Is this a possible or an accurate interpretation of his thought experiment?
As far as I could tell from reading the book, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid taking a stance on whether or not these internal sensations exist or not. However, he strongly emphasised that he wasn’t claiming they don’t exist.
Possibly. Is this your interpretation of the paragraphs 304 and 307? But which arguments can he use to assert that, if he argued previously for not knowing definitively? I really enjoy your takes on this. I hope this is also kind of fruitful for your endeavors.
It’s my overall impression. He revisits the topic a lot.
But which arguments can he use to assert that, if he argued previously for not knowing definitively?
I don’t think he took a position. I just meant that he puts more emphasis on avoiding people mistakenly thinking he is claiming internal experience don’t exist than he does on avoiding people mistakenly thinking that he is claiming they do exist. Presumably because he was more often attacked for the former.
Thanks for the description
As far as I could tell from reading the book, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid taking a stance on whether or not these internal sensations exist or not. However, he strongly emphasised that he wasn’t claiming they don’t exist.
Possibly. Is this your interpretation of the paragraphs 304 and 307? But which arguments can he use to assert that, if he argued previously for not knowing definitively? I really enjoy your takes on this. I hope this is also kind of fruitful for your endeavors.
It’s my overall impression. He revisits the topic a lot.
I don’t think he took a position. I just meant that he puts more emphasis on avoiding people mistakenly thinking he is claiming internal experience don’t exist than he does on avoiding people mistakenly thinking that he is claiming they do exist. Presumably because he was more often attacked for the former.
I see, thank you for that and thank you for the conversation.