Again, the objection seems to be more about the particular USE of the argument than the nature of the argument itself (what I call above “non-responsiveness”). I would genuinely like to understand why analogies of the kind you call the Worst Argument in the World are so harmful (and I appreciate your engaging on it). Is it your claim that people are particularly likely to take analogies seriously as arguments, more than other arguments? Is it their very power that makes them so bad?
Rhyming and other poetic tricks, like showing a picture, make statements feel more true to hearers; are those tricks less dangerous than analogy because we (think we) are immune to them? I can kind of intuitively understand what you mean by something being a real argument or not (“as an argument”), but I’m not sure why things taken seriously as arguments are more dangerous than sneaky, non-argument cues that make things seem true.
I wonder if what you really want to destroy are “things effectively masquerading as arguments that aren’t really arguments.” That class is not exhausted by inexact analogies (which is to say all analogies), nor are all inexact analogies members of that class.
I think metonymy (association, like eugenics --> Hitler) is a much more harmful cognitive sin than metaphor (which at least requires a theory of why things are similar).
I wonder if what you really want to destroy are “things effectively masquerading as arguments that aren’t really arguments.” That class is not exhausted by inexact analogies (which is to say all analogies), nor are all inexact analogies members of that class.
This sounds like a fair summary. I stick to my assertion that what you’re calling analogies (and which I would specify are analogies that are not phrased in analogy form and which the overwhelming majority of people never recognize as analogies) are more common and more convincing than most other members of this class.
In grade school we learn that “X is like Y” is a simile, and “X is Y” is a metaphor, and that there is some crucial difference between the two. Perhaps there is, but I haven’t seen an argument to that effect. Mainly, we call both of these “analogy” or “metaphor.”
So the argument for tabooing The Worst Argument in the World is that, since many analogies are unusually powerful and people may not recognize that they’re analogies rather than perhaps identities, every analogy is The Worst Argument in the World. Even though many analogies are admittedly productive, the class of argument is tabooed because many of its members are problematic.
Doesn’t that make the taboo on The Worst Argument in the World itself a species of The Worst Argument in the World?
I’m not trying to taboo everything of the form “X is Y”.
Consider an analogy to the argumentum ad hominem fallacy. I think it’s correct to dub this a fallacy and say it’s not a legitimate move in argument. However, some people are stupid, some people are evil, and it may be correct and proper to mention that they are stupid and evil. It just can’t be doing the heavy lifting in an argument. Certainly calling people stupid and evil is useful as a slogan, it’s useful for introducing evidence against them, it’s even valid in some kinds of arguments (For example, “Bob is stupid, so we probably don’t want to let him design the nuclear plant.”)
I think Worst Argument in the World is the same way. There are some legitimate uses for statements of the “X is in category Y!” form, but actually doing the heavy lifting in a philosophical argument is not one of them. I’d be pretty happy if people just stopped doing it entirely, but I admit that it’s possible (although I think unlikely) to keep using it and always be responsible with it.
Again, the objection seems to be more about the particular USE of the argument than the nature of the argument itself (what I call above “non-responsiveness”). I would genuinely like to understand why analogies of the kind you call the Worst Argument in the World are so harmful (and I appreciate your engaging on it). Is it your claim that people are particularly likely to take analogies seriously as arguments, more than other arguments? Is it their very power that makes them so bad?
Rhyming and other poetic tricks, like showing a picture, make statements feel more true to hearers; are those tricks less dangerous than analogy because we (think we) are immune to them? I can kind of intuitively understand what you mean by something being a real argument or not (“as an argument”), but I’m not sure why things taken seriously as arguments are more dangerous than sneaky, non-argument cues that make things seem true.
I wonder if what you really want to destroy are “things effectively masquerading as arguments that aren’t really arguments.” That class is not exhausted by inexact analogies (which is to say all analogies), nor are all inexact analogies members of that class.
I think metonymy (association, like eugenics --> Hitler) is a much more harmful cognitive sin than metaphor (which at least requires a theory of why things are similar).
This sounds like a fair summary. I stick to my assertion that what you’re calling analogies (and which I would specify are analogies that are not phrased in analogy form and which the overwhelming majority of people never recognize as analogies) are more common and more convincing than most other members of this class.
In grade school we learn that “X is like Y” is a simile, and “X is Y” is a metaphor, and that there is some crucial difference between the two. Perhaps there is, but I haven’t seen an argument to that effect. Mainly, we call both of these “analogy” or “metaphor.”
So the argument for tabooing The Worst Argument in the World is that, since many analogies are unusually powerful and people may not recognize that they’re analogies rather than perhaps identities, every analogy is The Worst Argument in the World. Even though many analogies are admittedly productive, the class of argument is tabooed because many of its members are problematic.
Doesn’t that make the taboo on The Worst Argument in the World itself a species of The Worst Argument in the World?
I’m not trying to taboo everything of the form “X is Y”.
Consider an analogy to the argumentum ad hominem fallacy. I think it’s correct to dub this a fallacy and say it’s not a legitimate move in argument. However, some people are stupid, some people are evil, and it may be correct and proper to mention that they are stupid and evil. It just can’t be doing the heavy lifting in an argument. Certainly calling people stupid and evil is useful as a slogan, it’s useful for introducing evidence against them, it’s even valid in some kinds of arguments (For example, “Bob is stupid, so we probably don’t want to let him design the nuclear plant.”)
I think Worst Argument in the World is the same way. There are some legitimate uses for statements of the “X is in category Y!” form, but actually doing the heavy lifting in a philosophical argument is not one of them. I’d be pretty happy if people just stopped doing it entirely, but I admit that it’s possible (although I think unlikely) to keep using it and always be responsible with it.