Peterdjones comments on The raw-experience dogma: Dissolving the “qualia” problem

[Peterdjones]

I’m not sure how this is relevant. I was responding to the objection that qualia have no vocabulary of their own, but ony parasitize vocabulary relating to external properties.

But of course, it makes good evolutionary sense for us to be aware of some internal states

Sure, but that’s introspection, not subjectivity.

So you are quite wrong to assert, elsewhere in the thread, that subjective qualities would not be expected on the hypothesis of physicalism.

I don’t think so. bearing in mind that what I mean by “subjectivity” is “objective inaccessibility”, not “introspectability”. Permalink

[torekp]

but that’s introspection, not subjectivity

I smell a false dichotomy.

bearing in mind that what I mean by “subjectivity” is “objective inaccessibility”

Just how inaccessible must something be, objectively, to count? Must it be logically impossible to access the state objectively, for example? Depending on how you cash this out, you may be in danger of using the word “subjectivity” idiosyncratically.

[Peterdjones]

Must it be logically impossible to access the state objectively, for example?

No. But introspectability if far too weak a standard. I can introspect thoughts that are possible to communicate objectively.

[torekp]

I have already listed another condition besides introspectability:

internal states which are intimately involved in, but not informationally exhausted by, cognition of the external world.

We could easily add conditions or clarifications. For example, let “external world” or “objective access” be specified as what other humans can detect with unaided senses.