Well, that and demonstrating that Identity Isn’t in Specific Atoms because there is no such thing as specific atoms, and being a good example of weirdness being a reaction of the mind, not a property of the physics.
And, subordinate to those three, the point that Occam’s Razor applies to code not RAM (so to speak). Worth mentioning since I think that’s the part that went over shminux’s head.
And, subordinate to those three, the point that Occam’s Razor applies to code not RAM (so to speak). Worth mentioning since I think that’s the part that went over shminux’s head.
You are right, it did the first time I tried to honestly estimate the complexity of QM (I wish someone else bother to do it numerically, as well). However, even when removing the necessary boundary conditions and grid storage (they take up lots of RAM), one still ends up with the code that evolves the Schroediger equation (complicated) and applies the Born postulate (trivial) for any interpretation.
But collapse interpretations require additional non-local algorithms
Not for computations, they do not. If you try to write a code simulating a QM system, end up writing unitary evolution on top of the elliptic time-independent SE (H psi = E psi) to describe the initial state. If you want to calculate probabilities, such as the pattern on the screen from the double-slit experiment, you apply the Born rule. And computational complexity is the only thing thing that matters for Occam’s razor.
And, subordinate to those three, the point that Occam’s Razor applies to code not RAM (so to speak). Worth mentioning since I think that’s the part that went over shminux’s head.
I think the supposed Occamian benefit is overstated. E.g., the transactional interpretation has an Occamian benefit in that you don’t asymmetrically reject advanced wave solutions to Maxwell’s equations, and yet I don’t see anyone telling me that therefore the T.I. is obviously correct. Mirror matter: predicted by fundamental-ness of supersymmetry, Occamian benefit, still highly speculative. (Don’t have a PhD in physics (dropped out of high school physics), only felt justified in replying to wedrifid because AFAIK he doesn’t have a PhD in physics either. Someone with domain knowledge, please correct/refine/embarrass my point.)
Mirror matter comes from “N=2” supersymmetry, where along with the usual particle and its superpartner, you have a mirror partner for both of those. Ordinary “N=1″ supersymmetry doesn’t have the mirrors. N=2 supersymmetry is of major interest mathematically, but it’s difficult to get the standard model from an N=2 theory. But if you did, the mirror matter might be the dark matter. It’s in my top ten of cool possibilities, but I can’t say it’s favored by Occam.
I think the supposed Occamian benefit is overstated.
To clarify, do you mean that Eliezer overstated the degree to which the RAM vs code simplicity point applies to this specific physics example, or that Eliezer overstated the principle itself? I’m more inclined to accept the former than the latter.
Maybe he didn’t overstate the significance of the principle even when it comes to interpreting QM, but I think using it to pick out a particular interpretation (whether MWI or TI) leads to overconfidence, and isn’t very good evidence in itself, compared to relatively naive considerations like “using straightforward physical intuition, this idea that other worlds are somehow in a metaphysical sense as ‘real’ as our world doesn’t seem likely to hold water”. In retrospect I might be attributing connotations to Eliezer’s original argument that weren’t in that specific argument and only implicit in the overall tone of the sequence. It’s been two years since I read the QM sequence.
Maybe he didn’t overstate the significance of the principle even when it comes to interpreting QM, but I think using it to pick out a particular interpretation (whether MWI or TI) leads to overconfidence, and isn’t very good evidence in itself, compared to relatively naive considerations like “using straightforward physical intuition, this idea that other worlds are somehow in a metaphysical sense as ‘real’ as our world doesn’t seem likely to hold water”.
I place less value on metaphisical intuitions about what ‘real’ means. I do not particularly like the baggage that comes with MWI, I do like the principle of asserting that we can consider reality as we understand it to be more or less just like the core math—with any additional mechanisms required to make our intuitions fit rejected out of hand.
The undesirable baggage of “MWI” extends to the titular concept. The whole idea of “Many Worlds” seems to be a description that would be made by those stuck in the mindset of someone stuck with trying to force reality to be like our metaphisical intuitions of a simple classical world. As far as I am aware experiments have not identified any level at which the worlds are discrete like that (except for the sense in which you could allocate each possible configuration of a universe down to the level of plank distances and suchforth as a ‘World’.) So the question “are the other Worlds ‘real’” doesn’t seem to qualify for a yes or no answer so much as a “huh? There’s just a ‘reality’ of the stuff in this wave equation. Call some specific subset of that a ‘world’ if you really want to.”
It’s been two years since I read the QM sequence.
It’s been at least that for me too (it isn’t a sequence that works in audio format, which is my preferred media). I place very low confidence on what I remember of QM from there and research elsewhere and only placed slightly higher confidence on my understanding even back when I remembered it.
