I haven’t read your post due to its extreme length, but to say something in response to your opening – I think much content on LW addresses the question of confidence contra putative experts on a field and high confidence often seems warranted. The most notable recent case is LW being ahead of the curve on Covid, but also see our latest curated post.
Could you link me to some of those posts. I wouldn’t agree with the heuristic ‘never disagree with experts’, but I’d generally—particularly in an area like philosophy—be wary of being super confident in a view that’s extremely controversial among the people that have most seriously studied it.
Sorry, short on time, can’t dig up links. Take a look at Inadequate Equilibria.
I think philosophy it might be less the case than any empirical field. Experts in biology have perhaps run experiments and seen the results, etc., whereas philosophy is arguments on the page that could easily be very detached from reality.
And “more time spent” has some value, but not that much. There are people who’ve spent 10x more time driving a car than me, but are much worse because they weren’t practicing and training the way I was. And more relevantly, you might say “yes, they’ve spent more time but they’re saying X, and X is clearly wrong, so I don’t trust them.
For philosophy, I think a major reason I distrust most philosophers is they’ve only been thinking about philosophy, whereas I think you’re a much better thinker when you’ve engaged with more of the world and more domains, e.g. your philosophical thinking gets better having studied physics and maths and biology and neuroscience, and most philosophers simply haven’t.
For philosophy, I think a major reason I distrust most philosophers is they’ve only been thinking about philosophy
Well, Chalmers has studied maths. The fact that someone is currently employed as a philosopher doesn’t tell you much about their background, or side interests.
Trust , of course , is irrelevant. You should consider the arguments.
philosophy is arguments on the page that could easily be very detached from reality.
That would include the many untestable philosophical claims in the Sequences, of course.
The people who’ve most seriously studied philosophy of religion tend to be theists (69.5%), which is larger than the proportion of philosophers specializing in metaethics that endorse moral realism (65.4%). Do you think this is good evidence that theism is true? I don’t.
I think it’s the best argument for theism, though I would basically Moorean shift it because theism is so crazy. Also, there’s huge selection effects—studying POR makes people less religious.
Why do you think it’s the best argument for theism?
Also, there’s huge selection effects—studying POR makes people less religious.
...Right, and what if selection effects are causing people more disposed to endorse moral realism to become academic philosophers? If that’s the case, the 62% moral realism among philosophers may also reflect selection effects, rather than philosophers being persuaded by the quality of the arguments.
I haven’t read your post due to its extreme length, but to say something in response to your opening – I think much content on LW addresses the question of confidence contra putative experts on a field and high confidence often seems warranted. The most notable recent case is LW being ahead of the curve on Covid, but also see our latest curated post.
Could you link me to some of those posts. I wouldn’t agree with the heuristic ‘never disagree with experts’, but I’d generally—particularly in an area like philosophy—be wary of being super confident in a view that’s extremely controversial among the people that have most seriously studied it.
Sorry, short on time, can’t dig up links. Take a look at Inadequate Equilibria.
I think philosophy it might be less the case than any empirical field. Experts in biology have perhaps run experiments and seen the results, etc., whereas philosophy is arguments on the page that could easily be very detached from reality.
And “more time spent” has some value, but not that much. There are people who’ve spent 10x more time driving a car than me, but are much worse because they weren’t practicing and training the way I was. And more relevantly, you might say “yes, they’ve spent more time but they’re saying X, and X is clearly wrong, so I don’t trust them.
For philosophy, I think a major reason I distrust most philosophers is they’ve only been thinking about philosophy, whereas I think you’re a much better thinker when you’ve engaged with more of the world and more domains, e.g. your philosophical thinking gets better having studied physics and maths and biology and neuroscience, and most philosophers simply haven’t.
Well, Chalmers has studied maths. The fact that someone is currently employed as a philosopher doesn’t tell you much about their background, or side interests.
Trust , of course , is irrelevant. You should consider the arguments.
That would include the many untestable philosophical claims in the Sequences, of course.
Currently this comment has −2 agreement karma—why do people disagree with this idea?
The people who’ve most seriously studied philosophy of religion tend to be theists (69.5%), which is larger than the proportion of philosophers specializing in metaethics that endorse moral realism (65.4%). Do you think this is good evidence that theism is true? I don’t.
I think it’s the best argument for theism, though I would basically Moorean shift it because theism is so crazy. Also, there’s huge selection effects—studying POR makes people less religious.
Why do you think it’s the best argument for theism?
...Right, and what if selection effects are causing people more disposed to endorse moral realism to become academic philosophers? If that’s the case, the 62% moral realism among philosophers may also reflect selection effects, rather than philosophers being persuaded by the quality of the arguments.