I don’t think the phenomenal character of pleasure and pain is best explained at the level of natural selection at all; the best bet would be that it emerges from the algorithms that our brains implement. So I am really trying to generalize from human cognitive algorithms to algorithms that are analogous in the sense of (roughly) having a utility function.
Suffice it to say, you will find it’s exceedingly hard to find a non-magical reason why non-human cognitive algorithms shouldn’t have a phenomenal character if broadly similar human algorithms do.
Does it follow from the above that all human cognitive algorithms that motivate behavior have the phenomenal character of pleasure and pain? If not, can you clarify why not?
I think that probably all human cognitive algorithms that motivate behaviour have some phenomenal character, not necessarily that of pleasure and pain (e.g., jealousy).
I agree that any cognitive system that implements algorithms sufficiently broadly similar to those implemented in human minds is likely to have the same properties that the analogous human algorithms do, including those algorithms which implement pleasure and pain.
I agree that not all algorithms that motivate behavior will necessarily have the same phenomenal character as pleasure or pain.
This leads me away from the intuition that phenomenal pleasure and pain necessarily fall out of any functional cognitive structure that implements anything analogous to a utility function.
I don’t think the phenomenal character of pleasure and pain is best explained at the level of natural selection at all; the best bet would be that it emerges from the algorithms that our brains implement. So I am really trying to generalize from human cognitive algorithms to algorithms that are analogous in the sense of (roughly) having a utility function.
Suffice it to say, you will find it’s exceedingly hard to find a non-magical reason why non-human cognitive algorithms shouldn’t have a phenomenal character if broadly similar human algorithms do.
Does it follow from the above that all human cognitive algorithms that motivate behavior have the phenomenal character of pleasure and pain? If not, can you clarify why not?
I think that probably all human cognitive algorithms that motivate behaviour have some phenomenal character, not necessarily that of pleasure and pain (e.g., jealousy).
OK, thanks for clarifying.
I agree that any cognitive system that implements algorithms sufficiently broadly similar to those implemented in human minds is likely to have the same properties that the analogous human algorithms do, including those algorithms which implement pleasure and pain.
I agree that not all algorithms that motivate behavior will necessarily have the same phenomenal character as pleasure or pain.
This leads me away from the intuition that phenomenal pleasure and pain necessarily fall out of any functional cognitive structure that implements anything analogous to a utility function.