Eliezer is pointing out that the concept of “objective morality” (in the “the referent of ‘should’ is written on a stone tablet somewhere” sense) is not just false but incoherent. In other words, he’s making an argument against moral realism.
As such, your criticism does not apply. (Though there are different criticisms one might make, which may or may not be valid.)
His argument is that if something is bad in any sense, then it is morally bad. Pain is bad in the sense that one wishes to avoid it, but then things like exercise ,hard work, and formal education are also immediately unappealing , whilst being morally positive. Even if his argument worked ,it would only show that moral realism is false, not incoherent.
You can both believe that there is no objective morality, and think that if objective morality existed then you should follow it. my criticism is—he saying that if objective morality existed and you dont like it, you should ignore it. thats not logical.
Eliezer is saying that if “objective morality” “existed”, objective morality still wouldn’t exist. He’s not saying that there’s no such thing—he’s saying that there can’t be any such thing; that the concept is incoherent; he’s illustrating that the hypothetical scenario where “objective morality exists” can’t be consistently constructed. It is, in a sense, a proof by contradiction.
So in Eliezer’s hypothetical, where “objective morality exists”, of course you should ignore “objective morality”, because there actually isn’t any such thing—because there can’t be any such thing.
Eliezer is saying that if “objective morality” “existed”, objective morality still wouldn’t exist. He’s not saying that there’s no such thing—he’s saying that there can’t be any such thing; that the concept is incoherent; he’s illustrating that the hypothetical scenario where “objective morality exists” can’t be consistently constructed. It is, in a sense, a proof by contradiction.
...as well as one about Jorterder’s wrongness.
Sorry, no, you’ve misunderstood.
Note how they are interconnected. If EY hasn’t claimed that objective morality is incoherent, then his claim that he wouldn’t follow it must be based on something other than “I can’t follow what doesn’t exist”. In fact what he says is just that “pain is bad” is obviously true.
Incidentally, the word “incoherent” doesn’t appear in the linked posting by EY.
Eliezer is pointing out that the concept of “objective morality” (in the “the referent of ‘should’ is written on a stone tablet somewhere” sense) is not just false but incoherent. In other words, he’s making an argument against moral realism.
As such, your criticism does not apply. (Though there are different criticisms one might make, which may or may not be valid.)
His argument is that if something is bad in any sense, then it is morally bad. Pain is bad in the sense that one wishes to avoid it, but then things like exercise ,hard work, and formal education are also immediately unappealing , whilst being morally positive. Even if his argument worked ,it would only show that moral realism is false, not incoherent.
You can both believe that there is no objective morality, and think that if objective morality existed then you should follow it. my criticism is—he saying that if objective morality existed and you dont like it, you should ignore it. thats not logical.
Sorry, no, you’ve misunderstood.
Eliezer is saying that if “objective morality” “existed”, objective morality still wouldn’t exist. He’s not saying that there’s no such thing—he’s saying that there can’t be any such thing; that the concept is incoherent; he’s illustrating that the hypothetical scenario where “objective morality exists” can’t be consistently constructed. It is, in a sense, a proof by contradiction.
So in Eliezer’s hypothetical, where “objective morality exists”, of course you should ignore “objective morality”, because there actually isn’t any such thing—because there can’t be any such thing.
He might well be claiming it, but he isn’t validly arguing for it. The claim about pain might be
A) begging the question in favour of subjective morality
B) semantic confusion about the meaning of “bad”
Or
C) insistence that if moral facts aren’t motivating, they don’t exist.
But none of those arguments is particularly strong.
That’s as may be, but it’s not pertinent to the question of whether the OP’s criticism is valid.
You made a claim about EY’s correctness ….
...as well as one about Jorterder’s wrongness.
Note how they are interconnected. If EY hasn’t claimed that objective morality is incoherent, then his claim that he wouldn’t follow it must be based on something other than “I can’t follow what doesn’t exist”. In fact what he says is just that “pain is bad” is obviously true.
Incidentally, the word “incoherent” doesn’t appear in the linked posting by EY.