For me this is where the symmetry with doomsday argument breaks. Because here the result of the die roll is actually randomly selected from a distribution from 1 to 100.
While with doomsday argument it’s not the case. I’m not selected among all the humans throughout the time to be instantiated in 21st century. That’s not how causal process that produced me works. Actually, that’s not how causality itself works. Future humans causally depend on the past humans it’s not an independant random variable at all.
I agree that they are not symmetrical. My point with that thought experiment was to counter one of their arguments, which as I understand it can be paraphrased to:
In your thought experiment, the people who bet that they are in the last 95% of humans only win in aggregate, so there is still no selfish reason to think that taking that bet is the best decision for an individual.
My thought experiment with the dice was meant to show that this reasoning also applies to regular expected utility maximization, so if they use that argument to dismiss all anthropic reasoning, then they have to reject basically all probabilistic decision making. Presumably they will not reject all probabilistic reasoning, and therefore they have to reject this argument. (Assuming that I’ve correctly understood their argument and the logic I’ve just laid out holds.)
For me this is where the symmetry with doomsday argument breaks. Because here the result of the die roll is actually randomly selected from a distribution from 1 to 100.
While with doomsday argument it’s not the case. I’m not selected among all the humans throughout the time to be instantiated in 21st century. That’s not how causal process that produced me works. Actually, that’s not how causality itself works. Future humans causally depend on the past humans it’s not an independant random variable at all.
I agree that they are not symmetrical. My point with that thought experiment was to counter one of their arguments, which as I understand it can be paraphrased to:
My thought experiment with the dice was meant to show that this reasoning also applies to regular expected utility maximization, so if they use that argument to dismiss all anthropic reasoning, then they have to reject basically all probabilistic decision making. Presumably they will not reject all probabilistic reasoning, and therefore they have to reject this argument. (Assuming that I’ve correctly understood their argument and the logic I’ve just laid out holds.)
Edit: Minor changes to improve clarity.