Now, hold on: your phrasing seems to suggest that panpsychism either is the same thing as, or entails, thinking that “phenomenal consciousness isn’t fully reducible to third-person descriptions”. But… that’s not the case, as far as I can tell. Did I misunderstand you?
He’s the kind of panpsychist who holds that view because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. I think this is by far the best reason to be a panpsychist, and it’s the only type of panpsychism I’ve heard endorsed by analytic philosophers working in academia.
I think Brian Tomasik endorses a different kind of panpsychism, which asserts that phenomenal consciousness is eliminable rather than fundamental? So I wouldn’t assume that arbitrary rationalist panpsychists are in the Chalmers camp; but Chalmers certainly is!
Hmm. Ok, I think I sort-of see in what direction to head to resolve the disagreement/confusion we’ve got here (and I am very unsure whether I am more confused, of the two of us, or you are, though maybe we both are)… but I don’t think that I can devote the time / mental effort to this discussion at this time. Perhaps we can come back to it another time? (Or not; it’s not terribly important, I don’t think…)
He’s the kind of panpsychist who holds that view because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable.
He’s a property dualist because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. He also has a commitment to the idea that phenomemal consciousness supervenes on information processing and to the idea that human and biological information processing are not privileged , which all add up to something like panpsychism.
Now, hold on: your phrasing seems to suggest that panpsychism either is the same thing as, or entails, thinking that “phenomenal consciousness isn’t fully reducible to third-person descriptions”. But… that’s not the case, as far as I can tell. Did I misunderstand you?
He’s the kind of panpsychist who holds that view because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. I think this is by far the best reason to be a panpsychist, and it’s the only type of panpsychism I’ve heard endorsed by analytic philosophers working in academia.
I think Brian Tomasik endorses a different kind of panpsychism, which asserts that phenomenal consciousness is eliminable rather than fundamental? So I wouldn’t assume that arbitrary rationalist panpsychists are in the Chalmers camp; but Chalmers certainly is!
Hmm. Ok, I think I sort-of see in what direction to head to resolve the disagreement/confusion we’ve got here (and I am very unsure whether I am more confused, of the two of us, or you are, though maybe we both are)… but I don’t think that I can devote the time / mental effort to this discussion at this time. Perhaps we can come back to it another time? (Or not; it’s not terribly important, I don’t think…)
He’s a property dualist because he thinks consciousness isn’t fully reducible / third-person-describable. He also has a commitment to the idea that phenomemal consciousness supervenes on information processing and to the idea that human and biological information processing are not privileged , which all add up to something like panpsychism.