Once we understand all the physical facts (including e.g. the physical causes of people talking about qualia) there are no other facts to understand.
It’s the last bit here that’s controversial. Why are there no other facts to understand past the physical ones? What’s the argument for that?
Here’s what I mean: Say that whenever I see that something is red, a certain neural network is activated, call it the R-network. Once we discover that seeing red is, physically, the activation of the R-network, should we then say that there are two facts (‘I saw a red thing’ and ‘My R-network was activated’) or only one fact (‘My R-network was activated’)? We might readily admit that seeing red is reducible to the activation of the R-network, but that alone doesn’t mean that the fact ‘I saw a red thing’ is not a fact.
Every time I see a red thing, I see a thing. So, are “I see a red thing” and “I see a thing” two separate facts? If so, then I cannot imagine what value there is in counting facts. On that account simply listing all the facts that derive from a given observation (“I see a thing that isn’t blue” “I see a thing that isn’t yellow” “I see a thing that isn’t orange” etc. etc. etc.) would take a lifetime. It might be useful to Taboo “fact”.
So, are “I see a red thing” and “I see a thing” two separate facts?
I think they’d have to be, since they’re not mutually entailing. They certainly can’t be identical facts.
If so, then I cannot imagine what value there is in counting facts.
Safe to say, there is an uncountable infinity of facts, whether or not we restrict ourselves to physical facts. The question is whether or not there are non-physical facts (where an experience of a red thing is taken to be a non-physical fact). So this isn’t a question of quantity or counting.
The question is whether or not there are non-physical facts (where an experience of a red thing is taken to be a non-physical fact).
Well, if an experience of a red thing is taken to be a non-physical fact, then there are certainly non-physical facts, inasmuch as there are experiences of red things.
What do you suggest?
I don’t know, since I’m not really sure what you have in mind when you say “nonphysical fact,” beyond knowing that experiencing red is an example. That’s why I suggested it.
Well, if an experience of a red thing is taken to be a non-physical fact, then there are certainly non-physical facts, inasmuch as there are experiences of red things.
Agreed. I think it’s illegitimate to suggest that the problem of qualia can be dismissed by associating experiential facts with physical facts, and then revoking the fact-license of the experiential one. This isn’t to say that I think the problem of qualia is an unsolved one. It just can’t be solved (or disolved or whatever) like that.
I don’t know, since I’m not really sure what you have in mind when you say “nonphysical fact,” beyond knowing that experiencing red is an example.
I was using the term ‘fact’ as I understood Duck to be using it. I guess I’d say a fact is something that’s true. (Though we use the term ambiguously, sometimes meaning ‘the state of affairs about which a true thing is said’ or something like that) A physical fact is something thats true and that’s about nature. An astrological fact is something that’s true and that’s about astrological stuff (and from this we get the conclusion that there are no positive astrological facts).
Well, I certainly agree that all of this semantic pettifoggery gets us no closer to understanding what distinguishes systems capable of having experiences from those that aren’t, or how to identify a real experience that we ourselves aren’t having, or how to construct systems capable of having experiences, or how to ensure that systems we construct won’t have experiences.
That wouldn’t matter to the number of facts though. Anything, for example, which weighs 1 lb weighs more than .9 lb. And there are uncountably many weights between .9 and 1 lb that this thing is heavier than. All those are facts by anyone’s measure.
Not by anyone’s measure. There are those who would say there is one basica fact, wich has to be derived
emprically, and a host of logically derivable true statements.
It’s the last bit here that’s controversial. Why are there no other facts to understand past the physical ones? What’s the argument for that?
Here’s what I mean: Say that whenever I see that something is red, a certain neural network is activated, call it the R-network. Once we discover that seeing red is, physically, the activation of the R-network, should we then say that there are two facts (‘I saw a red thing’ and ‘My R-network was activated’) or only one fact (‘My R-network was activated’)? We might readily admit that seeing red is reducible to the activation of the R-network, but that alone doesn’t mean that the fact ‘I saw a red thing’ is not a fact.
Every time I see a red thing, I see a thing. So, are “I see a red thing” and “I see a thing” two separate facts? If so, then I cannot imagine what value there is in counting facts. On that account simply listing all the facts that derive from a given observation (“I see a thing that isn’t blue” “I see a thing that isn’t yellow” “I see a thing that isn’t orange” etc. etc. etc.) would take a lifetime. It might be useful to Taboo “fact”.
I think they’d have to be, since they’re not mutually entailing. They certainly can’t be identical facts.
Safe to say, there is an uncountable infinity of facts, whether or not we restrict ourselves to physical facts. The question is whether or not there are non-physical facts (where an experience of a red thing is taken to be a non-physical fact). So this isn’t a question of quantity or counting.
It might. What do you suggest?
Well, if an experience of a red thing is taken to be a non-physical fact, then there are certainly non-physical facts, inasmuch as there are experiences of red things.
I don’t know, since I’m not really sure what you have in mind when you say “nonphysical fact,” beyond knowing that experiencing red is an example. That’s why I suggested it.
Agreed. I think it’s illegitimate to suggest that the problem of qualia can be dismissed by associating experiential facts with physical facts, and then revoking the fact-license of the experiential one. This isn’t to say that I think the problem of qualia is an unsolved one. It just can’t be solved (or disolved or whatever) like that.
I was using the term ‘fact’ as I understood Duck to be using it. I guess I’d say a fact is something that’s true. (Though we use the term ambiguously, sometimes meaning ‘the state of affairs about which a true thing is said’ or something like that) A physical fact is something thats true and that’s about nature. An astrological fact is something that’s true and that’s about astrological stuff (and from this we get the conclusion that there are no positive astrological facts).
Well, I certainly agree that all of this semantic pettifoggery gets us no closer to understanding what distinguishes systems capable of having experiences from those that aren’t, or how to identify a real experience that we ourselves aren’t having, or how to construct systems capable of having experiences, or how to ensure that systems we construct won’t have experiences.
Well, there’s a infinity of true statements. Some folks like to restict “fact” to what is not Cambridge
That wouldn’t matter to the number of facts though. Anything, for example, which weighs 1 lb weighs more than .9 lb. And there are uncountably many weights between .9 and 1 lb that this thing is heavier than. All those are facts by anyone’s measure.
Not by anyone’s measure. There are those who would say there is one basica fact, wich has to be derived emprically, and a host of logically derivable true statements.