I support the position that all social roles that are totally uncorrelated with physical facts should be re-examined (and probably eliminated).
Where to draw the line between physical difference and pure social construct is a difficult empirical question. Ev. Psych asks the right questions, but I don’t trust its answers.
I know that gender != sex, but people are societally assigned the gender corresponding to their biological sex (or more accurately the gender corresponding to their genitalia). So if gender is a wholly social construct, there would probably not exist such a thing as gender identity dysphoria.
I don’t trust the particular answers of Ev. Psych either, but I also mistrust any claim of psychological equality in biologically different groups. It smacks of a mind-body duality that doesn’t exist: The brain is a physical organ like any other; psychology is a biological function—culture and society shape it, but so does biology.
Therefore there’s no physical law requiring its average characteristics to be completely the same between males and females. That would be privileging the theory we would prefer to be true as egalitarians.
There are historical ideologies that seem to repeatedly be wrong for essentially the same reasons.
Mind-body dualism.
Essentialist “scientific” theories to explain then existing social norms.
Which is more powerful in this case? Hopefully we can find out.
As for gender identity dysphoria, I don’t doubt there is a phenomena out there. But for it to support your position seems to require that the DSM-IV cut the world at its joints. I think we agree that this is a laughable assertion.
In particular, I distrust the current descriptions because I suspect that the distinction between gender and sex is not being sufficiently respected by those making the diagnostic definitions. Lots of mental illness is defined explicitly or implicitly in terms of fit into current social norms.
As for gender identity dysphoria, I don’t doubt there is a phenomena out there. But for it to support your position seems to require that the DSM-IV cut the world at its joints. I think we agree that this is a laughable assertion.
This is a package-deal fallacy — the DSM can get a lot of things wrong about gender dysphoria without weakening AK’s position.
I support the position that all social roles that are totally uncorrelated with physical facts should be re-examined (and probably eliminated).
This leaves open a line a very traditional line of reasoning that I would have expected you to be hostile to. We can determine a physical fact about a child with high accuracy, and at a glance: whether or not they will have a chance to become pregnant as adults (1). Many people believe this physical fact should inform the way the kid is raised, including the kind of social roles they are prepared for. I assume you don’t accept this kind of argument, but I’d be interested in hearing your “true rejection.”
(1) In case my meaning is not clear, the way I would put it in a less abstract conversation is “girls and not boys can get pregnant.” But in this case I understand there are high stakes attached to the words “girl” and boy.”
Many people believe this physical fact should inform the way the kid is raised, including the kind of social roles they are prepared for.
Those beliefs are not really facts about the baby. Where did the beliefs come from? Isn’t there a counter-factual history where (1) society works, (2) no one has those beliefs?
You should counter that “society works” just assumes the conclusion. I could respond by pointing to societies that actually existed in other places and times. And I’m sure that there are further responses on both sides.
Ultimately, the problem is that our differences in terminal values affect what sorts of things we consider good evidence. Or, if one were a moral realist, this would be evidence that one of us is so defective that they can’t perceive moral truths.
Gender != sex.
I support the position that all social roles that are totally uncorrelated with physical facts should be re-examined (and probably eliminated).
Where to draw the line between physical difference and pure social construct is a difficult empirical question. Ev. Psych asks the right questions, but I don’t trust its answers.
I know that gender != sex, but people are societally assigned the gender corresponding to their biological sex (or more accurately the gender corresponding to their genitalia). So if gender is a wholly social construct, there would probably not exist such a thing as gender identity dysphoria.
I don’t trust the particular answers of Ev. Psych either, but I also mistrust any claim of psychological equality in biologically different groups. It smacks of a mind-body duality that doesn’t exist: The brain is a physical organ like any other; psychology is a biological function—culture and society shape it, but so does biology.
Therefore there’s no physical law requiring its average characteristics to be completely the same between males and females. That would be privileging the theory we would prefer to be true as egalitarians.
There are historical ideologies that seem to repeatedly be wrong for essentially the same reasons.
Mind-body dualism.
Essentialist “scientific” theories to explain then existing social norms.
Which is more powerful in this case? Hopefully we can find out.
As for gender identity dysphoria, I don’t doubt there is a phenomena out there. But for it to support your position seems to require that the DSM-IV cut the world at its joints. I think we agree that this is a laughable assertion.
In particular, I distrust the current descriptions because I suspect that the distinction between gender and sex is not being sufficiently respected by those making the diagnostic definitions. Lots of mental illness is defined explicitly or implicitly in terms of fit into current social norms.
This is a package-deal fallacy — the DSM can get a lot of things wrong about gender dysphoria without weakening AK’s position.
This leaves open a line a very traditional line of reasoning that I would have expected you to be hostile to. We can determine a physical fact about a child with high accuracy, and at a glance: whether or not they will have a chance to become pregnant as adults (1). Many people believe this physical fact should inform the way the kid is raised, including the kind of social roles they are prepared for. I assume you don’t accept this kind of argument, but I’d be interested in hearing your “true rejection.”
(1) In case my meaning is not clear, the way I would put it in a less abstract conversation is “girls and not boys can get pregnant.” But in this case I understand there are high stakes attached to the words “girl” and boy.”
Those beliefs are not really facts about the baby. Where did the beliefs come from? Isn’t there a counter-factual history where (1) society works, (2) no one has those beliefs?
You should counter that “society works” just assumes the conclusion. I could respond by pointing to societies that actually existed in other places and times. And I’m sure that there are further responses on both sides.
Ultimately, the problem is that our differences in terminal values affect what sorts of things we consider good evidence. Or, if one were a moral realist, this would be evidence that one of us is so defective that they can’t perceive moral truths.