Also, the very fact that you talk about “arguing [...] whether or not you can be [...] sexist [...] without [property X]” implies that there exists some Platonic idea of “sexism,” since otherwise it would be a trivial question of whether property X is included in the definition.
It is trivial. Jandila’s definition of sexism and racism does not include the speaker being a bigot as a necessary criterion. Now, I often complain to my anti-subordination activisty friends that a lot of people don’t realize their definitions of racism and sexism don’t imply that. It’s a problem since people tend to get more defensive than they need to be when someone points out something they did or said that is racist, sexist, anti- gay, etc. But people getting defensive after they know these words don’t imply bigotry really is silly. And yet it still happens—which is why Jandila doesn’t always have the patience to deal with it.
That’s because words like “bigot, racist, sexist, anti- gay” are frequently used to sneak in conotations that the argument in question (and by extension the person making it) is somehow immoral and can be dismissed without looking at its validity, or at the very least requires us to engage in motivated continuation until the argument has been “rationally” dismissed. If you and Jandila don’t mean to sneak in these connotations, say so; however, in that case you should probably pick a word that doesn’t have these connotations in common usage.
I didn’t mind being told my behavior pattern matches with that of bad people’s by people who I thought think probabilistically.
If someone were to see me handcuffed in the back of a police car with blood all over me, they should think me more likely to have killed someone than if they hadn’t seen that. If they concluded I killed someone because they saw me there, they would just be stupid.
All I really need is for two (Asch conformity) of twelve regular people who accept stupid arguments to accept arguments I am not guilty, or one nut juror, or one intelligent juror.
I am reticent to discuss this without there being any object level issue—I don’t trust either side’s claims about how these words are ‘frequently used’. I would be comfortable evaluating a specific instance of the use of these words but I suspect discussion of how they tend to be used will just leave people insisting on generalities that flatter their own ideology. Both sides have ways of framing the other’s rhetorical techniques as harmful and destructive to honest communication. And both sides are often oblivious to what the other side is saying. Usually when words like sexist and racist are thrown out the users usually have reasons why they used those words instead of others despite (or I guess sometimes because of) connotations. But again, those reasons can’t be evaluated in abstract.
I suspect discussion of how they tend to be used will just leave people insisting on generalities that flatter their own ideology.
I think that the burden of proof is on those criticizing authors for using particular language.
But again, those reasons can’t be evaluated in abstract.
It ought to disqualify the prosecutors from bringing such cases if there can’t be evidence to support them, so it seems to me you’re on a “side” if you think that.
I think that the burden of proof is on those criticizing authors for using particular language.
Both sides are criticizing the other for using particular language. Bob says x. Susan says saying x is racist (criticizing Bob). Bob says saying something is racist sneaks in connotations (criticizing Susan).
It ought to disqualify the prosecutors from bringing such cases if there can’t be evidence to support them, so it seems to me you’re on a “side” if you think that.
I don’t know what you’re talking about here.
Edit: If I understand you right I guess I don’t see a justification for ‘burden of proof’ type analyses except in literal court rooms. There usually isn’t a reason for them other than presumption and status quo bias.
Both sides are criticizing the other for using particular language.
The criticisms are importantly different.
“Susan says saying x is racist.”
There is nothing wrong with that statement, but “arguing [...] whether or not you can be racist/sexist/whatever without intentionally being a bigot,” is confused, though not necessarily accusatory.
“Bob says saying something is racist sneaks in connotations.”
Bob is saying something not confused, but coherent and accusatory. “If you and Jandila don’t mean to sneak in these connotations, say so;” is unfair. Bob has to address the argument as if those connotations were not intended, even if they probably were (in his mind), or weren’t but probably are so misinterpreted by others (in his models of them), he can’t decline to address the actual argument unless he has overwhelming evidence that it was designed primarily to manipulate and not substantially to present evidence.
If it’s easier for Bob to show the argument is dishonest rather than refute it, it’s fine to let him do that if he feels it is better for some reason, and I don’t think Bob owes an explanation of how the argument was wrong or even an honest attempt to try and understand it, depending on how sinuous and sinuous it was.
Susan’s statement isn’t supposed to be a counter argument, just an argument. (When I described the situation above I could have as easily started with “Bob does something racist” instead of “says. She may or may not have a propositional disagreement with what Bob said.)
[And now we have two threads about Bob. He is apparently both a racist and terrible with women.]
It relies on the implication that the user of the word frowns on racisms and that other people ought to as well. This is different from the connotation that someone who does something racist must be intentionally bigoted or some kind of secret white supremacist. The difference is that the first is merely a normative implication that is obvious to everyone while the second suggests additional beliefs about Bob that are being snuck in but not officially defended by anyone.
It relies on the implication that the user of the word frowns on racisms and that other people ought to as well.
