I am not too familiar with how advocates of Pilot wave theory usually state this, but I want to disagree slightly.
I fully agree with the description of what happens mathematically in Pilot wave theory, but I think that there is a way in which the worlds that one finds oneself outside of do not exist.
If we assume that it is in fact just the particle positions which are “reality”, the only way in which the wave function (including all many worlds contributions) affects “reality” is by influencing its future dynamics.
Sure, this means that the many worlds computationally do exist even in pilot wave theory. But I find the idea that “the way that the world state evolves is influenced by huge amounts of world states that ‘could have been’” meaningfully different to “there literally are other worlds that include versions of myself which are just as real as I am”. The first is a lot closer to everyday intuitions.
Well, this works to the degree to which we can (arbitrarily?) decide the particle positions to define “reality” (the thing in the theory that we want to look at in order to locate ourselves in the theory) in a way that is separate from being computationally a part of the model.
One can easily have different opinions on how plausible this step is.
The Church-Turing thesis gives us the “substrate independence principle”. We could be living in a simulation. In principle, AI could be conscious. In principle, minds could be uploaded. Even granting that there’s such a thing as the superfluous corpuscles, the Universe still has to be computing the wave function.
Then the people made out of “pilot” waves instead of pilot waves and corpuscles would still be just as conscious as AIs or sims or ems could (in principle) be, and they would far outnumber the corpuscle folk. How do you know you’re not one of them? Is this an attachment to dualism, or do you have some other reason? Why do the corpuscles even need to exist?
The Church-Turing thesis gives us the “substrate independence principle”. In principle, AI could be conscious.
The C-T thesis gives you the substrate independence of computation. To get to the substrate independence of consciousness, you need the further premise that the performance of certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, including qualia. This is, of course, not known.
I don’t think this is correct, either (although it’s closer). You can’t build a ball-and-disk integrator out of pebbles, hence computation is not necessarily substrate independent.
What the Turing Thesis says is that a Turing machine, and also any system capable of emulating a Turing machine, is computationally general (i.e., can solve any problem that can be solved at all). You can build a Turing machine out of lots of substrates (including pebbles), hence lots of substrates are computationally general. So it’s possible to integrate a function using pebbles, but it’s not possible to do it using the same computation as the ball-and-disk integrator uses—the pebbles system will perform a very different computation to obtain the same result.
So even if you do hold that certain computations/algorithms are sufficient for consciousness, it still doesn’t follow that a simulated brain has identical consciousness to an original brain. You need an additional argument that says that the algorithms run by both systems are sufficiently similar.
Albert: “Suppose I replaced all the neurons in your head with tiny robotic artificial neurons that had the same connections, the same local input-output behavior, and analogous internal state and learning rules.”
Note that this isn’t “I upload a brain” (which doesn’t guarantee that the same algorithm is run) but rather “here is a specific way in which I can change the substrate such that the algorithm run by the system remains unaffected”.
I don’t think this is correct, either (although it’s closer). You can’t build a ball-and-disk integrator out of pebbles, hence computation is not necessarily substrate neutral.
Meaning that a strong version of computational substrate independence , where any substrate will do, is false? Maybe, but I was arguing against hypothetical, that “the substrate independence of computation implies the substrate independence of consciousness”, not *for* the antecedent, the substrate independence of computation.
What the Turing Thesis says is that a Turing machine, and also any system capable of emulating a Turing machine, is computationally general (i.e., can solve any problem that can be solved at all). You can build a Turing machine out of lots of substrates (including pebbles), hence lots of substrates are computationally general. So it’s possible to integrate a function using pebbles, but it’s not possible to do it using the same computation as the ball-and-disk integrator uses—the pebbles system will perform a very different computation to obtain the same result.
I don’t see the relevance.
So even if you do hold that certain computations/algorithms are sufficient for consciousness, it still doesn’t follow that a simulated brain has identical consciousness to an original brain. You need an additional argument that says that the algorithms run by both systems are sufficiently similar.
OK. A crappy computational emulation might not be conscious, because it’s crappy. It still doesn’t follow that a good emulation is necessarily conscious. You’re just pointing out another possible defeater.
This is a good opportunity to give Eliezer credit because he addressed something similar in the sequences and got the argument right:
Which argument? Are you saying that a good enough emulation is necessarily conscious?
Albert: “Suppose I replaced all the neurons in your head with tiny robotic artificial neurons that had the same connections, the same local input-output behavior, and analogous internal state and learning rules.”
Note that this isn’t “I upload a brain” (which doesn’t guarantee that the same algorithm is run)
If it’s detailed enough, it’s guaranteed to. That’s what “enough” means
but rather “here is a specific way in which I can change the substrate such that the algorithm run by the system remains unaffected”.
Ok...that might prove the substrate independence of computation, which I wasn’t arguing against. Past that, I don’t see your point
The result (at least partially) of a particular physical substrate. Physicalism and computationalism are both not-dualism , but they are not the same as each other.
Hmm.. . In my mind, the Pilot wave theory position does introduce a substrate dependence for the particle-position vs. wavefunction distinction, but need not distinguish any further than that.
This still leaves simulation, AI-consciousness and mind-uploads completely open. It seems to me that the Pilot wave vs. Many worlds question is independent of/orthogonal to these questions.
