The problem is that once you know morality is in a sense man-made, it becomes tempting to remake it self-servingly.
as: ”...it becomes tempting to use some other M instead of morality.”
It expresses the same idea, without the confusion about whether morality can be redefined arbitrarily. (Yes, anything can be redefined arbitrarily. It just stops being the original thing.)
“some other M” will still count as morality for many purposes, because self-serving ideas (“be loyal to the Geniralissimo”, “obey your husband”) are transmitted thorugh the same memetic channels are genuine morality. Morality is already blurred with disgust reactions and tribal shibboleths.
That’s not sufficient—there can be wildly different, incompatible universalizable morality systems based on different premises and axioms; and each could reasonably claim to be that they are a true morality and the other is a tribal shibboleth.
As an example (but there are others), many of the major religious traditions would definitely claim to be universalizable systems of morality; and they are contradicting each other on some points.
Maybe. But in context it is onlhy necessary, since in context the point is to separate out the non-etchial cclams which have been piggybacked onto ethics.
there can be wildly different, incompatible universalizable morality systems based on different premises and axioms;
That’s not obvious.
As an example (but there are others), many of the major religious traditions would definitely claim to be universalizable systems of morality; and they are contradicting each other on some points.
The points they most obviouslty contradict each other on tend to be the most symbolic ones, about diet and dress, etc.
OK, for a slightly clearer example, in the USA abortion debate, the pro-life “camp” definitely considers pro-life to be moral and wants to apply to everyone; and pro-choice “camp” definitely considers pro-choice to be moral and to apply to everyone.
This is not a symbolic point, it is a moral question that defines literally life-and-death decisions.
The points they most obviouslty contradict each other on tend to be the most symbolic ones, about diet and dress, etc.
I would dispute this. Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative is pretty clearly contradictory to some of the universalisable commandments given by versions of theistic morality.
“You shall not covet your neighbor’s house; you shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, or his male servant, or his female servant, or his ox, or his donkey, or anything that is your neighbor’s.”
“Observe the Sabbath day, to keep it holy, as the LORD your God commanded you. Six days you shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the LORD your God. On it you shall not do any work, you or your son or your daughter or your male servant or your female servant, or your ox or your donkey or any of your livestock, or the sojourner who is within your gates, that your male servant and your female servant may rest as well as you.”
Ermm...what’s the teaching that says covetousness is fine? Ayn Rand?
“Observe the Sabbath day
If that is taken to mean the Jewish Sabbath specifically, that is a shibboleth. If it is taken broadly to mean
“holdiays are good” ot “you need to take a break”, who disagrees?
Both these commandments talk about other people as means to ends, rather than only as ends, which is a violation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, as I mentioned in the great-grandfather. The bolded parts are the main offenders.
The first is surely advising against using people as ends.
That would be a very odd interpretation for the full content of the commandment. The universalized version would, roughly, read: “Never want to have someone else’s property, where property includes people.” Slaves are a fairly obvious violation of the CI.
I also don’t see how giving your servants a holiday is using them as ends.
Because you are using them (and also any family members or visitors) as a mean in order to show respect to or worship God. If God is the end, then anyone who you make rest on Sabbath in order to fulfill this commandment is being used purely as a means.
I would translate this:
as: ”...it becomes tempting to use some other M instead of morality.”
It expresses the same idea, without the confusion about whether morality can be redefined arbitrarily. (Yes, anything can be redefined arbitrarily. It just stops being the original thing.)
“some other M” will still count as morality for many purposes, because self-serving ideas (“be loyal to the Geniralissimo”, “obey your husband”) are transmitted thorugh the same memetic channels are genuine morality. Morality is already blurred with disgust reactions and tribal shibboleths.
What is the difference between “self-serving ideas” as you describe, “tribal shibboleths” and “true morality” ?
What if “Peterdjones-true-morality” is “PeterisP-tribal-shibboleth”, and “Peterdjones-tribal-shibboleth” is “PeterisP-true-morality” ?
universalizability
That’s not sufficient—there can be wildly different, incompatible universalizable morality systems based on different premises and axioms; and each could reasonably claim to be that they are a true morality and the other is a tribal shibboleth.
As an example (but there are others), many of the major religious traditions would definitely claim to be universalizable systems of morality; and they are contradicting each other on some points.
Maybe. But in context it is onlhy necessary, since in context the point is to separate out the non-etchial cclams which have been piggybacked onto ethics.
That’s not obvious.
The points they most obviouslty contradict each other on tend to be the most symbolic ones, about diet and dress, etc.
OK, for a slightly clearer example, in the USA abortion debate, the pro-life “camp” definitely considers pro-life to be moral and wants to apply to everyone; and pro-choice “camp” definitely considers pro-choice to be moral and to apply to everyone.
This is not a symbolic point, it is a moral question that defines literally life-and-death decisions.
I would dispute this. Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative is pretty clearly contradictory to some of the universalisable commandments given by versions of theistic morality.
Examples?
Ermm...what’s the teaching that says covetousness is fine? Ayn Rand?
If that is taken to mean the Jewish Sabbath specifically, that is a shibboleth. If it is taken broadly to mean “holdiays are good” ot “you need to take a break”, who disagrees?
Ah, no, I wasn’t being clear enough.
Both these commandments talk about other people as means to ends, rather than only as ends, which is a violation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, as I mentioned in the great-grandfather. The bolded parts are the main offenders.
The first is surely advising against using people as ends.
I also don’t see how giving your servants a holiday is using them as ends.
That would be a very odd interpretation for the full content of the commandment. The universalized version would, roughly, read: “Never want to have someone else’s property, where property includes people.” Slaves are a fairly obvious violation of the CI.
Because you are using them (and also any family members or visitors) as a mean in order to show respect to or worship God. If God is the end, then anyone who you make rest on Sabbath in order to fulfill this commandment is being used purely as a means.
Why? And, perhaps more importantly, how do you know that this is the case?
Very true, but I’m not sure why you posted this as a reply to that comment.
Theres motivation to redefine morality, and reason to think it stil is in some sense morality once it has been redefined. Neither is true of maths.
Oh, I see. So your comment basically said “True, but it’s easy to inadvertently treat this “other M” as morality.”