That’s still sneaking in connotations unless deserving to be frowned upon is part of the definition of “racism”. However, in that case Susan needs to establish that the action and/or argument deserves to be frowned upon in addition to satisfying the other parts of the definition of racism to justify her claim that the action and/or argument is indeed “racist”. Notice that what you called “defensiveness” in the comment that started this sub-thread is simply Bob pointing out that she hasn’t done so.
Essentially Susan is trying to argue that Bob’s action and/or argument is racist and hence by definition bad. This argument runs into the problem Eliezer discusses in that article.
Essentially Susan is trying to argue that Bob’s action and/or argument is racist and hence by definition bad.
Too many guards were facing the wrong direction until now.
The problem isn’t so much that connotations may sneak in, it’s that relevance may sneak out. That’s why I said some things were confused and not even an argument: the key step was that a label applied and everything with that label was invalid, and that thinking something is an argument doesn’t make it so be it sentences or even a string of arbitrary characters, and so on.
It’s too difficult and too costly in terms of accusations made and inferences drained from language to zealously guard against bad connotations.
That’s still sneaking in connotations unless deserving to be frowned upon is part of the definition of “racism”.
No, it’s merely an assumption in polite society. Bob is free to say that he doesn’t care that he’s being racist—but that is not what he is being defensive about.
The defensiveness is in response to the connotation which Jandila at the very start of the thread disclaimed:
if there’s one thing I don’t need more of in my life it’s arguing with a population comprised mostly of wealthy, white Libertarian-esque cisgendered/heterosexual men whether or not you can be racist/sexist/whatever without intentionally being a bigot.
There is a connotation that doing something racist or sexist means you’re intentionally trying to hurt people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant. When I say there is an implication to the word “racism” that my activist friends aren’t paying attention to I’m talking about that not the implication that a racist statement shouldn’t be said. Note, those activist friends consider everyone a racist, themselves included.
There is a connotation that doing something racist or sexist means you’re intentionally trying to hurt people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant.
You’re still trying to sneak in connotations, notice how you seem to be trying to exclude the possibility that a statement you describe as racist could actually be true, or that an action you describe as racist could actually be rational.
Also, why are you getting so defensive about my pointing out that you’re sneaking in connotations? There is a connotation that sneaking in connotations or exhibiting some other bias means you’re intentionally trying to mislead people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant. Note, people on lesswrong consider everyone biased, themselves included.
You’re still trying to sneak in connotations, notice how you seem to be trying to exclude the possibility that a statement you describe as racist could actually be true, or that an action you describe as racist could actually be rational.
I don’t notice how I seem to be doing it, actually.
Also, why are you getting so defensive about my pointing out that your sneaking in connotations? There is a connotation that sneaking in connotations or exhibiting some other bias means you’re intentionally trying to mislead people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant. Note, people on lesswrong consider everyone biased, themselves included.
Clever. It’s actually a good analogy. I’m really not getting defensive, just frustrated that you seem to be misunderstanding me (which is weird because I thought your original comment understood me perfectly).
You’re still trying to sneak in connotations, notice how you seem to be trying to exclude the possibility that a statement you describe as racist could actually be true, or that an action you describe as racist could actually be rational.
I don’t notice how I seem to be doing it, actually.
The statement I quoted:
There is a connotation that doing something racist or sexist means you’re intentionally trying to hurt people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant.
seems to imply that the only reason one would make a “racist” statement is either out of a desire to hurt people or out of ignorance.
Clever. It’s actually a good analogy.
One difference is that the definition of bias as used on lw does explicitly include the requirement that they provide incorrect results, as such I’ve been providing you with links to the relevant lesswrong articles.
I’m really not getting defensive,
One reason I did that is so you could see how annoying arguments of the form:
“Why are you getting so defensive about my accusing you of bad thing X, X doesn’t imply worse thing Y?”
“may subjectively be considered a counterargument but that doesn’t make it important. The statement was made because it was intended to make a certain point, even though its mechanism was to exclude things from consideration based on a labeling criteria too many steps removed from truth.”
Btw, Could you provide your definition of “bigot”? I’ve gotten a vague idea of what you mean by the word from context, but I’d like to see your formulation. (Note: be prepared to explain why being a “bigot” is obviously a “very bad thing”.)
The predominant usage in modern English refers to persons hostile to those of differing sex, race, ethnicity, religion or spirituality, nationality, language, inter-regional prejudice, gender and sexual orientation, age, homelessness, various medical disorders particularly behavioral disorders and addictive disorders.
(Note: be prepared to explain why being a “bigot” is obviously a very bad thing”.)
I am not so prepared—though it doesn’t seem especially controversial to me I am vaguely open to an argument that it isn’t obvious. But I don’t see why I should be expected to explain why.
