I don’t know to what extent you still endorse the quoted reasoning (as an accurate model of the mistakes being made by the sorts of people you describe), but: it seems clear to me that the big error is in step 2… and it also seems to me that step 2 is a “rookie-level” error, an error that a careful thinker shouldn’t ever make (and, indeed, that people like e.g. David Chalmers do not in fact make).
That is, the Hard Problem shouldn’t lead us to conclude that consciousness isn’t reducible to physics—only that we haven’t reduced it, and that in fact there remains an open (and hard!) problem to solve. But reasoning from the Hard Problem to a positive belief in extra-physical phenomena is surely a mistake…
Now, hold on: your phrasing seems to suggest that panpsychism either is the same thing as, or entails, thinking that “phenomenal consciousness isn’t fully reducible to third-person descriptions”. But… that’s not the case, as far as I can tell. Did I misunderstand you?
He’s the kind of panpsychist who holds that view because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. I think this is by far the best reason to be a panpsychist, and it’s the only type of panpsychism I’ve heard endorsed by analytic philosophers working in academia.
I think Brian Tomasik endorses a different kind of panpsychism, which asserts that phenomenal consciousness is eliminable rather than fundamental? So I wouldn’t assume that arbitrary rationalist panpsychists are in the Chalmers camp; but Chalmers certainly is!
Hmm. Ok, I think I sort-of see in what direction to head to resolve the disagreement/confusion we’ve got here (and I am very unsure whether I am more confused, of the two of us, or you are, though maybe we both are)… but I don’t think that I can devote the time / mental effort to this discussion at this time. Perhaps we can come back to it another time? (Or not; it’s not terribly important, I don’t think…)
He’s the kind of panpsychist who holds that view because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable.
He’s a property dualist because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. He also has a commitment to the idea that phenomemal consciousness supervenes on information processing and to the idea that human and biological information processing are not privileged , which all add up to something like panpsychism.
That is, the Hard Problem shouldn’t lead us to conclude that consciousness isn’t reducible to physics—only that we haven’t reduced it, and that in fact there remains an open (and hard!) problem to solve. But reasoning from the Hard Problem to a positive belief in extra-physical phenomena is surely a mistake
Don’t say “surely”, prove it.
It’s not unreasonable to say that a problem that has remained unsolved for an extended period of time, is insoluble...but it’s not necessarily the case either. Your opponents are making a subjective judgement call, and so are you.
Saying that two extremes are both unreasonable is not the same as saying that those extremes are both reasonabe.
Said (if I am reading him right) is saying that it is unreasonable (i.e. unjustified) to claim that just because a problem hasn’t been solved for an extended period of time, it is therefore insoluble.
To which you (seemed to me to) reply “don’t just declare that [the original claim] is unreasonable. Prove that [the original claim] is unreasonable.”
To which Said (seemed to me to) answer “no, I think that there’s a strong prior here that the extreme statement isn’t one worth making.”
My own stance: a problem remaining unsolved for a long time is weak evidence that it’s fundamentally insoluble, but you really need a model of why it’s insoluble before making a strong claim there.
Said (if I am reading him right) is saying that it is unreasonable (i.e. unjustified) to claim that just because a problem hasn’t been solved for an extended period of time, it is therefore insoluble.
Which would be true if “reasonable” and “justified” were synonyms, but they are not.
no, I think that there’s a strong prior here that the extreme statement isn’t one worth making.”
Which statement is the one that is extreme? Is it not extreme to claim an unsolved problem will definitely be solved?
My own stance: a problem remaining unsolved for a long time is weak evidence that it’s fundamentally insoluble,
It’s weak evidence, in that it’s not justification, but it’s some evidence , in that it’s reasonable. Who are you disagreeing with?
I don’t know to what extent you still endorse the quoted reasoning (as an accurate model of the mistakes being made by the sorts of people you describe), but: it seems clear to me that the big error is in step 2… and it also seems to me that step 2 is a “rookie-level” error, an error that a careful thinker shouldn’t ever make (and, indeed, that people like e.g. David Chalmers do not in fact make).
That is, the Hard Problem shouldn’t lead us to conclude that consciousness isn’t reducible to physics—only that we haven’t reduced it, and that in fact there remains an open (and hard!) problem to solve. But reasoning from the Hard Problem to a positive belief in extra-physical phenomena is surely a mistake…
? Chalmers is a panpsychist. He totally thinks phenomenal consciousness isn’t fully reducible to third-person descriptions.
(I also think you’re just wrong, but maybe poking at the Chalmers part will clarify things.)
Now, hold on: your phrasing seems to suggest that panpsychism either is the same thing as, or entails, thinking that “phenomenal consciousness isn’t fully reducible to third-person descriptions”. But… that’s not the case, as far as I can tell. Did I misunderstand you?
He’s the kind of panpsychist who holds that view because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. I think this is by far the best reason to be a panpsychist, and it’s the only type of panpsychism I’ve heard endorsed by analytic philosophers working in academia.
I think Brian Tomasik endorses a different kind of panpsychism, which asserts that phenomenal consciousness is eliminable rather than fundamental? So I wouldn’t assume that arbitrary rationalist panpsychists are in the Chalmers camp; but Chalmers certainly is!
Hmm. Ok, I think I sort-of see in what direction to head to resolve the disagreement/confusion we’ve got here (and I am very unsure whether I am more confused, of the two of us, or you are, though maybe we both are)… but I don’t think that I can devote the time / mental effort to this discussion at this time. Perhaps we can come back to it another time? (Or not; it’s not terribly important, I don’t think…)
He’s a property dualist because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. He also has a commitment to the idea that phenomemal consciousness supervenes on information processing and to the idea that human and biological information processing are not privileged , which all add up to something like panpsychism.
Don’t say “surely”, prove it.
It’s not unreasonable to say that a problem that has remained unsolved for an extended period of time, is insoluble...but it’s not necessarily the case either. Your opponents are making a subjective judgement call, and so are you.
No, I’d say it’s pretty unreasonable, actually.
Don’t say it’s unreasonable, prove it.
Prove that a problem is not insoluble? Why don’t you prove that it is insoluble?
The only reasonable stance in this situation is “we don’t have any very good basis for either stance”.
So both stances are reasonable, which is what I said, but not what you said.
Nnnno, I think you’re missing Said.
Saying that two extremes are both unreasonable is not the same as saying that those extremes are both reasonabe.
Said (if I am reading him right) is saying that it is unreasonable (i.e. unjustified) to claim that just because a problem hasn’t been solved for an extended period of time, it is therefore insoluble.
To which you (seemed to me to) reply “don’t just declare that [the original claim] is unreasonable. Prove that [the original claim] is unreasonable.”
To which Said (seemed to me to) answer “no, I think that there’s a strong prior here that the extreme statement isn’t one worth making.”
My own stance: a problem remaining unsolved for a long time is weak evidence that it’s fundamentally insoluble, but you really need a model of why it’s insoluble before making a strong claim there.
This is a reasonably accurate reading of my comments, yes.
Which would be true if “reasonable” and “justified” were synonyms, but they are not.
Which statement is the one that is extreme? Is it not extreme to claim an unsolved problem will definitely be solved?
It’s weak evidence, in that it’s not justification, but it’s some evidence , in that it’s reasonable. Who are you disagreeing with?
So both stances are reasonable, which is what I said, but not what you said.