Are you arguing that humans should not try to live as long as possible, because if we were meant to, then Evolution would have made us so?
Sounds a lot like: “if God had meant us to fly, he would have given us wings.” What possible relevance does evolutionary pressure for innate drives have when considering whether we want to pursue a goal? Very weak evidence that we may be confused in our desire, and it won’t ultimately bring us happiness? Counterexample: repeated sex without reproduction, with the same woman, makes me happy.
My comment was an explanation for why so few are interested in cryonics.
Most humans are just not built to be interested in living for a long time. Such humans are not losing “the game” of living for as long as possible. They were not playing that game in the first place!
People aren’t interested in cryonics because it seems unreliable/speculative, it pattern matches as a religion or scam, and its advocates are too few and too low status. I don’t expect any evolutionary inclination to be at play except the desire to survive, which we certainly should expect to have evolved.
Those are very strange expectations in my book. Most people are much more interested in things like relationships, family, loved ones, sex, fertility, status, weath—and heath and fitness—than they are in living for a long time. That is just what evolution 101 would predict.
Yet we have had people here advocate jumping off a bridge in front of a trolley if you are fat enough to stop it.
Suppose it could be argued young people create more joy per annum, for themselves and others, than do old people. Suppose (more controversially) that this excess joy over the first thirty years or so of life more than counterbalances the negative joy associated with death (for self and others).
That is, we are assuming that people contribute net positive utility to the world—even when their death after three score and ten is taken into account. Most people would, I believe, assent to this.
Now assume that there is a bound on the total number of people that can be supported comfortably in any milieu. This should be completely obvious given the previous assumption, even in a post-singularity universe. If the milieu is not yet at the carrying capacity, generate more children—don’t resurrect more corpsicles!
Given this analysis, a utilitarian seems to have a clear-cut duty not to support cryonics—unless he disagrees that mortal human life is a net plus. And in that case, cryonics should be a lower priority to vasectomy or tubal ligation.
I think the usual idea is to fix aging—so young people are not more joyful people.
Until then, cryonics does seem like a bad move—from society’s POV. Having big freezers sitting around doing nothing except burn up fuel serves very little useful purpose to society. Those resources could be going into living scientists or engineers—who would make a more positive contribution to the world.
Well, I had in mind a situation in which immortal people maintain a physical age of roughly 50 forever. But that the first 50 years of a person’s life are so much better than any succeeding immortal 50 year period so as to make up for the mortal “bad years” from physical 50 to death.
So, I am taking it into account, though perhaps I was insufficiently explicit.
It strikes me as entirely rational to regard death as so terrible or youth as so angst-ridden that a world filled with immortals is the ideal. In which case cryonics makes sense. But it certainly is not a slam-dunk judgement. And this judgment is also inconsistent with a lack of activism regarding population limitation in the absense of cryonic revival.
It could be argued that while the creation of new children has positive utility (it certainly suits the preferences of the parents, e.g.), it is not anywhere near as high as the continued survival of humans already in existence.
Probably not for the humans already in existence. But, given a reasonable life prospect, the utility of being born is pretty high for the child being born. Higher for a neutral onlooker, too, I think.
Since we don’t know the ultimate limits on human technology (one possibility: we’re just too dumb to ever invent AI or FAI; space travel will never be practical; but maybe cryonics is actually easy w/ enough experimentation), it’s reasonable to imagine an eventual bound as you discuss.
To further concur, and to counter the obvious objection against the evolutionary benefit of old people to their genes (tangential to cryonics, IMO) that natural reproductive life ends at 40-60 years (for women), and that most men stop fathering children perhaps a decade later: there is some benefit to the young in having old people around (including advice about infrequent events from the elders’ distant experience, caring and education from their grandparents/aunts, and the expectation of similar treatment in their own senescence) .
Also, utilitarianism aside, I’m certainly selfishly in favor of my own long life regardless of whether on net I’m bringing others utility :) Similarly, I’m in selfishly in favor of own property rights, and the mechanisms in society that enforce them.