The predominant usage in modern English refers to persons hostile to those of differing sex, race, ethnicity, religion or spirituality, nationality, language, inter-regional prejudice, gender and sexual orientation, age, homelessness, various medical disorders particularly behavioral disorders and addictive disorders.
So if I believe that, say, religion X is wrong and its teachings are immoral, do I qualify as a bigot under this definition?
Thats a unique example in that definition, that, in retrospect I should have perhaps left out. Unlike the other groupings religion partly consists in beliefs and values which I think it is often important to be hostile to. Those beliefs and values are closely tied to the culture of a religion which I don’t think people should be hostile to. I would not call someone a bigot for criticizing, mocking or insulting the beliefs and values associated with a particular religion. Doing the same to the people themselves or the culture, purposefully, and not the result of merely being uninformed or temporarily blinded would make a person a bigot.
Obviously it’s specific contents are political and I don’t necessarily think it is complete (or as we seen without mistakes)-- but the criteria for an ideal list is something like ‘classes of people that agents cannot help but be members of’.
Yeah. It’s a mess of a hard problem. Thats why I try not to talk about it here because nobody is good at talking about it rationally. I’m not defending every instance of someone calling something racist, sexist etc. I’m not defending everything the people who tend to do it nor the list of groups they do it for.
That being the case I don’t think the solution is to deny the harms people are talking about when they complain about racism, sexism etc. And it’s going to get talked about at some point just like all politics.
That being the case I don’t think the solution is to deny the harms people are talking about when they complain about racism, sexism etc.
Nor is the solution to suppress discussion of statements that could be construed as bigoted. Even statements about race and IQ, or whether homosexuality is a sexual deviance.
To be fare, the main problem on LessWrong, as opposed to the world in general, is people engaging in motivated stopping and motivated continuation when discussing these topics in an attempt to avoid being sexist (for some reason race is less of a problem) and/or bigots.
Does this question have empirical content that constrains my anticipated experiences? Or is it just a value judgment?
I don’t think there is a lot of room or reason to discuss terminal or near-terminal value judgments. I find that criticism along the lines of “Stop valuing that, it’s a character defect” is a perfectly reasonable response to terminal value judgments that I disagree with (though I try not to penalize people for value disagreement here since people with bad values can still be insightful about factual matters).
With something like race and IQ I don’t think they should be suppressed and haven’t tried to suppress them (I have comments elsewhere lamenting such suppression). But do think it is reasonable to expect those conversations to occur at a higher level than they have so far. For whatever reason the most vocal advocates of genetic inheritance as an explanation for the race IQ gap have been worse than average commenters. A while back I linked to an article Steve Hsu wrote on the subject, he showed up and there was briefly a really good back and forth on the subject. But for the most part discussion of the subject here consists of anecdotal evidence, baseless claims and people on both sides paying no attention to the relevant studies or population genetics. It is worthwhile in these cases, I think, for people to do what they can to avoid pattern matching with something designed to demean or oppress people. Both to avoid hurting people unnecessarily and to avoid triggering mind-killing. You don’t have to sound like George Cuvier to argue for a genetic explanation of the race IQ-gap.
Edit: Though apparently we can’t even talk about talking it without the both of us being downvoted.
About race and IQ, that really hasn’t been a problem here.
But for the most part discussion of the subject here consists of anecdotal evidence, baseless claims and people on both sides paying no attention to the relevant studies or population genetics.
Part of the problem is how politicized population genetics has become.
I should probably have listed as an example something like talking about PUA and whether it works, because that has caused problems here, despite being less controversial in the outside world.
Edit: Though apparently we can’t even talk about talking it without the both of us being downvoted.
The only thing that offended me was the one value judgment in the bunch:
the behaviors associated with the pederastic/dominating classical style are entangled with abuse and degradation in a way that can only be described as evil
And I’m not offended on behalf of homosexuals but on behalf of BDSMers and kinky people who take those styles and practice them, but only between consenting adults. The rest of the piece, I think, exhibited a lot of ignorance about modern homosexual and heterosexual sex and desire and an overconfidence in historical records about romantic homosexuality. But I think you might be surprised at how similar his point is to that made by some radical queer theorists I’ve read.
They exist, but they’re mostly all tangled up in whatever hybrid of Marxism and/or postmodernism is in vogue. Add in a sprinkling of half-understood genetics, evolution, and evolutionary psychology, and it’s just a monstrous headache every paragraph.
The one I have in mind is Lee Edelman. He quotes Hegel a lot. He does philosophy from an English department and works in post-structuralism and, wait for it, psychoanalytic theory. Probably not Less Wrong’s cup of tea. He does show gay porn in his lectures, though.
