Hanson’s idea is that given that “A person’s decision will have an affect on the well being of N people” the prior probability that you, and not someone else, is the person who gets to make that decision is 1/N.
What is the crucial difference between being 1 distinct person, of N people making N distinct decisions, and being 1 of N distinct people? In other words, why would the ability to make a decision, that is inaccessible to other decision makers, penalize the prior probability of its realization more than any other feature of distinct world-state?
I will probably have to grasp anthropic reasoning first. I am just a bit confused that if only 1 of N people faces a certain choice it becomes 1/N times more unlikely to be factual.
I am just a bit confused that if only 1 of N people faces a certain choice it becomes 1/N times more unlikely to be factual.
That only 1 of N people face the choice doesn’t make it less likely that the choice exists, it makes less likely the conjunction of the choice existing, and that you are the one that makes the choice.
What is the crucial difference between being 1 distinct person, of N people making N distinct decisions, and being 1 of N distinct people? In other words, why would the ability to make a decision, that is inaccessible to other decision makers, penalize the prior probability of its realization more than any other feature of distinct world-state?
I will probably have to grasp anthropic reasoning first. I am just a bit confused that if only 1 of N people faces a certain choice it becomes 1/N times more unlikely to be factual.
That only 1 of N people face the choice doesn’t make it less likely that the choice exists, it makes less likely the conjunction of the choice existing, and that you are the one that makes the choice.
Each of the people in question could be claimed (by the mugger) to be making this exact same choice.