Taking a step back, we can ask: what physical mechanism makes it feel as though I’m persisting over time?
The actual physical organism which you are persists over time, and you are not a separate thing from the physical organism. This does not apply in the teleporter case, because in the teleporter case the relevant physical organism is disassembled atom-by-atom and a duplicate is assembled elsewhere. (The duplicate is, well, a duplicate; if it’s assembled on the other side without disassembling the initial person, there will then be two people. They will have identical traits and sets of memories up until the teleporter event, but that doesn’t make them physically contiguous.) I think this post relies on a dualist conception of minds wherein they can be separated from one physical object and attached to another, which I do not subscribe to. In my view, a mind is only a specific assemblage of matter; if that assemblage of matter is gone, so is that mind.
The actual physical organism which you are persists over time, and you are not a separate thing from the physical organism. This does not apply in the teleporter case, because in the teleporter case the relevant physical organism is disassembled atom-by-atom and a duplicate is assembled elsewhere. (The duplicate is, well, a duplicate; if it’s assembled on the other side without disassembling the initial person, there will then be two people. They will have identical traits and sets of memories up until the teleporter event, but that doesn’t make them physically contiguous.) I think this post relies on a dualist conception of minds wherein they can be separated from one physical object and attached to another, which I do not subscribe to. In my view, a mind is only a specific assemblage of matter; if that assemblage of matter is gone, so is that mind.