Anyway, he critiques what he calls “reproductive futurism”, by which he means the norms and values that serve to continue civilization in the traditional sense: “The children are our future”, the fact that political appeals on behalf of children are impossible to refuse, heterosexual marriage, the nuclear family, and the entire political edifice he sees as built up around the idea. He sees the figure of the queer person as someone left out of this social order. He suggests that rather than (or maybe in addition to) fighting for the right to join in the social order—through joining the military openly, gay marriage, gay adoption etc. gays and lesbians should resist the entirety of reproductive futurism.
He positively quotes conservatives for accurately revealing just how it is queers lie outside the established social order. I suspect he might see the “romantic homosexuality” style in the above linked blog post as acquiescence to reproductive futurism.
[That make sense to anyone? Just trying to translate the ideas into something reasonable sounding.]
“The children are our future”, the fact that political appeals on behalf of children are impossible to refuse, heterosexual marriage, the nuclear family, and the entire political edifice he sees as built up around the idea. He sees the figure of the queer person as someone left out of this social order. He suggests that rather than (or maybe in addition to) fighting for the right to join in the social order—through joining the military openly, gay marriage, gay adoption etc. gays and lesbians should resist the entirety of reproductive futurism.
Even if they succeed in that goal all they’ll do is cause the affected culture to evolve to extinction.
[That make sense to anyone? Just trying to translate the ideas into something reasonable sounding.]
This is more or less what conservatives have been accusing the gay-rights movement of being a cover for since day one.
apparently we can’t even talk about talking it without the both of us being downvoted.
Many comments like this one get net upvotes. Are you concerned with total or net votes? What are your net votes from such discussions? How possible would it be for you to reshape downvoted-type comments into upvoted-type comments, particularly because any one downvoted comment is unlikely to have received much of your editing attention?
both sides
Comments expressing the lament of “people on both sides” are likely to be downvoted by me. I have many similar loose heuristics, such as “vote down people arguing by definition”, “vote up people changing their mind”, “vote up people citing sources”, “vote down people who do not apply the principle of charity”, and “vote up comments in which people correctly use the word ‘literally’”.
You’re unlikely to avoid tripping any if you make multiple comments, but I think each is fair and generally the type of content I want to see gets communicated. Consequently I suggest being less concerned by total downvotes, even if your only other change is to be more concerned with net downvotes. It’s not really supposed to be possible to avoid tripping any wire any reader has.
But I don’t see you getting net downvotes, so I’m not sure if that is instead your complaint...because that would be weird, as getting a near balance of favorable and unfavorable reviews isn’t too harsh a form of censorship.
I’m concerned not with my karma total but with the net-negative karma score for individual comments. A net negative karma for a comment signals that Less Wrong does not want to see that comment. When I see net negative comments I try to figure out why. For any one comment there are lots of possible explanations for downvoting. But when I see a trend that suggests downvoting heuristics I think are bad I sometimes publicly lament those heuristics. For example, I see a lot of bad pattern matching downvoting where people say things that unexamined resemble theistic apologist arguments. Taking any position that could be considered political also seems to be subject to downvoting. Especially when that position is inconsistent with the values of the local demographic cluster. Laments of downvote heuristics seems to be a rather unpopular comment type as well. These heuristics have a chilling effect on the discussions of those subjects and partly explain Eugine’s complaint:
To be fare, the main problem on LessWrong, as opposed to the world in general, is people engaging in motivated stopping and motivated continuation when discussing these topics in an attempt to avoid being sexist (for some reason race is less of a problem) and/or bigots.
Comments expressing the lament of “people on both sides” are likely to be downvoted by me.
Fair enough as a heuristic, though I’ll note I made it pretty clear which side I thought was worse in the preceding sentences. But don’t worry about your downvote- the heuristic you used was fine by me.
Laments of downvote heuristics seems to be a rather unpopular comment type as well.
Laments of downvote heuristics seem to be about why the complainer’s immediately preceding comments were downvoted.
How often are such complaint framed as laments that political allies were downvoted, much less neutrals or opponents?
If everyone writing a comment of content type X also always added spam links, I would downvote overconfident speculation about why people don’t like content X and how that makes them bad people.
But when I see a trend that suggests downvoting heuristics I think are bad I sometimes publicly lament those heuristics. For example, I see a lot of bad pattern matching downvoting where people say things that unexamined resemble theistic apologist arguments. Taking any position that could be considered political also seems to be subject to downvoting.
Outside of threads I’m personally involved in, I try to downvote any comment which seems detrimental to the overall signal-to-noise ratio on LW. Most often that means posts which are statistically illiterate, incoherent, obviously biased, or poorly written, which I imagine should be uncontroversial. Beyond content and style, though, it’s also possible for a post’s framing to lower the signal-to-noise ratio through a variety of knock-on effects.