Actually, space travel is completely irrelevant to the limitation of resources argument. As is FAI. Regardless of how cheap it becomes to transport a corpsicle to Alpha Centauri, it will always be cheaper yet to just make a baby once you get there. And this is true whether we are talking about real or simulated babies.
But I agree that anyone who can put together a trust fund of a few million dollars should have the legal, moral, and economic right to stay frozen as long as they want, and then pay for their own resurrection, if it is technically possible. I might do so myself if I had those millions of dollars and no younger relative that I would prefer to give it to.
Cryonics makes some sense as an egoistic act. But please spare me the preaching (Yes, I’m talking to you, EY!) about how it is some kind of rationalist moral duty.
While I think there probably are fundamental (and maybe also human closed under self-mod) limits, if technology keeps improving fast enough, then it doesn’t follow that the universe can only support a finite number of us. I’m considering simulations, new universes, etc. as all possibilities for satisfactory continued existence, not only resurrecting a frozen body.
I agree that for all plausible amounts of science+tech, infinite expected lifespan + desire for reproduction (either concern-for-possible-beings, or hedonistic/value) would mean we eventually run into effectively scarce resources. I think it’s nearly as likely we end up there without extremely long lifespans. Human population is growing quite nicely already.
My argument is independent of whether the universe can support only a finite number. All I am assuming is that the population growth rate is limited, which means that at any particular time the population is (at least for the time being) bounded. And that if there is currently room for more people, babies have moral priority over old people (for a utilitarian, given my assumptions).
Now a case can be made for the opposite—that people already alive have moral priority over the unborn. But this case can not be made by a utilitarian who accepts my assumptions regarding the “wonder years”.
Edit: That is my response to your first paragraph. I notice too late that your second paragraph seems to agree with me. But you seem to think that it is relevant to point out that longevity is not the cause of overpopulation. Of course it is not. The question is, given that the world only supports so many, who is it that should not live? The young, or the old?
It’s a fair question. It can hypothetically happen, no matter how rich technology makes you, that resources are effectively scarce in that moment (you desire to produce copies of yourself at a nearly infinite rate, or breed w/ legions of artificial wombs).
To rephrase old vs. young, you could ask: who deserves to exist—those who already exist, or those who might be created anew? Precedent (and conflict avoidance) favors the incumbent, but an extremist utilitarian coalition or singleton might have the power to disregard that. Say that we rule against the old (the average lifespan is finite by decree); you still have to decide which new lives to create. The question you pose is relevant to life extension, but not limited to it.
I guess I think that arguments over who ought to exist are just a distant curiosity (of course it’s easy to imagine a future where they’re actually used to make decisions; but for now they’re just for fun). I’m also interested in the slight generalization: ought anti-wealth-concentration mechanisms (e.g. taxes) block the possibility (or maybe just the frequency of) long-lived winners, if everybody can’t live to 100 million years? I propose that the right to create offspring or duplicates, and the right to live longer than normal yourself, should come from the same ration. It’s easy to imagine this as money, but I suppose just as slavery is prohibited, you could prohibit trading of the right to other families/entities.
I propose that the right to create offspring or duplicates, and the right to live longer than normal yourself, should come from the same ration. It’s easy to imagine this as money, but I suppose just as slavery is prohibited, you could prohibit trading of the right to other families/entities.
Maybe I’m missing something, but I see no reason to place such restrictions. A “ration coupon” for reproduction only comes into existence when someone dies or moves off-planet or moves away from this space-station or whatever. The deceased or departed or lucky lottery winner should have the right to pass on the “coupon” to whomever he/she chooses for whatever compensation is mutually agreed. Same goes for the heir.
Hmmm. Maybe you are right. It might not be a good idea to have a futures market on those things.
You’re not a utilitarian, though. Presumably most cryonics patients are not utilitarians—at least they spend more money freezing themselves than others—which seems like a pretty reliable indication of egoism to me.
A utilitarian analysis might be relevant to the government if deciding whether to fund or ban cryonics, I suppose. It is pretty hard to imagine government funded cryonics at the moment. Not very many are going to vote for that.
