Actually, space travel is completely irrelevant to the limitation of resources argument. As is FAI. Regardless of how cheap it becomes to transport a corpsicle to Alpha Centauri, it will always be cheaper yet to just make a baby once you get there. And this is true whether we are talking about real or simulated babies.
But I agree that anyone who can put together a trust fund of a few million dollars should have the legal, moral, and economic right to stay frozen as long as they want, and then pay for their own resurrection, if it is technically possible. I might do so myself if I had those millions of dollars and no younger relative that I would prefer to give it to.
Cryonics makes some sense as an egoistic act. But please spare me the preaching (Yes, I’m talking to you, EY!) about how it is some kind of rationalist moral duty.
While I think there probably are fundamental (and maybe also human closed under self-mod) limits, if technology keeps improving fast enough, then it doesn’t follow that the universe can only support a finite number of us. I’m considering simulations, new universes, etc. as all possibilities for satisfactory continued existence, not only resurrecting a frozen body.
I agree that for all plausible amounts of science+tech, infinite expected lifespan + desire for reproduction (either concern-for-possible-beings, or hedonistic/value) would mean we eventually run into effectively scarce resources. I think it’s nearly as likely we end up there without extremely long lifespans. Human population is growing quite nicely already.
My argument is independent of whether the universe can support only a finite number. All I am assuming is that the population growth rate is limited, which means that at any particular time the population is (at least for the time being) bounded. And that if there is currently room for more people, babies have moral priority over old people (for a utilitarian, given my assumptions).
Now a case can be made for the opposite—that people already alive have moral priority over the unborn. But this case can not be made by a utilitarian who accepts my assumptions regarding the “wonder years”.
Edit: That is my response to your first paragraph. I notice too late that your second paragraph seems to agree with me. But you seem to think that it is relevant to point out that longevity is not the cause of overpopulation. Of course it is not. The question is, given that the world only supports so many, who is it that should not live? The young, or the old?
It’s a fair question. It can hypothetically happen, no matter how rich technology makes you, that resources are effectively scarce in that moment (you desire to produce copies of yourself at a nearly infinite rate, or breed w/ legions of artificial wombs).
To rephrase old vs. young, you could ask: who deserves to exist—those who already exist, or those who might be created anew? Precedent (and conflict avoidance) favors the incumbent, but an extremist utilitarian coalition or singleton might have the power to disregard that. Say that we rule against the old (the average lifespan is finite by decree); you still have to decide which new lives to create. The question you pose is relevant to life extension, but not limited to it.
I guess I think that arguments over who ought to exist are just a distant curiosity (of course it’s easy to imagine a future where they’re actually used to make decisions; but for now they’re just for fun). I’m also interested in the slight generalization: ought anti-wealth-concentration mechanisms (e.g. taxes) block the possibility (or maybe just the frequency of) long-lived winners, if everybody can’t live to 100 million years? I propose that the right to create offspring or duplicates, and the right to live longer than normal yourself, should come from the same ration. It’s easy to imagine this as money, but I suppose just as slavery is prohibited, you could prohibit trading of the right to other families/entities.
I propose that the right to create offspring or duplicates, and the right to live longer than normal yourself, should come from the same ration. It’s easy to imagine this as money, but I suppose just as slavery is prohibited, you could prohibit trading of the right to other families/entities.
Maybe I’m missing something, but I see no reason to place such restrictions. A “ration coupon” for reproduction only comes into existence when someone dies or moves off-planet or moves away from this space-station or whatever. The deceased or departed or lucky lottery winner should have the right to pass on the “coupon” to whomever he/she chooses for whatever compensation is mutually agreed. Same goes for the heir.
Hmmm. Maybe you are right. It might not be a good idea to have a futures market on those things.
Actually, space travel is completely irrelevant to the limitation of resources argument. As is FAI. Regardless of how cheap it becomes to transport a corpsicle to Alpha Centauri, it will always be cheaper yet to just make a baby once you get there. And this is true whether we are talking about real or simulated babies.
But I agree that anyone who can put together a trust fund of a few million dollars should have the legal, moral, and economic right to stay frozen as long as they want, and then pay for their own resurrection, if it is technically possible. I might do so myself if I had those millions of dollars and no younger relative that I would prefer to give it to.
Cryonics makes some sense as an egoistic act. But please spare me the preaching (Yes, I’m talking to you, EY!) about how it is some kind of rationalist moral duty.
While I think there probably are fundamental (and maybe also human closed under self-mod) limits, if technology keeps improving fast enough, then it doesn’t follow that the universe can only support a finite number of us. I’m considering simulations, new universes, etc. as all possibilities for satisfactory continued existence, not only resurrecting a frozen body.
I agree that for all plausible amounts of science+tech, infinite expected lifespan + desire for reproduction (either concern-for-possible-beings, or hedonistic/value) would mean we eventually run into effectively scarce resources. I think it’s nearly as likely we end up there without extremely long lifespans. Human population is growing quite nicely already.
My argument is independent of whether the universe can support only a finite number. All I am assuming is that the population growth rate is limited, which means that at any particular time the population is (at least for the time being) bounded. And that if there is currently room for more people, babies have moral priority over old people (for a utilitarian, given my assumptions).
Now a case can be made for the opposite—that people already alive have moral priority over the unborn. But this case can not be made by a utilitarian who accepts my assumptions regarding the “wonder years”.
Edit: That is my response to your first paragraph. I notice too late that your second paragraph seems to agree with me. But you seem to think that it is relevant to point out that longevity is not the cause of overpopulation. Of course it is not. The question is, given that the world only supports so many, who is it that should not live? The young, or the old?
It’s a fair question. It can hypothetically happen, no matter how rich technology makes you, that resources are effectively scarce in that moment (you desire to produce copies of yourself at a nearly infinite rate, or breed w/ legions of artificial wombs).
To rephrase old vs. young, you could ask: who deserves to exist—those who already exist, or those who might be created anew? Precedent (and conflict avoidance) favors the incumbent, but an extremist utilitarian coalition or singleton might have the power to disregard that. Say that we rule against the old (the average lifespan is finite by decree); you still have to decide which new lives to create. The question you pose is relevant to life extension, but not limited to it.
I guess I think that arguments over who ought to exist are just a distant curiosity (of course it’s easy to imagine a future where they’re actually used to make decisions; but for now they’re just for fun). I’m also interested in the slight generalization: ought anti-wealth-concentration mechanisms (e.g. taxes) block the possibility (or maybe just the frequency of) long-lived winners, if everybody can’t live to 100 million years? I propose that the right to create offspring or duplicates, and the right to live longer than normal yourself, should come from the same ration. It’s easy to imagine this as money, but I suppose just as slavery is prohibited, you could prohibit trading of the right to other families/entities.
Maybe I’m missing something, but I see no reason to place such restrictions. A “ration coupon” for reproduction only comes into existence when someone dies or moves off-planet or moves away from this space-station or whatever. The deceased or departed or lucky lottery winner should have the right to pass on the “coupon” to whomever he/she chooses for whatever compensation is mutually agreed. Same goes for the heir.
Hmmm. Maybe you are right. It might not be a good idea to have a futures market on those things.