Usually this happens by way of halo effects and their negative-affect equivalent (let’s call that a miasma effect, if it lacks a proper name): arguments matching religious apologia too closely, for example, tend to trigger a cluster of negative associations in our largely atheistic audience that prime it for confrontation even if the content itself is benign. Likewise for comments with political framing or drawing unwisely from political examples. I don’t usually click the downvote button on comments like these until there’s evidence of them actually causing problems, but that’s sufficiently common that I still end up burning a lot of votes on them.
I submit that this isn’t a bad heuristic. It’s one that shouldn’t be necessary if we were all free from emotive priming effects, but we clearly aren’t, and exposing ourselves to many sources of them isn’t going to help us get rid of the problem; in the meantime, discouraging such comments seems like a useful way of keeping the shouting down.
If I believe it’s better for people not to have behavioral disorders or/and addictive disorders develop a treatment and encourage people with said disorders to take it, am I being hostile? What if I do the same w.r.t. homosexuality?
BTW, if the answer to both those questions is “no”, I have no further problem with the definition.
Treating someone like an enemy. Shrug. I don’t have a clear bright line or anything, the amount and intensity of bigotry someone must exhibit before I’m comfortable calling them a bigoted person is pretty high.
If I believe it’s better for people not to have behavioral disorders or/and addictive disorders develop a treatment and encourage people with said disorders to take it am I being hostile? What if I do the same w.r.t. homosexuality?
In both cases it depends on why you want people to take the treatment.
We’re now very far from what was a pretty contingent defense of another commenter’s position and I don’t especially enjoy the topic...
It is trivial. Jandila’s definition of sexism and racism does not include the speaker being a bigot as a necessary criterion. Now, I often complain to my anti-subordination activisty friends that a lot of people don’t realize their definitions of racism and sexism don’t imply that. It’s a problem since people tend to get more defensive than they need to be when someone points out something they did or said that is racist, sexist, anti- gay, etc. But people getting defensive after they know these words don’t imply bigotry really is silly. And yet it still happens—which is why Jandila doesn’t always have the patience to deal with it.
That’s because words like “bigot, racist, sexist, anti- gay” are frequently used to sneak in conotations that the argument in question (and by extension the person making it) is somehow immoral and can be dismissed without looking at its validity, or at the very least requires us to engage in motivated continuation until the argument has been “rationally” dismissed. If you and Jandila don’t mean to sneak in these connotations, say so; however, in that case you should probably pick a word that doesn’t have these connotations in common usage.
I didn’t mind being told my behavior pattern matches with that of bad people’s by people who I thought think probabilistically.
If someone were to see me handcuffed in the back of a police car with blood all over me, they should think me more likely to have killed someone than if they hadn’t seen that. If they concluded I killed someone because they saw me there, they would just be stupid.
Scary thing is: The jury is made up of these people!
All I really need is for two (Asch conformity) of twelve regular people who accept stupid arguments to accept arguments I am not guilty, or one nut juror, or one intelligent juror.
I am reticent to discuss this without there being any object level issue—I don’t trust either side’s claims about how these words are ‘frequently used’. I would be comfortable evaluating a specific instance of the use of these words but I suspect discussion of how they tend to be used will just leave people insisting on generalities that flatter their own ideology. Both sides have ways of framing the other’s rhetorical techniques as harmful and destructive to honest communication. And both sides are often oblivious to what the other side is saying. Usually when words like sexist and racist are thrown out the users usually have reasons why they used those words instead of others despite (or I guess sometimes because of) connotations. But again, those reasons can’t be evaluated in abstract.
I think that the burden of proof is on those criticizing authors for using particular language.
It ought to disqualify the prosecutors from bringing such cases if there can’t be evidence to support them, so it seems to me you’re on a “side” if you think that.
Both sides are criticizing the other for using particular language. Bob says x. Susan says saying x is racist (criticizing Bob). Bob says saying something is racist sneaks in connotations (criticizing Susan).
I don’t know what you’re talking about here.
Edit: If I understand you right I guess I don’t see a justification for ‘burden of proof’ type analyses except in literal court rooms. There usually isn’t a reason for them other than presumption and status quo bias.
The criticisms are importantly different.
“Susan says saying x is racist.”
There is nothing wrong with that statement, but “arguing [...] whether or not you can be racist/sexist/whatever without intentionally being a bigot,” is confused, though not necessarily accusatory.
“Bob says saying something is racist sneaks in connotations.”
Bob is saying something not confused, but coherent and accusatory. “If you and Jandila don’t mean to sneak in these connotations, say so;” is unfair. Bob has to address the argument as if those connotations were not intended, even if they probably were (in his mind), or weren’t but probably are so misinterpreted by others (in his models of them), he can’t decline to address the actual argument unless he has overwhelming evidence that it was designed primarily to manipulate and not substantially to present evidence.
