Is dox the right word here? I guess this fits inside the definition but it feels kinda non-central to me. A typical example would include some intent to do harm. Considering a different principle more important feels importantly different.
Not that this is much consolation to Scott and I think the NYT is wrong to reveal Scott’s identity (and have written in to say this), I just think doxxing is the wrong way to describe it.
I don’t think I agree that a central example of doxxing requires intent to do harm. I think if you carelessly reveal, say, someone’s home address on the internet, you have doxxed them. If the person first asks you not to, and you do it anyway in spite of them, then the fact that you didn’t intend to do harm seems fairly irrelevant to me. I don’t buy the intend/foresee distinction at the best of times, and this one seems especially shaky.
Revealing someone’s name against their will isn’t as bad as revealing their address or workplace or so on, but it seems close enough in spirit that I don’t think splitting hairs over the definition of doxxing is very useful.
I think its hard to argue that a central example of doxxing doesn’t involve intent to cause harm. The central example I think in most people’s minds would be something like the hit list of abortion providers or anonymous. Wikipedia has a list of examples of doxxing - a rough count suggests ~13/15 involve providing information about someone ideologically opposed to the doxxer (confirming intent is more difficult). The non-centrality here isn’t as extreme as it is in, say, “Martin Luther King was a criminal” but it is there.
On the relevance of the distinction, yes, I do think it is important. I would support different responses to the NYT depending on whether I thought they were acting out of a desire to endanger/silence Scott or were following a journalistic norm in a way I considered wrong.
The dispute here, then, is whether doxing is a concept like murder[1] (with intent built into the definition) or homicide (which is defined solely by the nature of the act and its consequences).
I think it is useful to have a general word for “publicly revealing personal information about someone without/against their consent in a manner that is likely to foreseeably damage them”. Calling that thing “doxing”, and saying that doxing is generally bad unless you have a very compelling reason, seems more useful to me than restricting the use of “doxing” to malicious cases and being left without a good handle for the other thing.
That said, I am generally pretty opposed to label creep; I think it’s often very harmful when terms that were previously restricted to very bad things get applied to less bad (or just differently bad) things (Scott’s own work has plenty of good examples of this), especially when this is done as a rhetorical technique to coerce action. So I’m in agreement with the general spirit of the objection, I’m just not convinced it applies in this particular case.
The dispute here, then, is whether doxing is a concept like murder[1] (with intent built into the definition) or homicide (which is defined solely by the nature of the act and its consequences).
I feel like we’re still talking past each other a bit here. I don’t dispute that doxxing can mean any revealing of information about someone, it could be used even when no foreseeable damage is implied and someone just wanted to remain private. The strict definition is not the question.
The non-central fallacy is when a negative affect word is used to describe something where the word is technically true but the actual thing should not have that negative affect associated with it. Martin Luther King fits the definition of a criminal but the negative affect of the word criminal (the reasons why crimes are bad) shouldn’t apply to him.
The problem I have using “dox” here is that some portion of the word’s negative affect doesn’t (or at least might not) apply in this case. An alternative phrasing would be “reveal Scott’s true identity” or, to be snappier, “unmask Scott” which are more neutral. dontdoxscottalexander.com’s title is Don’t De-Anonymize Scott Alexander which I think is better than my ideas.
The problem I have using “dox” here is that some portion of the word’s negative affect doesn’t (or at least might not) apply in this case.
But the pitch for the non-central fallacy is that this is an intentional deviation. For example, if everyone everywhere has always talked about “the criminal, MLK” then saying MLK is a criminal wouldn’t be non-central anymore, it would just be the way he is described.
I’ve never heard any other term except doxxing for deliberately revealing another person’s identity on the internet; it is even common use when describing accidental cases. As a practical matter and according to our (or at least the American-centered internet) norms it is a fundamentally malicious act.
Is dox the right word here? I guess this fits inside the definition but it feels kinda non-central to me. A typical example would include some intent to do harm. Considering a different principle more important feels importantly different.
Not that this is much consolation to Scott and I think the NYT is wrong to reveal Scott’s identity (and have written in to say this), I just think doxxing is the wrong way to describe it.
I don’t think I agree that a central example of doxxing requires intent to do harm. I think if you carelessly reveal, say, someone’s home address on the internet, you have doxxed them. If the person first asks you not to, and you do it anyway in spite of them, then the fact that you didn’t intend to do harm seems fairly irrelevant to me. I don’t buy the intend/foresee distinction at the best of times, and this one seems especially shaky.
Revealing someone’s name against their will isn’t as bad as revealing their address or workplace or so on, but it seems close enough in spirit that I don’t think splitting hairs over the definition of doxxing is very useful.
I think its hard to argue that a central example of doxxing doesn’t involve intent to cause harm. The central example I think in most people’s minds would be something like the hit list of abortion providers or anonymous. Wikipedia has a list of examples of doxxing - a rough count suggests ~13/15 involve providing information about someone ideologically opposed to the doxxer (confirming intent is more difficult). The non-centrality here isn’t as extreme as it is in, say, “Martin Luther King was a criminal” but it is there.
On the relevance of the distinction, yes, I do think it is important. I would support different responses to the NYT depending on whether I thought they were acting out of a desire to endanger/silence Scott or were following a journalistic norm in a way I considered wrong.
The dispute here, then, is whether doxing is a concept like murder[1] (with intent built into the definition) or homicide (which is defined solely by the nature of the act and its consequences).
I think it is useful to have a general word for “publicly revealing personal information about someone without/against their consent in a manner that is likely to foreseeably damage them”. Calling that thing “doxing”, and saying that doxing is generally bad unless you have a very compelling reason, seems more useful to me than restricting the use of “doxing” to malicious cases and being left without a good handle for the other thing.
That said, I am generally pretty opposed to label creep; I think it’s often very harmful when terms that were previously restricted to very bad things get applied to less bad (or just differently bad) things (Scott’s own work has plenty of good examples of this), especially when this is done as a rhetorical technique to coerce action. So I’m in agreement with the general spirit of the objection, I’m just not convinced it applies in this particular case.
Murder in the UK, that is; I think the US does things differently?
I feel like we’re still talking past each other a bit here. I don’t dispute that doxxing can mean any revealing of information about someone, it could be used even when no foreseeable damage is implied and someone just wanted to remain private. The strict definition is not the question.
The non-central fallacy is when a negative affect word is used to describe something where the word is technically true but the actual thing should not have that negative affect associated with it. Martin Luther King fits the definition of a criminal but the negative affect of the word criminal (the reasons why crimes are bad) shouldn’t apply to him.
The problem I have using “dox” here is that some portion of the word’s negative affect doesn’t (or at least might not) apply in this case. An alternative phrasing would be “reveal Scott’s true identity” or, to be snappier, “unmask Scott” which are more neutral. dontdoxscottalexander.com’s title is Don’t De-Anonymize Scott Alexander which I think is better than my ideas.
But the pitch for the non-central fallacy is that this is an intentional deviation. For example, if everyone everywhere has always talked about “the criminal, MLK” then saying MLK is a criminal wouldn’t be non-central anymore, it would just be the way he is described.
I’ve never heard any other term except doxxing for deliberately revealing another person’s identity on the internet; it is even common use when describing accidental cases. As a practical matter and according to our (or at least the American-centered internet) norms it is a fundamentally malicious act.