I fully agree that saying “only corpuscle folk is real” (nice term by the way!) is a move that needs explaining. One advantage of Pilot wave theory is that one need not wonder about where the Born probabilities are coming from—they are directly implied of one wishes to make predictions about the future.
One not-so-satisfying property is that the particle positions are fully guided by the wavefunction without any influence going the other way. I do agree that this makes it a lot easier to regard the positions as a superfluous addition that Occam’s razor should cut away.
For me, an important aspect of these discussions is that we know that our understanding is incomplete for every of these perspectives. Gravity has not been satisfyingly incorporated into any of these. Further, the Church-Turing thesis is an open question.
I am not too familiar with how advocates of Pilot wave theory usually state this, but I want to disagree slightly. I fully agree with the description of what happens mathematically in Pilot wave theory, but I think that there is a way in which the worlds that one finds oneself outside of do not exist.
If we assume that it is in fact just the particle positions which are “reality”, the only way in which the wave function (including all many worlds contributions) affects “reality” is by influencing its future dynamics. Sure, this means that the many worlds computationally do exist even in pilot wave theory. But I find the idea that “the way that the world state evolves is influenced by huge amounts of world states that ‘could have been’” meaningfully different to “there literally are other worlds that include versions of myself which are just as real as I am”. The first is a lot closer to everyday intuitions.
Well, this works to the degree to which we can (arbitrarily?) decide the particle positions to define “reality” (the thing in the theory that we want to look at in order to locate ourselves in the theory) in a way that is separate from being computationally a part of the model. One can easily have different opinions on how plausible this step is.
The Church-Turing thesis gives us the “substrate independence principle”. We could be living in a simulation. In principle, AI could be conscious. In principle, minds could be uploaded. Even granting that there’s such a thing as the superfluous corpuscles, the Universe still has to be computing the wave function.
Then the people made out of “pilot” waves instead of pilot waves and corpuscles would still be just as conscious as AIs or sims or ems could (in principle) be, and they would far outnumber the corpuscle folk. How do you know you’re not one of them? Is this an attachment to dualism, or do you have some other reason? Why do the corpuscles even need to exist?
The C-T thesis gives you the substrate independence of computation. To get to the substrate independence of consciousness, you need the further premise that the performance of certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, including qualia. This is, of course, not known.
I don’t think this is correct, either (although it’s closer). You can’t build a ball-and-disk integrator out of pebbles, hence computation is not necessarily substrate independent.
What the Turing Thesis says is that a Turing machine, and also any system capable of emulating a Turing machine, is computationally general (i.e., can solve any problem that can be solved at all). You can build a Turing machine out of lots of substrates (including pebbles), hence lots of substrates are computationally general. So it’s possible to integrate a function using pebbles, but it’s not possible to do it using the same computation as the ball-and-disk integrator uses—the pebbles system will perform a very different computation to obtain the same result.
So even if you do hold that certain computations/algorithms are sufficient for consciousness, it still doesn’t follow that a simulated brain has identical consciousness to an original brain. You need an additional argument that says that the algorithms run by both systems are sufficiently similar.
This is a good opportunity to give Eliezer credit because he addressed something similar in the sequences and got the argument right:
Note that this isn’t “I upload a brain” (which doesn’t guarantee that the same algorithm is run) but rather “here is a specific way in which I can change the substrate such that the algorithm run by the system remains unaffected”.
Meaning that a strong version of computational substrate independence , where any substrate will do, is false? Maybe, but I was arguing against hypothetical, that “the substrate independence of computation implies the substrate independence of consciousness”, not *for* the antecedent, the substrate independence of computation.
I don’t see the relevance.
OK. A crappy computational emulation might not be conscious, because it’s crappy. It still doesn’t follow that a good emulation is necessarily conscious. You’re just pointing out another possible defeater.
Which argument? Are you saying that a good enough emulation is necessarily conscious?
If it’s detailed enough, it’s guaranteed to. That’s what “enough” means
Ok...that might prove the substrate independence of computation, which I wasn’t arguing against. Past that, I don’t see your point
Ok I guess that was very poorly written. I’ll figure out how to phrase it better and then make a top level post.
Yes, agreed (and I endorse the clarification), hence my question about dualism. (If consciousness is not a result of computation, then what is it?)
The result (at least partially) of a particular physical substrate. Physicalism and computationalism are both not-dualism , but they are not the same as each other.
Hmm.. . In my mind, the Pilot wave theory position does introduce a substrate dependence for the particle-position vs. wavefunction distinction, but need not distinguish any further than that. This still leaves simulation, AI-consciousness and mind-uploads completely open. It seems to me that the Pilot wave vs. Many worlds question is independent of/orthogonal to these questions.
I fully agree that saying “only corpuscle folk is real” (nice term by the way!) is a move that needs explaining. One advantage of Pilot wave theory is that one need not wonder about where the Born probabilities are coming from—they are directly implied of one wishes to make predictions about the future. One not-so-satisfying property is that the particle positions are fully guided by the wavefunction without any influence going the other way. I do agree that this makes it a lot easier to regard the positions as a superfluous addition that Occam’s razor should cut away.
For me, an important aspect of these discussions is that we know that our understanding is incomplete for every of these perspectives. Gravity has not been satisfyingly incorporated into any of these. Further, the Church-Turing thesis is an open question.