If it’s easier for Bob to show the argument is dishonest rather than refute it, it’s fine to let him do that if he feels it is better for some reason, and I don’t think Bob owes an explanation of how the argument was wrong or even an honest attempt to try and understand it, depending on how sinuous and sinuous it was.
(...)
The problem is that without the connotations associated with the word, Susan’s statement doesn’t even constitute a counter argument.
Susan’s statement isn’t supposed to be a counter argument, just an argument. (When I described the situation above I could have as easily started with “Bob does something racist” instead of “says. She may or may not have a propositional disagreement with what Bob said.)
[And now we have two threads about Bob. He is apparently both a racist and terrible with women.]
The presumed purpose of the statement is to criticize Bob’s argument and/or action. To do this it relies on the connotations of the word “racist”.
It relies on the implication that the user of the word frowns on racisms and that other people ought to as well. This is different from the connotation that someone who does something racist must be intentionally bigoted or some kind of secret white supremacist. The difference is that the first is merely a normative implication that is obvious to everyone while the second suggests additional beliefs about Bob that are being snuck in but not officially defended by anyone.
That’s still sneaking in connotations unless deserving to be frowned upon is part of the definition of “racism”. However, in that case Susan needs to establish that the action and/or argument deserves to be frowned upon in addition to satisfying the other parts of the definition of racism to justify her claim that the action and/or argument is indeed “racist”. Notice that what you called “defensiveness” in the comment that started this sub-thread is simply Bob pointing out that she hasn’t done so.
Essentially Susan is trying to argue that Bob’s action and/or argument is racist and hence by definition bad. This argument runs into the problem Eliezer discusses in that article.
Too many guards were facing the wrong direction until now.
The problem isn’t so much that connotations may sneak in, it’s that relevance may sneak out. That’s why I said some things were confused and not even an argument: the key step was that a label applied and everything with that label was invalid, and that thinking something is an argument doesn’t make it so be it sentences or even a string of arbitrary characters, and so on.
It’s too difficult and too costly in terms of accusations made and inferences drained from language to zealously guard against bad connotations.
No, it’s merely an assumption in polite society. Bob is free to say that he doesn’t care that he’s being racist—but that is not what he is being defensive about.
The defensiveness is in response to the connotation which Jandila at the very start of the thread disclaimed:
There is a connotation that doing something racist or sexist means you’re intentionally trying to hurt people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant. When I say there is an implication to the word “racism” that my activist friends aren’t paying attention to I’m talking about that not the implication that a racist statement shouldn’t be said. Note, those activist friends consider everyone a racist, themselves included.
You’re still trying to sneak in connotations, notice how you seem to be trying to exclude the possibility that a statement you describe as racist could actually be true, or that an action you describe as racist could actually be rational.
Also, why are you getting so defensive about my pointing out that you’re sneaking in connotations? There is a connotation that sneaking in connotations or exhibiting some other bias means you’re intentionally trying to mislead people, that you’re a bad person instead of just making a mistake or being ignorant. Note, people on lesswrong consider everyone biased, themselves included.
I don’t notice how I seem to be doing it, actually.
Clever. It’s actually a good analogy. I’m really not getting defensive, just frustrated that you seem to be misunderstanding me (which is weird because I thought your original comment understood me perfectly).
The statement I quoted:
seems to imply that the only reason one would make a “racist” statement is either out of a desire to hurt people or out of ignorance.
One difference is that the definition of bias as used on lw does explicitly include the requirement that they provide incorrect results, as such I’ve been providing you with links to the relevant lesswrong articles.
One reason I did that is so you could see how annoying arguments of the form:
“Why are you getting so defensive about my accusing you of bad thing X, X doesn’t imply worse thing Y?”
are when you’re on the receiving end of them.
What if someone thought that even with the connotations associated with the word, it still wouldn’t constitute a counter argument?
Then why did Susan make that statement at all?
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Is that a ponycode?
It’s ponycode for:
“may subjectively be considered a counterargument but that doesn’t make it important. The statement was made because it was intended to make a certain point, even though its mechanism was to exclude things from consideration based on a labeling criteria too many steps removed from truth.”
Btw, Could you provide your definition of “bigot”? I’ve gotten a vague idea of what you mean by the word from context, but I’d like to see your formulation. (Note: be prepared to explain why being a “bigot” is obviously a “very bad thing”.)
Wikipedia looks fine:
I am not so prepared—though it doesn’t seem especially controversial to me I am vaguely open to an argument that it isn’t obvious. But I don’t see why I should be expected to explain why.
So if I believe that, say, religion X is wrong and its teachings are immoral, do I qualify as a bigot under this definition?
