Yeah, I gave a version of IIA in a previous comment, and I think it’s a pretty faithful translation of Arrow’s IIA to my formalism. Do you think some other translation would be better?
I think your “tweaking” is too restrictive. Your version forces the allocations to A and B to be unchanged, whereas I think a more accurate translation would be that the ordering doesn’t change (or perhaps that the new allocations to A and B are in the same proportion as the old allocations). Those translations produce versions which are broken by your proposed voting system.
ETA: I think we (or at least I) am at risk of falling into the trap of arguing over definitions. Any way of defining IIA needs to be accompanied by a reason why anyone should care about that definition. So, a rough explanation of my position:
The reason we care about Arrow’s Theorem is that it basically says “any voting system will have some undesirable properties”
The reason IIA is desirable is that it’s a formalisation of the notion that candidates who don’t win can’t act as “spoilers” that change which candidate does win.
I suspect that by using your probability scheme, even if you can get around the specific definitions of undesirable properties that Arrow used, any voting system based on it will still have analogous bad properties.
In particular, the voting system you propose, third(or more)-party candidates can act as spoilers.
ETA2: Add formatting, and note that my first ETA would likely have been a bit different had I seen your reply first.
On rereading, you’re right that my translation was overly strict, and it’s obvious that the more lenient translations immediately fail. Thanks.
I googled some more and found a very nice discussion of this topic here on LW: Arrow’s Theorem is a Lie. Tommccabe’s idea, a reinvention of range voting, is better than mine by pretty much all criteria.
ETA: the rationale for Arrow’s IIA still seems different from what you say, because it doesn’t allow changing the set of candidates. I’m not sure how to express the rationale for Arrow’s IIA so it carries over to other settings.
Thanks for the links, I hadn’t come across range voting before.
Like pretty much every voting system ever, it still allows for tactical voting (You naturally give your preferred candidate the highest possible score, but the optimal scores to give for the other depends on how other people are voting). It makes me wonder if that’s a thing that voting systems can’t get rid of (well, apart from degenerate things like the “dictator” voting scheme).
How about a system that picks a voter at random and uses their choice? This way there’s no incentive for tactical voting. But it still violates your strengthened version of IIA because a candidate can steal votes from another.
Yeah, I gave a version of IIA in a previous comment, and I think it’s a pretty faithful translation of Arrow’s IIA to my formalism. Do you think some other translation would be better?
I think your “tweaking” is too restrictive. Your version forces the allocations to A and B to be unchanged, whereas I think a more accurate translation would be that the ordering doesn’t change (or perhaps that the new allocations to A and B are in the same proportion as the old allocations). Those translations produce versions which are broken by your proposed voting system.
ETA: I think we (or at least I) am at risk of falling into the trap of arguing over definitions. Any way of defining IIA needs to be accompanied by a reason why anyone should care about that definition. So, a rough explanation of my position:
The reason we care about Arrow’s Theorem is that it basically says “any voting system will have some undesirable properties”
The reason IIA is desirable is that it’s a formalisation of the notion that candidates who don’t win can’t act as “spoilers” that change which candidate does win.
I suspect that by using your probability scheme, even if you can get around the specific definitions of undesirable properties that Arrow used, any voting system based on it will still have analogous bad properties.
In particular, the voting system you propose, third(or more)-party candidates can act as spoilers.
ETA2: Add formatting, and note that my first ETA would likely have been a bit different had I seen your reply first.
On rereading, you’re right that my translation was overly strict, and it’s obvious that the more lenient translations immediately fail. Thanks.
I googled some more and found a very nice discussion of this topic here on LW: Arrow’s Theorem is a Lie. Tommccabe’s idea, a reinvention of range voting, is better than mine by pretty much all criteria.
ETA: the rationale for Arrow’s IIA still seems different from what you say, because it doesn’t allow changing the set of candidates. I’m not sure how to express the rationale for Arrow’s IIA so it carries over to other settings.
Thanks for the links, I hadn’t come across range voting before.
Like pretty much every voting system ever, it still allows for tactical voting (You naturally give your preferred candidate the highest possible score, but the optimal scores to give for the other depends on how other people are voting). It makes me wonder if that’s a thing that voting systems can’t get rid of (well, apart from degenerate things like the “dictator” voting scheme).
How about a system that picks a voter at random and uses their choice? This way there’s no incentive for tactical voting. But it still violates your strengthened version of IIA because a candidate can steal votes from another.