I don’t think this is correct, either (although it’s closer). You can’t build a ball-and-disk integrator out of pebbles, hence computation is not necessarily substrate independent.
What the Turing Thesis says is that a Turing machine, and also any system capable of emulating a Turing machine, is computationally general (i.e., can solve any problem that can be solved at all). You can build a Turing machine out of lots of substrates (including pebbles), hence lots of substrates are computationally general. So it’s possible to integrate a function using pebbles, but it’s not possible to do it using the same computation as the ball-and-disk integrator uses—the pebbles system will perform a very different computation to obtain the same result.
So even if you do hold that certain computations/algorithms are sufficient for consciousness, it still doesn’t follow that a simulated brain has identical consciousness to an original brain. You need an additional argument that says that the algorithms run by both systems are sufficiently similar.
Albert: “Suppose I replaced all the neurons in your head with tiny robotic artificial neurons that had the same connections, the same local input-output behavior, and analogous internal state and learning rules.”
Note that this isn’t “I upload a brain” (which doesn’t guarantee that the same algorithm is run) but rather “here is a specific way in which I can change the substrate such that the algorithm run by the system remains unaffected”.
I don’t think this is correct, either (although it’s closer). You can’t build a ball-and-disk integrator out of pebbles, hence computation is not necessarily substrate neutral.
Meaning that a strong version of computational substrate independence , where any substrate will do, is false? Maybe, but I was arguing against hypothetical, that “the substrate independence of computation implies the substrate independence of consciousness”, not *for* the antecedent, the substrate independence of computation.
What the Turing Thesis says is that a Turing machine, and also any system capable of emulating a Turing machine, is computationally general (i.e., can solve any problem that can be solved at all). You can build a Turing machine out of lots of substrates (including pebbles), hence lots of substrates are computationally general. So it’s possible to integrate a function using pebbles, but it’s not possible to do it using the same computation as the ball-and-disk integrator uses—the pebbles system will perform a very different computation to obtain the same result.
I don’t see the relevance.
So even if you do hold that certain computations/algorithms are sufficient for consciousness, it still doesn’t follow that a simulated brain has identical consciousness to an original brain. You need an additional argument that says that the algorithms run by both systems are sufficiently similar.
OK. A crappy computational emulation might not be conscious, because it’s crappy. It still doesn’t follow that a good emulation is necessarily conscious. You’re just pointing out another possible defeater.
This is a good opportunity to give Eliezer credit because he addressed something similar in the sequences and got the argument right:
Which argument? Are you saying that a good enough emulation is necessarily conscious?
Albert: “Suppose I replaced all the neurons in your head with tiny robotic artificial neurons that had the same connections, the same local input-output behavior, and analogous internal state and learning rules.”
Note that this isn’t “I upload a brain” (which doesn’t guarantee that the same algorithm is run)
If it’s detailed enough, it’s guaranteed to. That’s what “enough” means
but rather “here is a specific way in which I can change the substrate such that the algorithm run by the system remains unaffected”.
Ok...that might prove the substrate independence of computation, which I wasn’t arguing against. Past that, I don’t see your point
I don’t think this is correct, either (although it’s closer). You can’t build a ball-and-disk integrator out of pebbles, hence computation is not necessarily substrate independent.
What the Turing Thesis says is that a Turing machine, and also any system capable of emulating a Turing machine, is computationally general (i.e., can solve any problem that can be solved at all). You can build a Turing machine out of lots of substrates (including pebbles), hence lots of substrates are computationally general. So it’s possible to integrate a function using pebbles, but it’s not possible to do it using the same computation as the ball-and-disk integrator uses—the pebbles system will perform a very different computation to obtain the same result.
So even if you do hold that certain computations/algorithms are sufficient for consciousness, it still doesn’t follow that a simulated brain has identical consciousness to an original brain. You need an additional argument that says that the algorithms run by both systems are sufficiently similar.
This is a good opportunity to give Eliezer credit because he addressed something similar in the sequences and got the argument right:
Note that this isn’t “I upload a brain” (which doesn’t guarantee that the same algorithm is run) but rather “here is a specific way in which I can change the substrate such that the algorithm run by the system remains unaffected”.
Meaning that a strong version of computational substrate independence , where any substrate will do, is false? Maybe, but I was arguing against hypothetical, that “the substrate independence of computation implies the substrate independence of consciousness”, not *for* the antecedent, the substrate independence of computation.
I don’t see the relevance.
OK. A crappy computational emulation might not be conscious, because it’s crappy. It still doesn’t follow that a good emulation is necessarily conscious. You’re just pointing out another possible defeater.
Which argument? Are you saying that a good enough emulation is necessarily conscious?
If it’s detailed enough, it’s guaranteed to. That’s what “enough” means
Ok...that might prove the substrate independence of computation, which I wasn’t arguing against. Past that, I don’t see your point
Ok I guess that was very poorly written. I’ll figure out how to phrase it better and then make a top level post.