Only if you are therefore hostile to its members.
Depending on what you mean by “hostile” that may be a perfectly reasonable course of action.
Thats a unique example in that definition, that, in retrospect I should have perhaps left out. Unlike the other groupings religion partly consists in beliefs and values which I think it is often important to be hostile to. Those beliefs and values are closely tied to the culture of a religion which I don’t think people should be hostile to. I would not call someone a bigot for criticizing, mocking or insulting the beliefs and values associated with a particular religion. Doing the same to the people themselves or the culture, purposefully, and not the result of merely being uninformed or temporarily blinded would make a person a bigot.
What exactly is the criterion for being an element on the list?
Obviously it’s specific contents are political and I don’t necessarily think it is complete (or as we seen without mistakes)-- but the criteria for an ideal list is something like ‘classes of people that agents cannot help but be members of’.
And that’s the problem given that politics is the mindkiller.
Yeah. It’s a mess of a hard problem. Thats why I try not to talk about it here because nobody is good at talking about it rationally. I’m not defending every instance of someone calling something racist, sexist etc. I’m not defending everything the people who tend to do it nor the list of groups they do it for.
That being the case I don’t think the solution is to deny the harms people are talking about when they complain about racism, sexism etc. And it’s going to get talked about at some point just like all politics.
Nor is the solution to suppress discussion of statements that could be construed as bigoted. Even statements about race and IQ, or whether homosexuality is a sexual deviance.
To be fare, the main problem on LessWrong, as opposed to the world in general, is people engaging in motivated stopping and motivated continuation when discussing these topics in an attempt to avoid being sexist (for some reason race is less of a problem) and/or bigots.
Does this question have empirical content that constrains my anticipated experiences? Or is it just a value judgment?
I don’t think there is a lot of room or reason to discuss terminal or near-terminal value judgments. I find that criticism along the lines of “Stop valuing that, it’s a character defect” is a perfectly reasonable response to terminal value judgments that I disagree with (though I try not to penalize people for value disagreement here since people with bad values can still be insightful about factual matters).
With something like race and IQ I don’t think they should be suppressed and haven’t tried to suppress them (I have comments elsewhere lamenting such suppression). But do think it is reasonable to expect those conversations to occur at a higher level than they have so far. For whatever reason the most vocal advocates of genetic inheritance as an explanation for the race IQ gap have been worse than average commenters. A while back I linked to an article Steve Hsu wrote on the subject, he showed up and there was briefly a really good back and forth on the subject. But for the most part discussion of the subject here consists of anecdotal evidence, baseless claims and people on both sides paying no attention to the relevant studies or population genetics. It is worthwhile in these cases, I think, for people to do what they can to avoid pattern matching with something designed to demean or oppress people. Both to avoid hurting people unnecessarily and to avoid triggering mind-killing. You don’t have to sound like George Cuvier to argue for a genetic explanation of the race IQ-gap.
Edit: Though apparently we can’t even talk about talking it without the both of us being downvoted.
I had in mind something like this.
About race and IQ, that really hasn’t been a problem here.
Part of the problem is how politicized population genetics has become.
I should probably have listed as an example something like talking about PUA and whether it works, because that has caused problems here, despite being less controversial in the outside world.
Welcome to my reality. ;)
The only thing that offended me was the one value judgment in the bunch:
And I’m not offended on behalf of homosexuals but on behalf of BDSMers and kinky people who take those styles and practice them, but only between consenting adults. The rest of the piece, I think, exhibited a lot of ignorance about modern homosexual and heterosexual sex and desire and an overconfidence in historical records about romantic homosexuality. But I think you might be surprised at how similar his point is to that made by some radical queer theorists I’ve read.
They exist, but they’re mostly all tangled up in whatever hybrid of Marxism and/or postmodernism is in vogue. Add in a sprinkling of half-understood genetics, evolution, and evolutionary psychology, and it’s just a monstrous headache every paragraph.
The one I have in mind is Lee Edelman. He quotes Hegel a lot. He does philosophy from an English department and works in post-structuralism and, wait for it, psychoanalytic theory. Probably not Less Wrong’s cup of tea. He does show gay porn in his lectures, though.
Anyway, he critiques what he calls “reproductive futurism”, by which he means the norms and values that serve to continue civilization in the traditional sense: “The children are our future”, the fact that political appeals on behalf of children are impossible to refuse, heterosexual marriage, the nuclear family, and the entire political edifice he sees as built up around the idea. He sees the figure of the queer person as someone left out of this social order. He suggests that rather than (or maybe in addition to) fighting for the right to join in the social order—through joining the military openly, gay marriage, gay adoption etc. gays and lesbians should resist the entirety of reproductive futurism.
