In the talk, rationality is positioned as something that decides which of System 1 or System 2 should be used in a particular situation. But that’s straw System 2! What’s actually happening is that your System 2 is smart enough to get input from System 1 and update on it appropriately (or conversely, as in taking ideas seriously on an intuitive level).
Great point, in many cases, such as when you’re trying to decide what school to go to, and you make the decision deliberatively but taking into account the data from your intuitive reactions to the schools.
But in other cases, such as chess-playing, aren’t you mainly just deciding based on your System 1 judgments? (Admittedly I’m no chess player; that’s just my impression of how it works.)
I agree you need to use System 2 for your meta-judgment about which system to use in a particular context, but once you’ve made that meta-judgment, I think there are some cases in which you make the actual judgment based on System 1.
To the moderate theist who says he or she believes some things based on science/rationality/reason/etc. and some based on faith, I reply that the algorithm that sorts claims between categories is responsible for all evaluations. This means that when he or she only selects reasonable religious claims to be subject to reason, reason is responsible for none of the conclusions, and faith is responsible for all of them.
In the same way, apparently pure System 1 judgments are best thought of as a special case of System 2 judgments so long as System 2 decided how to make them.
I think implicit in almost any decision to use System 1 judgments is that if System 2 sees an explicit failure of them, one will not execute the System 1 judgment.
In the talk, rationality is positioned as something that decides which of System 1 or System 2 should be used in a particular situation. But that’s straw System 2! What’s actually happening is that your System 2 is smart enough to get input from System 1 and update on it appropriately (or conversely, as in taking ideas seriously on an intuitive level).
Great point, in many cases, such as when you’re trying to decide what school to go to, and you make the decision deliberatively but taking into account the data from your intuitive reactions to the schools.
But in other cases, such as chess-playing, aren’t you mainly just deciding based on your System 1 judgments? (Admittedly I’m no chess player; that’s just my impression of how it works.)
I agree you need to use System 2 for your meta-judgment about which system to use in a particular context, but once you’ve made that meta-judgment, I think there are some cases in which you make the actual judgment based on System 1.
Am I correctly understanding your point?
To the moderate theist who says he or she believes some things based on science/rationality/reason/etc. and some based on faith, I reply that the algorithm that sorts claims between categories is responsible for all evaluations. This means that when he or she only selects reasonable religious claims to be subject to reason, reason is responsible for none of the conclusions, and faith is responsible for all of them.
In the same way, apparently pure System 1 judgments are best thought of as a special case of System 2 judgments so long as System 2 decided how to make them.
I think implicit in almost any decision to use System 1 judgments is that if System 2 sees an explicit failure of them, one will not execute the System 1 judgment.