Thus, to deny this, one needs to think either moral claims aren’t truth apt, they’re all false, or they depend on attitudes.
No they don’t. The standard claim that all antirealist positions are either relativism, error theory, or noncognitivism is false: it requires antirealist positions to include a semantic claim about the meaning of moral claims.
But an antirealist can both deny that there are stance-independent moral facts, and deny the philosophical presuppositions implicit in the claim that there is some kind of correct analysis of moral claims, such that moral claims are either truth apt, all false, or depend on attitudes. Also, an antirealist can endorse indeterminacy about the meaning of moral claims, and maintain that they aren’t determinately truth-apt, false, or dependent on attitudes. For an example, see:
Gill, M. B. (2009). Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics. Philosophical studies, 145(2), 215-234.
I agree with this—one can think some claims aren’t truth apt, others false, others dependent on attitudes. The claim is that collectively these have to cover all moral claims.
I’m explicitly denying that that covers all the possibilities. You can also endorse incoherentism or indeterminacy.
Also, when you say that the claims aren’t truth-apt, are you supposing that the claims themselves have a meaning, or that the person who made the claim means to communicate something with a given moral utterance?
No they don’t. The standard claim that all antirealist positions are either relativism, error theory, or noncognitivism is false: it requires antirealist positions to include a semantic claim about the meaning of moral claims.
But an antirealist can both deny that there are stance-independent moral facts, and deny the philosophical presuppositions implicit in the claim that there is some kind of correct analysis of moral claims, such that moral claims are either truth apt, all false, or depend on attitudes. Also, an antirealist can endorse indeterminacy about the meaning of moral claims, and maintain that they aren’t determinately truth-apt, false, or dependent on attitudes. For an example, see:
Gill, M. B. (2009). Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics. Philosophical studies, 145(2), 215-234.
I agree with this—one can think some claims aren’t truth apt, others false, others dependent on attitudes. The claim is that collectively these have to cover all moral claims.
I’m explicitly denying that that covers all the possibilities. You can also endorse incoherentism or indeterminacy.
Also, when you say that the claims aren’t truth-apt, are you supposing that the claims themselves have a meaning, or that the person who made the claim means to communicate something with a given moral utterance?