There are certain assertions that I am comfortable rejecting but the specific positive assertions I have little confidence. For example I have no qualms with dismissing “but they are all just ‘interpretations’ and all interpretations are equal” sentiments. If additional mechanisms are introduced that isn’t just interpretation. Interpretation is a question of which words are used to describe the math.
the point that Occam’s Razor applies to code not RAM (so to speak).
This is true only if you are using some variant of a Kolmogorov prior. Many ways of dealing with Pascal’s mugging try to use other priors. Moreover, this will be not true in general for any computable prior.
And, subordinate to those three, the point that Occam’s Razor applies to code not RAM (so to speak). Worth mentioning since I think that’s the part that went over shminux’s head.
You are right, it did the first time I tried to honestly estimate the complexity of QM (I wish someone else bother to do it numerically, as well). However, even when removing the necessary boundary conditions and grid storage (they take up lots of RAM), one still ends up with the code that evolves the Schroediger equation (complicated) and applies the Born postulate (trivial) for any interpretation.
But collapse interpretations require additional non-local algorithms, which to me seem to be, by necessity, incredibly complicated
Not for computations, they do not. If you try to write a code simulating a QM system, end up writing unitary evolution on top of the elliptic time-independent SE (H psi = E psi) to describe the initial state. If you want to calculate probabilities, such as the pattern on the screen from the double-slit experiment, you apply the Born rule. And computational complexity is the only thing thing that matters for Occam’s razor.
I think the supposed Occamian benefit is overstated. E.g., the transactional interpretation has an Occamian benefit in that you don’t asymmetrically reject advanced wave solutions to Maxwell’s equations, and yet I don’t see anyone telling me that therefore the T.I. is obviously correct. Mirror matter: predicted by fundamental-ness of supersymmetry, Occamian benefit, still highly speculative. (Don’t have a PhD in physics (dropped out of high school physics), only felt justified in replying to wedrifid because AFAIK he doesn’t have a PhD in physics either. Someone with domain knowledge, please correct/refine/embarrass my point.)
Mirror matter comes from “N=2” supersymmetry, where along with the usual particle and its superpartner, you have a mirror partner for both of those. Ordinary “N=1″ supersymmetry doesn’t have the mirrors. N=2 supersymmetry is of major interest mathematically, but it’s difficult to get the standard model from an N=2 theory. But if you did, the mirror matter might be the dark matter. It’s in my top ten of cool possibilities, but I can’t say it’s favored by Occam.
I’d be interested in reading more about your top ten cool possibilities. They sound cool.
To clarify, do you mean that Eliezer overstated the degree to which the RAM vs code simplicity point applies to this specific physics example, or that Eliezer overstated the principle itself? I’m more inclined to accept the former than the latter.
Maybe he didn’t overstate the significance of the principle even when it comes to interpreting QM, but I think using it to pick out a particular interpretation (whether MWI or TI) leads to overconfidence, and isn’t very good evidence in itself, compared to relatively naive considerations like “using straightforward physical intuition, this idea that other worlds are somehow in a metaphysical sense as ‘real’ as our world doesn’t seem likely to hold water”. In retrospect I might be attributing connotations to Eliezer’s original argument that weren’t in that specific argument and only implicit in the overall tone of the sequence. It’s been two years since I read the QM sequence.
I place less value on metaphisical intuitions about what ‘real’ means. I do not particularly like the baggage that comes with MWI, I do like the principle of asserting that we can consider reality as we understand it to be more or less just like the core math—with any additional mechanisms required to make our intuitions fit rejected out of hand.
The undesirable baggage of “MWI” extends to the titular concept. The whole idea of “Many Worlds” seems to be a description that would be made by those stuck in the mindset of someone stuck with trying to force reality to be like our metaphisical intuitions of a simple classical world. As far as I am aware experiments have not identified any level at which the worlds are discrete like that (except for the sense in which you could allocate each possible configuration of a universe down to the level of plank distances and suchforth as a ‘World’.) So the question “are the other Worlds ‘real’” doesn’t seem to qualify for a yes or no answer so much as a “huh? There’s just a ‘reality’ of the stuff in this wave equation. Call some specific subset of that a ‘world’ if you really want to.”
It’s been at least that for me too (it isn’t a sequence that works in audio format, which is my preferred media). I place very low confidence on what I remember of QM from there and research elsewhere and only placed slightly higher confidence on my understanding even back when I remembered it.
There are certain assertions that I am comfortable rejecting but the specific positive assertions I have little confidence. For example I have no qualms with dismissing “but they are all just ‘interpretations’ and all interpretations are equal” sentiments. If additional mechanisms are introduced that isn’t just interpretation. Interpretation is a question of which words are used to describe the math.
Where can I get the sequences in audio format?
I recommend TextAloud.
This is true only if you are using some variant of a Kolmogorov prior. Many ways of dealing with Pascal’s mugging try to use other priors. Moreover, this will be not true in general for any computable prior.