Are you arguing that humans should not try to live as long as possible, because if we were meant to, then Evolution would have made us so?
Sounds a lot like: “if God had meant us to fly, he would have given us wings.” What possible relevance does evolutionary pressure for innate drives have when considering whether we want to pursue a goal? Very weak evidence that we may be confused in our desire, and it won’t ultimately bring us happiness? Counterexample: repeated sex without reproduction, with the same woman, makes me happy.
My comment was an explanation for why so few are interested in cryonics.
Most humans are just not built to be interested in living for a long time. Such humans are not losing “the game” of living for as long as possible. They were not playing that game in the first place!
People aren’t interested in cryonics because it seems unreliable/speculative, it pattern matches as a religion or scam, and its advocates are too few and too low status. I don’t expect any evolutionary inclination to be at play except the desire to survive, which we certainly should expect to have evolved.
Those are very strange expectations in my book. Most people are much more interested in things like relationships, family, loved ones, sex, fertility, status, weath—and heath and fitness—than they are in living for a long time. That is just what evolution 101 would predict.
I agree that it’s not necessary for genes’ survival for individuals to be long-lived. I don’t agree that people want to die.
Yet we have had people here advocate jumping off a bridge in front of a trolley if you are fat enough to stop it.
Suppose it could be argued young people create more joy per annum, for themselves and others, than do old people. Suppose (more controversially) that this excess joy over the first thirty years or so of life more than counterbalances the negative joy associated with death (for self and others).
That is, we are assuming that people contribute net positive utility to the world—even when their death after three score and ten is taken into account. Most people would, I believe, assent to this.
Now assume that there is a bound on the total number of people that can be supported comfortably in any milieu. This should be completely obvious given the previous assumption, even in a post-singularity universe. If the milieu is not yet at the carrying capacity, generate more children—don’t resurrect more corpsicles!
Given this analysis, a utilitarian seems to have a clear-cut duty not to support cryonics—unless he disagrees that mortal human life is a net plus. And in that case, cryonics should be a lower priority to vasectomy or tubal ligation.
Edit: spelling correction
I think the usual idea is to fix aging—so young people are not more joyful people.
Until then, cryonics does seem like a bad move—from society’s POV. Having big freezers sitting around doing nothing except burn up fuel serves very little useful purpose to society. Those resources could be going into living scientists or engineers—who would make a more positive contribution to the world.
Your argument doesn’t seem to take into account the plausible difference between old dying people and old immortal people.
Well, I had in mind a situation in which immortal people maintain a physical age of roughly 50 forever. But that the first 50 years of a person’s life are so much better than any succeeding immortal 50 year period so as to make up for the mortal “bad years” from physical 50 to death.
So, I am taking it into account, though perhaps I was insufficiently explicit.
It strikes me as entirely rational to regard death as so terrible or youth as so angst-ridden that a world filled with immortals is the ideal. In which case cryonics makes sense. But it certainly is not a slam-dunk judgement. And this judgment is also inconsistent with a lack of activism regarding population limitation in the absense of cryonic revival.
It could be argued that while the creation of new children has positive utility (it certainly suits the preferences of the parents, e.g.), it is not anywhere near as high as the continued survival of humans already in existence.
Probably not for the humans already in existence. But, given a reasonable life prospect, the utility of being born is pretty high for the child being born. Higher for a neutral onlooker, too, I think.
Since we don’t know the ultimate limits on human technology (one possibility: we’re just too dumb to ever invent AI or FAI; space travel will never be practical; but maybe cryonics is actually easy w/ enough experimentation), it’s reasonable to imagine an eventual bound as you discuss.
To further concur, and to counter the obvious objection against the evolutionary benefit of old people to their genes (tangential to cryonics, IMO) that natural reproductive life ends at 40-60 years (for women), and that most men stop fathering children perhaps a decade later: there is some benefit to the young in having old people around (including advice about infrequent events from the elders’ distant experience, caring and education from their grandparents/aunts, and the expectation of similar treatment in their own senescence) .
