If that isn’t hyperbole, I’m interested in your reasons for believing that.
Of course it is. The point is that we see all around us (that’s another hyperbole), and it is a recurring theme on LessWrong (that isn’t), that people persist in acting, or failing to act, in ways that they “feel bad” about. As a strategy for change, “feeling bad” doesn’t seem to be effective, does it?
“Making someone feel bad”, or “good”, fares even worse—see this parable.
it is a recurring theme on LessWrong (that isn’t), that people persist in acting, or failing to act, in ways that they “feel bad” about.
I agree.
As a strategy for change, “feeling bad” doesn’t seem to be effective, does it?
I disagree. One of the reasons akrasia is so notable is that feeling bad usually works. Usually touching a hot stove or hit your thumb with a hammer once is enough to change your behavior. Often being mocked by your peers, or sensing genuine disappointment from your mentors, is enough to change your behavior. It’s only in these weird corner cases where opposing strong motivations collide that we notice the unusual inefficacy of bad feelings, and haul out the rational analysis toolkit.
But doesn’t the same logic lead me to conclude that pain isn’t aversive? (That is: if pain were actually aversive, people wouldn’t do things that cause them pain. People do things that cause them pain, therefore pain is not aversive.)
The problem with that logic as it applies to pain is that pain can be aversive without completely preventing people from doing something. If a behavior B is N% likely ordinarily, and B becomes Y% likely if coupled to pain, and Y < X, that’s evidence for considering pain aversive even though we still do B. Relatedly, if B is always coupled to pain, then I never get to observe X.
Observing a nonzero Y is not evidence that pain is non-aversive.
It seems to me the same reasoning applies to guilt and other kinds of bad feelings. It’s certainly possible that they are non-aversive, but observing a nonzero frequency of the behaviors that cause it isn’t evidence of that.
There may be other evidence, though, which is why I asked Richard his reasons.
Taboo “feeling bad”, keeping in mind that our normal emotional vocabulary is pretty inadequate. (E.g., it seems to me that shame is basically never useful, but guilt and sadness can be.)
I mean I feel X when I’m not being productive. And yet I do not become productive. I have no idea how to taboo qualia like “X”.
Maybe an extensional definition?: That feeling you get when you’ve done something wrong. An uncomfortable and frustruating feeling that makes you feel guilty. A bit like stress.
That’s awfully specific. I wonder how general the non-utility of it is.
Huh. If that isn’t hyperbole, I’m interested in your reasons for believing that.
Of course it is. The point is that we see all around us (that’s another hyperbole), and it is a recurring theme on LessWrong (that isn’t), that people persist in acting, or failing to act, in ways that they “feel bad” about. As a strategy for change, “feeling bad” doesn’t seem to be effective, does it?
“Making someone feel bad”, or “good”, fares even worse—see this parable.
I agree.
I disagree. One of the reasons akrasia is so notable is that feeling bad usually works. Usually touching a hot stove or hit your thumb with a hammer once is enough to change your behavior. Often being mocked by your peers, or sensing genuine disappointment from your mentors, is enough to change your behavior. It’s only in these weird corner cases where opposing strong motivations collide that we notice the unusual inefficacy of bad feelings, and haul out the rational analysis toolkit.
If feeling bad was actually motivational, all of us who currently feel bad about our (present tense) actions would not have such problems.
But doesn’t the same logic lead me to conclude that pain isn’t aversive? (That is: if pain were actually aversive, people wouldn’t do things that cause them pain. People do things that cause them pain, therefore pain is not aversive.)
The problem with that logic as it applies to pain is that pain can be aversive without completely preventing people from doing something. If a behavior B is N% likely ordinarily, and B becomes Y% likely if coupled to pain, and Y < X, that’s evidence for considering pain aversive even though we still do B. Relatedly, if B is always coupled to pain, then I never get to observe X.
Observing a nonzero Y is not evidence that pain is non-aversive.
It seems to me the same reasoning applies to guilt and other kinds of bad feelings. It’s certainly possible that they are non-aversive, but observing a nonzero frequency of the behaviors that cause it isn’t evidence of that.
There may be other evidence, though, which is why I asked Richard his reasons.
Taboo “feeling bad”, keeping in mind that our normal emotional vocabulary is pretty inadequate. (E.g., it seems to me that shame is basically never useful, but guilt and sadness can be.)
Thanks for the taboo request.
I mean I feel X when I’m not being productive. And yet I do not become productive. I have no idea how to taboo qualia like “X”.
Maybe an extensional definition?: That feeling you get when you’ve done something wrong. An uncomfortable and frustruating feeling that makes you feel guilty. A bit like stress.
That’s awfully specific. I wonder how general the non-utility of it is.