I am aiming directly at questions of how an AI that starts with a only a robotic arm might get to controlling drones or trading stocks, from the perspective of the AI. My intuition, driven by Moravec’s Paradox, is that each new kind of output (or input) has a pretty hefty computational threshold associated with it, so I suspect that the details of the initial inputs/outputs will have a big influence on the risk any given service or agent presents.
The reason I am interested in this is that it feels like doing things has no intrinsic connection to learning things, and the we only link them because so much of our learning and doing is unconscious. That is to say, I suspect actions are orthogonal to intelligence.
Regarding “computational threshold”, my working assumption is that any given capability X is either (1) always and forever out of reach of a system by design, or (2) completely useless, or (3) very likely to be learned by a system, if the system has long-term real-world goals. Maybe it takes some computational time and effort to learn it, but AIs are not lazy (unless we program them to be). AIs are just systems that make good decisions in pursuit of a goal, and if “acquiring capability X” is instrumentally helpful towards achieving goals in the world, it will probably make that decision if it can (cf. “Instrumental convergence”).
If I have a life goal that is best accomplished by learning to use a forklift, I’ll learn to use a forklift, right? Maybe I won’t be very fluid at it, but fine, I’ll operate it more slowly and deliberately, or design a forklift autopilot subsystem, or whatever...
I am aiming directly at questions of how an AI that starts with a only a robotic arm might get to controlling drones or trading stocks, from the perspective of the AI. My intuition, driven by Moravec’s Paradox, is that each new kind of output (or input) has a pretty hefty computational threshold associated with it, so I suspect that the details of the initial inputs/outputs will have a big influence on the risk any given service or agent presents.
The reason I am interested in this is that it feels like doing things has no intrinsic connection to learning things, and the we only link them because so much of our learning and doing is unconscious. That is to say, I suspect actions are orthogonal to intelligence.
Regarding “computational threshold”, my working assumption is that any given capability X is either (1) always and forever out of reach of a system by design, or (2) completely useless, or (3) very likely to be learned by a system, if the system has long-term real-world goals. Maybe it takes some computational time and effort to learn it, but AIs are not lazy (unless we program them to be). AIs are just systems that make good decisions in pursuit of a goal, and if “acquiring capability X” is instrumentally helpful towards achieving goals in the world, it will probably make that decision if it can (cf. “Instrumental convergence”).
If I have a life goal that is best accomplished by learning to use a forklift, I’ll learn to use a forklift, right? Maybe I won’t be very fluid at it, but fine, I’ll operate it more slowly and deliberately, or design a forklift autopilot subsystem, or whatever...