unique, at least to me, in that I still have no idea what the heck people are even referring to most of the time when they use moralistic language. I can’t investigate X until I know what X is even supposed to be about. Most of the time there is a fundamental failure to communicate, even regarding the definition of the field itself. And whenever there isn’t such a failure, the problem disappears and all discussants agree as if nothing.
I don’t think you can explicate such a connection, especially not without any terms defined. In fact, it is just utterly pointless to try to develop a theory in a field that hasn’t even been defined in a coherent way. It’s not like it’s close to being defined, either.
For example, “Is abortion morally wrong?” combines about 12 possible questions into it because it has a least that many interpretations. Choose one, then we can study that. I just can’t see how otherwise rationality-oriented people can put up with such extreme vagueness. There is almost zero actual communication happening in this thread in the sense of actually expressing which interpretation of moral language anyone is taking. And once that starts happening it will cover way too many topics to ever reach a resolution. We’re simply going to have to stop compressing all these disparate-but-subtly-related concepts into a single field, taboo all the moralist language, and hug some queries (if any important ones actually remain).
Well I agree with this basically, and it reminds me of John Hasnas writing about customary legal systems. I find that when showing this to people I disagree with about ethics we usually end up in agreement:
In the absence of civil government, most people engage in productive activity in peaceful cooperation with their fellows. Some do not. A minority engages in predation, attempting to use violence to expropriate the labor or output of others. The existence of this predatory element renders insecure the persons and possessions of those engaged in production. Further, even among the productive portion of the population, disputes arise concerning broken agreements, questions of rightful possession, and actions that inadvertently result in personal injuries for which there is no antecedently established mechanism for resolution. In the state of nature, interpersonal conflicts that can lead to violence often arise.
What happens when they do? The existence of the predatory minority causes those engaged in productive activities to band together to institute measures for their collective security. Various methods of providing for mutual protection and for apprehending or discouraging aggressors are tried. Methods that do not provide adequate levels of security or that prove too costly are abandoned. More successful methods continue to be used. Eventually, methods that effectively discourage aggression while simultaneously minimizing the amount of retaliatory violence necessary to do so become institutionalized. Simultaneously, nonviolent alternatives for resolving interpersonal disputes among the productive members of the community are sought. Various methods are tried. Those that leave the parties unsatisfied and likely to resort again to violence are abandoned. Those that effectively resolve the disputes with the least disturbance to the peace of the community continue to be used and are accompanied by ever-increasing social pressure for disputants to employ them.
Over time, security arrangements and dispute settlement procedures that are well-enough adapted to social and material circumstances to reduce violence to generally acceptable levels become regularized. Members of the community learn what level of participation in or support for the security arrangements is required of them for the system to work and for them to receive its benefits. By rendering that level of participation or support, they come to feel entitled to the level of security the arrangements provide. After a time, they may come to speak in terms of their right to the protection of their persons and possessions against the type of depredation the security arrangements discourage, and eventually even of their rights to personal integrity and property. In addition, as the dispute settlement procedures resolve recurring forms of conflict in similar ways over time, knowledge of these resolutions becomes widely diffused and members of the community come to expect similar conflicts to be resolved in like manner. Accordingly, they alter their behavior toward other members of the community to conform to these expectations. In doing so, people begin to act in accordance with rules that identify when they must act in the interests of others (e.g., they may be required to use care to prevent their livestock from damaging their neighbors’ possessions) and when they may act exclusively in their own interests (e.g., they may be free to totally exclude their neighbors from using their possessions). To the extent that these incipient rules entitle individuals to act entirely in their own interests, individuals may come to speak in terms of their right to do so (e.g., of their right to the quiet enjoyment of their property).
In short, the inconveniences of the state of nature represent problems that human beings must overcome to lead happy and meaningful lives. In the absence of an established civil government to resolve these problems for them, human beings must do so for themselves. They do this not through coordinated collective action, but through a process of trial and error in which the members of the community address these problems in any number of ways, unsuccessful attempts to resolve them are discarded, and successful ones are repeated, copied by others, and eventually become widespread practices. As the members of the community conform their behavior to these practices, they begin to behave according to rules that specify the extent of their obligations to others, and, by implication, the extent to which they are free to act at their pleasure. Over time, these rules become invested with normative significance and the members of the community come to regard the ways in which the rules permit them to act at their pleasure as their rights. Thus, in the state of nature, rights evolve out of human beings’ efforts to address the inconveniences of that state. In the state of nature, rights are solved problems.
Fair enough, though I suspect that by asking for a “reductionist” description NMJablonski may have just been hoping for some kind of unambiguous wording.
It’s not an argument by reductionism...it’s simply trying to figure out how to interpret the words people are using—because it’s really not obvious. It only looks like reductionism because someone asks, “What is morality?” and the answer comes: “Right and wrong,” then “What should be done,” then “What is admirable”… It is all moralistic language that, if any of it means anything, it all means the same thing.
You’re aware that words have more than one definition, and in debates it is customary to define key terms before beginning? Perhaps I could interest you in this.
Including my viewing of the report itself? That would be silly. Later Eliezer says that the fact that it is a good idea to trust in science is “pragmatically true,” but probably better to say it’s a good rule of thumb. I agree with the spirit of the post, but it goes so far into the hyperbolic that it undermines some other aspects of rationality:
Science cannot prove a nonsensical claim. If I believe I read that as a proved result in an authoritative scientific paper, the probability that there was a miscommunication somewhere eclipses everything else. What about the claim “A and not-A”?