In the the preface to the latter, the author mentions a few other books too:
Designing Economic Mechanisms (2006) by Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter. “The focus of this text is on informational efficiency and privacy preservation in mechanisms. Incentive aspects play a much smaller role than they do in this book.”
Communication in Mechanism Design: A Differential Approach (2008)by Steven R. Williams “This book covers material similar to that of Hurwicz and Reiter. The emphasis that both books place on the size of the message space in a mechanism differentiates them from more modern treatments of mechanism design.”
A Toolbox for Economic Design (2009, also recommended by Badger) by Dmitrios Diamantaras, with Emina I. Cardamone, Karen A. Campbell, Scott Deacle, and Lisa A. Delgado. “This book is closest to mine among those listed here, but it covers more than I do, such as the theory of Nash implementation, the theory of matching markets, and empirical evidence on mechanisms. Sometimes I wish I had written this book. My own book is more narrowly focused, perhaps goes somewhat into greater depth, and places a greater emphasis on the relation between game theoretic foundations and mechanism design.”
Mechanism Design, A Linear Programming Approach (2011) by Rakesh Vohra. “This is a superb book, demonstrating how large parts of the theory of mechanism design can be developed as an application of results from linear programming. Vohra puts less emphasis than I do on the game theoretic aspects of mechanism design.”
He also wrote this about prerequisites:
This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory. Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) contains more than the reader needs for this book. I shall also assume a basic knowledge of real analysis that can, for example, be acquired from Rudin (1976).
Any recommendations for Mechanism Design textbooks?
In Introduction to Mechanism Design Badger recommended A Toolbox for Economic Design (2009) and An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015).
In the the preface to the latter, the author mentions a few other books too:
Designing Economic Mechanisms (2006) by Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter. “The focus of this text is on informational efficiency and privacy preservation in mechanisms. Incentive aspects play a much smaller role than they do in this book.”
Communication in Mechanism Design: A Differential Approach (2008) by Steven R. Williams “This book covers material similar to that of Hurwicz and Reiter. The emphasis that both books place on the size of the message space in a mechanism differentiates them from more modern treatments of mechanism design.”
A Toolbox for Economic Design (2009, also recommended by Badger) by Dmitrios Diamantaras, with Emina I. Cardamone, Karen A. Campbell, Scott Deacle, and Lisa A. Delgado. “This book is closest to mine among those listed here, but it covers more than I do, such as the theory of Nash implementation, the theory of matching markets, and empirical evidence on mechanisms. Sometimes I wish I had written this book. My own book is more narrowly focused, perhaps goes somewhat into greater depth, and places a greater emphasis on the relation between game theoretic foundations and mechanism design.”
Mechanism Design, A Linear Programming Approach (2011) by Rakesh Vohra. “This is a superb book, demonstrating how large parts of the theory of mechanism design can be developed as an application of results from linear programming. Vohra puts less emphasis than I do on the game theoretic aspects of mechanism design.”
He also wrote this about prerequisites: