Okay, so would you say that the you of today goes on to experience the you-of-tomorrow’s experiences? I think the relationship is the same to a perfect duplicate. The duplicate is no less you than the you of tomorrow is. They are separate people from their perspective after duplication, but almost-the-same-person to a much greater degree than twins.
You (pre-duplication) will go on to have two separate sets of experiences. Both are you from your current perspective before duplication; you should give them equal consideration in your decisions, since the causal relationship is the same in both ways between you and the duplicate as to your self of tomorrow.
Consider the case where the duplicate is teleported to your location and vice versa during duplication. Then just location swapped while you’re asleep. And consider that you wouldn’t care a whit if every molecule of your body was Theseus-swapped one by one for identical molecules in identical locations and roles while you slept.
No; I, pre-duplication, exist in a single body, and will not post-duplication have my consciousness transferred over to run in two. There will just be an identical copy. If the original body dies, one of me will also die.
The causal relationship between me and myself tomorrow is not the same is the causal relationship between me and my duplicate tomorrow, because one of those is a physical object which has continuity over time and one of those is a similar physical object which was instantiated de novo in a different location when the teleporter was run.
The mind is not a program which runs on the meat computer of the brain and could in principle be transferred to a thumb drive if we worked out the format conversions; the mind is the meat of the brain.
Okay, so would you say that the you of today goes on to experience the you-of-tomorrow’s experiences? I think the relationship is the same to a perfect duplicate. The duplicate is no less you than the you of tomorrow is. They are separate people from their perspective after duplication, but almost-the-same-person to a much greater degree than twins.
You (pre-duplication) will go on to have two separate sets of experiences. Both are you from your current perspective before duplication; you should give them equal consideration in your decisions, since the causal relationship is the same in both ways between you and the duplicate as to your self of tomorrow.
Consider the case where the duplicate is teleported to your location and vice versa during duplication. Then just location swapped while you’re asleep. And consider that you wouldn’t care a whit if every molecule of your body was Theseus-swapped one by one for identical molecules in identical locations and roles while you slept.
No; I, pre-duplication, exist in a single body, and will not post-duplication have my consciousness transferred over to run in two. There will just be an identical copy. If the original body dies, one of me will also die.
The causal relationship between me and myself tomorrow is not the same is the causal relationship between me and my duplicate tomorrow, because one of those is a physical object which has continuity over time and one of those is a similar physical object which was instantiated de novo in a different location when the teleporter was run.
The mind is not a program which runs on the meat computer of the brain and could in principle be transferred to a thumb drive if we worked out the format conversions; the mind is the meat of the brain.