Also, utilitarianism aside, I’m certainly selfishly in favor of my own long life regardless of whether on net I’m bringing others utility :) Similarly, I’m in selfishly in favor of own property rights, and the mechanisms in society that enforce them.
Actually, space travel is completely irrelevant to the limitation of resources argument. As is FAI. Regardless of how cheap it becomes to transport a corpsicle to Alpha Centauri, it will always be cheaper yet to just make a baby once you get there. And this is true whether we are talking about real or simulated babies.
But I agree that anyone who can put together a trust fund of a few million dollars should have the legal, moral, and economic right to stay frozen as long as they want, and then pay for their own resurrection, if it is technically possible. I might do so myself if I had those millions of dollars and no younger relative that I would prefer to give it to.
Cryonics makes some sense as an egoistic act. But please spare me the preaching (Yes, I’m talking to you, EY!) about how it is some kind of rationalist moral duty.
While I think there probably are fundamental (and maybe also human closed under self-mod) limits, if technology keeps improving fast enough, then it doesn’t follow that the universe can only support a finite number of us. I’m considering simulations, new universes, etc. as all possibilities for satisfactory continued existence, not only resurrecting a frozen body.
I agree that for all plausible amounts of science+tech, infinite expected lifespan + desire for reproduction (either concern-for-possible-beings, or hedonistic/value) would mean we eventually run into effectively scarce resources. I think it’s nearly as likely we end up there without extremely long lifespans. Human population is growing quite nicely already.
My argument is independent of whether the universe can support only a finite number. All I am assuming is that the population growth rate is limited, which means that at any particular time the population is (at least for the time being) bounded. And that if there is currently room for more people, babies have moral priority over old people (for a utilitarian, given my assumptions).
Now a case can be made for the opposite—that people already alive have moral priority over the unborn. But this case can not be made by a utilitarian who accepts my assumptions regarding the “wonder years”.
Edit: That is my response to your first paragraph. I notice too late that your second paragraph seems to agree with me. But you seem to think that it is relevant to point out that longevity is not the cause of overpopulation. Of course it is not. The question is, given that the world only supports so many, who is it that should not live? The young, or the old?
It’s a fair question. It can hypothetically happen, no matter how rich technology makes you, that resources are effectively scarce in that moment (you desire to produce copies of yourself at a nearly infinite rate, or breed w/ legions of artificial wombs).
To rephrase old vs. young, you could ask: who deserves to exist—those who already exist, or those who might be created anew? Precedent (and conflict avoidance) favors the incumbent, but an extremist utilitarian coalition or singleton might have the power to disregard that. Say that we rule against the old (the average lifespan is finite by decree); you still have to decide which new lives to create. The question you pose is relevant to life extension, but not limited to it.
I guess I think that arguments over who ought to exist are just a distant curiosity (of course it’s easy to imagine a future where they’re actually used to make decisions; but for now they’re just for fun). I’m also interested in the slight generalization: ought anti-wealth-concentration mechanisms (e.g. taxes) block the possibility (or maybe just the frequency of) long-lived winners, if everybody can’t live to 100 million years? I propose that the right to create offspring or duplicates, and the right to live longer than normal yourself, should come from the same ration. It’s easy to imagine this as money, but I suppose just as slavery is prohibited, you could prohibit trading of the right to other families/entities.
Maybe I’m missing something, but I see no reason to place such restrictions. A “ration coupon” for reproduction only comes into existence when someone dies or moves off-planet or moves away from this space-station or whatever. The deceased or departed or lucky lottery winner should have the right to pass on the “coupon” to whomever he/she chooses for whatever compensation is mutually agreed. Same goes for the heir.
Hmmm. Maybe you are right. It might not be a good idea to have a futures market on those things.
You’re not a utilitarian, though. Presumably most cryonics patients are not utilitarians—at least they spend more money freezing themselves than others—which seems like a pretty reliable indication of egoism to me.
A utilitarian analysis might be relevant to the government if deciding whether to fund or ban cryonics, I suppose. It is pretty hard to imagine government funded cryonics at the moment. Not very many are going to vote for that.