If I understand it correctly, that’s the position of, e.g. Max Tegmark (more generally, he thinks that “to exist” equals “to have a corresponding math structure”).
So there should be some sort of hardware-dependence to obtain subjective experience
My (and, I think, a lot of other people’s) intuition says something like “there is no hardware-dependence, but the process of computation must exist somewhere”.
Would your intuition suggest that a computation by hand produces the same kind of experience as your brain? Your intuition reminds me of the strange mathematical philosophy of ultrafinitism, where even mathematical statements that require a finite amount of computation to verify do not have a truth value until they are computed.
Yes, my default expectation is that in theory a sufficiently faithful computation performed “by hand” would be in itself conscious. The scale of those computations is likely staggeringly immense though, far beyond the lifespan of any known being capable of carrying them out. It would not be surprising that a second of conscious experience might require 10^20 years of “by hand” computation.
I doubt that any practical computation by hand can emulate even the (likely total lack of) consciousness of a virus, so the intuition that any actual computation by hand cannot support consciousness is preserved.
Consider some less mysterious algorithm, for instance, image recognition. Does a system implementing this algorithm recognizes images, regardless of what substance this system is made from? Does the mathematical description itself of this algorithm recognizes images, even when the algorithm is not executed?
If it was true and math itself was enough to perform image recognition why would implementation of this or any other algorithm be necessary? Why would engineers and programmers even exist in such a world?
It feels like this a semantic issue. For instance, if you asked me if Euclid’s algorithm produces the gcd, I wouldn’t think the answer is “no, until it runs”. Mathematically, we often view functions as the set of all pairs (input,output), even when the input size is infinite. Can you clarify?
Exactly! Well done! Indeed this is a semantic issue.
So, to resolve this confusion we simply need to explicitly distinguish between potential to do something and actually doing something. Algorithm for image recognition has the potential to recognize images, but only when executed in matter, image recognition actually happens.
Likewise, we can say that some class of mathematical algorithms has the potential to be conscious. Which means that when executed these algorithms will actually be conscious.
No, it isn’t.
If I understand it correctly, that’s the position of, e.g. Max Tegmark (more generally, he thinks that “to exist” equals “to have a corresponding math structure”).
My (and, I think, a lot of other people’s) intuition says something like “there is no hardware-dependence, but the process of computation must exist somewhere”.
Would your intuition suggest that a computation by hand produces the same kind of experience as your brain? Your intuition reminds me of the strange mathematical philosophy of ultrafinitism, where even mathematical statements that require a finite amount of computation to verify do not have a truth value until they are computed.
Yes, my default expectation is that in theory a sufficiently faithful computation performed “by hand” would be in itself conscious. The scale of those computations is likely staggeringly immense though, far beyond the lifespan of any known being capable of carrying them out. It would not be surprising that a second of conscious experience might require 10^20 years of “by hand” computation.
I doubt that any practical computation by hand can emulate even the (likely total lack of) consciousness of a virus, so the intuition that any actual computation by hand cannot support consciousness is preserved.
Consider some less mysterious algorithm, for instance, image recognition. Does a system implementing this algorithm recognizes images, regardless of what substance this system is made from? Does the mathematical description itself of this algorithm recognizes images, even when the algorithm is not executed?
I’m having a little trouble understanding how to extend this toy example. You meant for these questions to all be answered “yes”, correct?
If it was true and math itself was enough to perform image recognition why would implementation of this or any other algorithm be necessary? Why would engineers and programmers even exist in such a world?
It feels like this a semantic issue. For instance, if you asked me if Euclid’s algorithm produces the gcd, I wouldn’t think the answer is “no, until it runs”. Mathematically, we often view functions as the set of all pairs (input,output), even when the input size is infinite. Can you clarify?
Exactly! Well done! Indeed this is a semantic issue.
So, to resolve this confusion we simply need to explicitly distinguish between potential to do something and actually doing something. Algorithm for image recognition has the potential to recognize images, but only when executed in matter, image recognition actually happens.
Likewise, we can say that some class of mathematical algorithms has the potential to be conscious. Which means that when executed these algorithms will actually be conscious.