Pain is a textbook example of a quale, and “pain” describes an effect, a reaction, not a cause, which would be something like “sharp” or “hot”. Likewise, words for tastes barely map onto anything object[ive]. “Sweet” kind of means “high in calories”, but kind of doens’t, since saccharine is thousands of times sweeter than sugar, but not thousands of times more calorific. And so on.
And as I pointed out in the other thread, our experiences change in response to the relationship between viewer and object even as the object neither changes nor seems to change. We have the ability to be aware of internal states which are intimately involved in, but not informationally exhausted by, cognition of the external world. From a point of view valuing only knowledge of the external world as such, qualia are pure “noise”.
But of course, it makes good evolutionary sense for us to be aware of some internal states. (And even if it didn’t, evolution was never the perfect designer (witness flea wings and human appendix).) A cognitive system with a penchant for learning might easily take notice of its own internal workings during acts of perception. Such self-awareness might be extremely useful for a social animal. So you are quite wrong to assert, elsewhere in the thread, that subjective qualities would not be expected on the hypothesis of physicalism.
I’m not sure how this is relevant. I was responding to the objection that qualia have no vocabulary of their own, but ony parasitize vocabulary relating to external properties.
But of course, it makes good evolutionary sense for us to be aware of some internal states
Sure, but that’s introspection, not subjectivity.
So you are quite wrong to assert, elsewhere in the thread, that subjective qualities would not be expected on the hypothesis of physicalism.
I don’t think so. bearing in mind that what I mean by “subjectivity” is “objective inaccessibility”, not “introspectability”.
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bearing in mind that what I mean by “subjectivity” is “objective inaccessibility”
Just how inaccessible must something be, objectively, to count? Must it be logically impossible to access the state objectively, for example? Depending on how you cash this out, you may be in danger of using the word “subjectivity” idiosyncratically.
I have already listed another condition besides introspectability:
internal states which are intimately involved in, but not informationally exhausted by, cognition of the external world.
We could easily add conditions or clarifications. For example, let “external world” or “objective access” be specified as what other humans can detect with unaided senses.
And as I pointed out in the other thread, our experiences change in response to the relationship between viewer and object even as the object neither changes nor seems to change. We have the ability to be aware of internal states which are intimately involved in, but not informationally exhausted by, cognition of the external world. From a point of view valuing only knowledge of the external world as such, qualia are pure “noise”.
But of course, it makes good evolutionary sense for us to be aware of some internal states. (And even if it didn’t, evolution was never the perfect designer (witness flea wings and human appendix).) A cognitive system with a penchant for learning might easily take notice of its own internal workings during acts of perception. Such self-awareness might be extremely useful for a social animal. So you are quite wrong to assert, elsewhere in the thread, that subjective qualities would not be expected on the hypothesis of physicalism.
I’m not sure how this is relevant. I was responding to the objection that qualia have no vocabulary of their own, but ony parasitize vocabulary relating to external properties.
Sure, but that’s introspection, not subjectivity.
I don’t think so. bearing in mind that what I mean by “subjectivity” is “objective inaccessibility”, not “introspectability”. Permalink
I smell a false dichotomy.
Just how inaccessible must something be, objectively, to count? Must it be logically impossible to access the state objectively, for example? Depending on how you cash this out, you may be in danger of using the word “subjectivity” idiosyncratically.
No. But introspectability if far too weak a standard. I can introspect thoughts that are possible to communicate objectively.
I have already listed another condition besides introspectability:
We could easily add conditions or clarifications. For example, let “external world” or “objective access” be specified as what other humans can detect with unaided senses.