He positively quotes conservatives for accurately revealing just how it is queers lie outside the established social order. I suspect he might see the “romantic homosexuality” style in the above linked blog post as acquiescence to reproductive futurism.
[That make sense to anyone? Just trying to translate the ideas into something reasonable sounding.]
Even if they succeed in that goal all they’ll do is cause the affected culture to evolve to extinction.
This is more or less what conservatives have been accusing the gay-rights movement of being a cover for since day one.
Many comments like this one get net upvotes. Are you concerned with total or net votes? What are your net votes from such discussions? How possible would it be for you to reshape downvoted-type comments into upvoted-type comments, particularly because any one downvoted comment is unlikely to have received much of your editing attention?
Comments expressing the lament of “people on both sides” are likely to be downvoted by me. I have many similar loose heuristics, such as “vote down people arguing by definition”, “vote up people changing their mind”, “vote up people citing sources”, “vote down people who do not apply the principle of charity”, and “vote up comments in which people correctly use the word ‘literally’”.
You’re unlikely to avoid tripping any if you make multiple comments, but I think each is fair and generally the type of content I want to see gets communicated. Consequently I suggest being less concerned by total downvotes, even if your only other change is to be more concerned with net downvotes. It’s not really supposed to be possible to avoid tripping any wire any reader has.
But I don’t see you getting net downvotes, so I’m not sure if that is instead your complaint...because that would be weird, as getting a near balance of favorable and unfavorable reviews isn’t too harsh a form of censorship.
I’m concerned not with my karma total but with the net-negative karma score for individual comments. A net negative karma for a comment signals that Less Wrong does not want to see that comment. When I see net negative comments I try to figure out why. For any one comment there are lots of possible explanations for downvoting. But when I see a trend that suggests downvoting heuristics I think are bad I sometimes publicly lament those heuristics. For example, I see a lot of bad pattern matching downvoting where people say things that unexamined resemble theistic apologist arguments. Taking any position that could be considered political also seems to be subject to downvoting. Especially when that position is inconsistent with the values of the local demographic cluster. Laments of downvote heuristics seems to be a rather unpopular comment type as well. These heuristics have a chilling effect on the discussions of those subjects and partly explain Eugine’s complaint:
Fair enough as a heuristic, though I’ll note I made it pretty clear which side I thought was worse in the preceding sentences. But don’t worry about your downvote- the heuristic you used was fine by me.
Laments of downvote heuristics seem to be about why the complainer’s immediately preceding comments were downvoted.
How often are such complaint framed as laments that political allies were downvoted, much less neutrals or opponents?
If everyone writing a comment of content type X also always added spam links, I would downvote overconfident speculation about why people don’t like content X and how that makes them bad people.
Outside of threads I’m personally involved in, I try to downvote any comment which seems detrimental to the overall signal-to-noise ratio on LW. Most often that means posts which are statistically illiterate, incoherent, obviously biased, or poorly written, which I imagine should be uncontroversial. Beyond content and style, though, it’s also possible for a post’s framing to lower the signal-to-noise ratio through a variety of knock-on effects.
Usually this happens by way of halo effects and their negative-affect equivalent (let’s call that a miasma effect, if it lacks a proper name): arguments matching religious apologia too closely, for example, tend to trigger a cluster of negative associations in our largely atheistic audience that prime it for confrontation even if the content itself is benign. Likewise for comments with political framing or drawing unwisely from political examples. I don’t usually click the downvote button on comments like these until there’s evidence of them actually causing problems, but that’s sufficiently common that I still end up burning a lot of votes on them.
I submit that this isn’t a bad heuristic. It’s one that shouldn’t be necessary if we were all free from emotive priming effects, but we clearly aren’t, and exposing ourselves to many sources of them isn’t going to help us get rid of the problem; in the meantime, discouraging such comments seems like a useful way of keeping the shouting down.
If someone is going to be pulling a thread dangerously close to politics, we should expect those comments to be held to a higher standard.
What do you label with that symbol? How do you know no aspect of any of them should be criticized, mocked, or insulted?
Good point. Consider it striked.
I had assigned what felt like a 10% probability to your defending that without falling to the no true Scotsman fallacy, so I am disappointed.
Also, what do you mean by hostile?
If I believe it’s better for people not to have behavioral disorders or/and addictive disorders develop a treatment and encourage people with said disorders to take it, am I being hostile? What if I do the same w.r.t. homosexuality?
BTW, if the answer to both those questions is “no”, I have no further problem with the definition.
Treating someone like an enemy. Shrug. I don’t have a clear bright line or anything, the amount and intensity of bigotry someone must exhibit before I’m comfortable calling them a bigoted person is pretty high.
In both cases it depends on why you want people to take the treatment.
We’re now very far from what was a pretty contingent defense of another commenter’s position and I don’t especially enjoy the topic...