The question of population ethics can be dissolved by rejecting personal identity realism. And we already have good reasons to reject personal identity realism, or at least consider it suspect, due to the paradoxes that arise in split-brain thought experiments (e.g., the hemisphere swap thought experiment) if you assume there’s a single correct way to assign personal identity.
This is kind of vague. Doesn’t this start shading into territory like “it’s technically not bad to kill a person if you also create another person”? Or am I misunderstanding what you are getting at?
The question of population ethics can be dissolved by rejecting personal identity realism. And we already have good reasons to reject personal identity realism, or at least consider it suspect, due to the paradoxes that arise in split-brain thought experiments (e.g., the hemisphere swap thought experiment) if you assume there’s a single correct way to assign personal identity.
This is kind of vague. Doesn’t this start shading into territory like “it’s technically not bad to kill a person if you also create another person”? Or am I misunderstanding what you are getting at?