I think we should disentangle “consciousness” from “identity” in general and when talking about computationalism in particular.
I don’t think there is any reasonable alternative to computationalism when we are talking about the nature of consciousness. But this doesn’t seem to actually imply that my “identity”, whatever it is, will be necessary preserved during teleportation or uploading. I think at our current state of undertstanding, it’s quite coherent to be computationalist about consciousness and eliminativist towards identity.
Hm, I disagree with this, if only because I think that assuming we are eliminativist about identity for present day humans, then uploading vacuously preserves identity, because there’s nothing there to preserve, for the same reason as 0-0=0
And I also think that for uploading purposes, I don’t believe that uploading does anything special to your consciousness/identity, in that uploading doesn’t suddenly cause you to have or lose your identity, due to my answer above.
I think we should disentangle “consciousness” from “identity” in general and when talking about computationalism in particular.
I don’t think there is any reasonable alternative to computationalism when we are talking about the nature of consciousness. But this doesn’t seem to actually imply that my “identity”, whatever it is, will be necessary preserved during teleportation or uploading. I think at our current state of undertstanding, it’s quite coherent to be computationalist about consciousness and eliminativist towards identity.
Hm, I disagree with this, if only because I think that assuming we are eliminativist about identity for present day humans, then uploading vacuously preserves identity, because there’s nothing there to preserve, for the same reason as 0-0=0
And I also think that for uploading purposes, I don’t believe that uploading does anything special to your consciousness/identity, in that uploading doesn’t suddenly cause you to have or lose your identity, due to my answer above.