I disagree. I have presented arguments on LW in the past that if the experiment is run once in the history of the universe, you should reason as a halfer, but if the experiment is run many times, you will assign a probability in between 1⁄2 and 1⁄3, approaching one third as the number of times approaches infinity. I think that this applies even if you know the numerical identity of your particular run.
Actually, I was probably mistaken. I think I was thinking of this post and in particular this thread and this one. (I was previously using the username “Unknowns”.)
I think I confused this with Sleeping Beauty because of the similarity of Incubator situations with Sleeping Beauty. I’ll have to think about it but I suspect there will be similar results.
I disagree. I have presented arguments on LW in the past that if the experiment is run once in the history of the universe, you should reason as a halfer, but if the experiment is run many times, you will assign a probability in between 1⁄2 and 1⁄3, approaching one third as the number of times approaches infinity. I think that this applies even if you know the numerical identity of your particular run.
Interesting! I was away from LW for a long time and probably missed it. Can you give a link, or sketch the argument here?
Actually, I was probably mistaken. I think I was thinking of this post and in particular this thread and this one. (I was previously using the username “Unknowns”.)
I think I confused this with Sleeping Beauty because of the similarity of Incubator situations with Sleeping Beauty. I’ll have to think about it but I suspect there will be similar results.