Could you explain what process forces people to sell their kidneys to pay their student loans?
In my model, something like this will happen in the minds of people who study but have to pay hefty student loans (before they start studying):
“I want to study field X to signal that I’m a conscientious employee. But I know I will have to pay hefty student loans. There is a chance I will have to sell my kidney. Is the risk of me selling my kidney small enough to outweigh the benefit?”
After they have studied: “I now have to pay student loans. I will either have to work harder to pay them back, or I can sell my kidney. [If them selling their kidney is lower cost than working harder] I guess I’ll sell my kidney. [If working harder is lower cost than selling their kidney] I guess I’ll work harder then.”
I think a worldview in which taking options away from people is bad is actually quite informed by a deontological libertarianism—it says something like “you have too high uncertainty over the strategies that other people would take, and removing possible strategies shrinks their option set. You can’t increase the payoff for an agent in a normal-form game by taking actions away from them.”
I wonder whether this one is true (and can be easily proved): For a normal form gameG and actions ai for a player i, removing a set of actions a−i from the game yields a game G− in which the Nash equilibria are worse on average for i (or alternatively the pareto-best/pareto-worst Nash equilibrium is worse for G− than for G).
This is quite easily proved for a minimax strategy.
I wonder whether this one is true (and can be easily proved): For a normal form game G and actions ai for a player i, removing a set of actions a−i from the game yields a game G− in which the Nash equilibria are worse on average for i (or alternatively the pareto-best/pareto-worst Nash equilibrium is worse for G− than for G).
It’s false: consider the normal form game
(0,0) (2,1)
(1,1) (3,0)
For the first player the first option is dominated by the second, but once the second player knows the first player is going to choose the second option, he’s motivated to take the first option. Removing the first player’s second option means the second player is motivated to take the second option, yielding a higher payoff for the first player.
A common hypothesis is that the need for signalling increases as more people put more effort into signalling. So while it may be beneficial for an individual to be allowed to sell their kidney to pay for student loans, that benefit gets cancelled out by the fact that it increases the chance of them getting a degree and thus makes it more necessary for others to get a degree too.
I think this view is correct and restricting kidney sales would alleviate this somewhat.
Under my worldview that falls under positional games, and taxing positional games specifically would result in less of this happening.
I believe that people who complain about exploitation are worried about something else though: I think they would also count it as exploitation if someone would sell their kidney for food, which is not a positional game/done for signaling purposes.
Under my worldview that falls under positional games, and taxing positional games specifically would result in less of this happening.
Are positional games like education currently extra taxed? Do the people defending kidney markets make sure to first tax positional games before creating the markets?
I believe that people who complain about exploitation are worried about something else though: I think they would also count it as exploitation if someone would sell their kidney for food, which is not a positional game/done for signaling purposes.
Why not say that, then? Like you could go “hey quetzal_rainbow, I think you are misrepresenting your own opinion and are actually worried about people selling their kidneys for food”? Instead of your original comment buying into the student loans example.
I don’t think we currently tax positional goods in general. I have only intuitions whether that would happen in worlds where kidney markets are introduced, and those intuitions say “no”.
Why not say that, then? Like you could go “hey quetzal_rainbow, I think you are misrepresenting your own opinion and are actually worried about people selling their kidneys for food”? Instead of your original comment buying into the student loans example.
I hadn’t considered the fact that student loans are positional goods, and that allowing more expenditure of resources on positional goods wastes them. I had treated “student loans” similar to normal goods that can be purchased. I don’t know what @quetzal_rainbow intended their comment to mean.
I don’t think we currently tax positional goods in general. I have only intuitions whether that would happen in worlds where kidney markets are introduced, and those intuitions say “no”.
So if your intuitions say that there would be no taxes on positional goods in a world with kidney markets, doesn’t that make the possibility of taxing positional goods irrelevant? It seems like the effects of those markets should be judged based on the non-taxed case, not the taxed case?
Could you explain what process forces people to sell their kidneys to pay their student loans?
In my model, something like this will happen in the minds of people who study but have to pay hefty student loans (before they start studying):
“I want to study field X to signal that I’m a conscientious employee. But I know I will have to pay hefty student loans. There is a chance I will have to sell my kidney. Is the risk of me selling my kidney small enough to outweigh the benefit?”
After they have studied: “I now have to pay student loans. I will either have to work harder to pay them back, or I can sell my kidney. [If them selling their kidney is lower cost than working harder] I guess I’ll sell my kidney. [If working harder is lower cost than selling their kidney] I guess I’ll work harder then.”
I think a worldview in which taking options away from people is bad is actually quite informed by a deontological libertarianism—it says something like “you have too high uncertainty over the strategies that other people would take, and removing possible strategies shrinks their option set. You can’t increase the payoff for an agent in a normal-form game by taking actions away from them.”
I wonder whether this one is true (and can be easily proved): For a normal form game G and actions ai for a player i, removing a set of actions a−i from the game yields a game G− in which the Nash equilibria are worse on average for i (or alternatively the pareto-best/pareto-worst Nash equilibrium is worse for G− than for G).
This is quite easily proved for a minimax strategy.
It’s false: consider the normal form game
(0,0) (2,1)
(1,1) (3,0)
For the first player the first option is dominated by the second, but once the second player knows the first player is going to choose the second option, he’s motivated to take the first option. Removing the first player’s second option means the second player is motivated to take the second option, yielding a higher payoff for the first player.
A common hypothesis is that the need for signalling increases as more people put more effort into signalling. So while it may be beneficial for an individual to be allowed to sell their kidney to pay for student loans, that benefit gets cancelled out by the fact that it increases the chance of them getting a degree and thus makes it more necessary for others to get a degree too.
I think this view is correct and restricting kidney sales would alleviate this somewhat.
Under my worldview that falls under positional games, and taxing positional games specifically would result in less of this happening.
I believe that people who complain about exploitation are worried about something else though: I think they would also count it as exploitation if someone would sell their kidney for food, which is not a positional game/done for signaling purposes.
Are positional games like education currently extra taxed? Do the people defending kidney markets make sure to first tax positional games before creating the markets?
Why not say that, then? Like you could go “hey quetzal_rainbow, I think you are misrepresenting your own opinion and are actually worried about people selling their kidneys for food”? Instead of your original comment buying into the student loans example.
I don’t think we currently tax positional goods in general. I have only intuitions whether that would happen in worlds where kidney markets are introduced, and those intuitions say “no”.
I hadn’t considered the fact that student loans are positional goods, and that allowing more expenditure of resources on positional goods wastes them. I had treated “student loans” similar to normal goods that can be purchased. I don’t know what @quetzal_rainbow intended their comment to mean.
So if your intuitions say that there would be no taxes on positional goods in a world with kidney markets, doesn’t that make the possibility of taxing positional goods irrelevant? It seems like the effects of those markets should be judged based on the non-taxed case, not the taxed case?