In this case of Pascal’s Mugging both choices lead to negative expected utility as defined by the problem. Hence you look for a third option, and in this case, you find one: ignore all blackmailers; tell them to go ahead and torture all those people, you don’t care.
That works for the LW version of the problem (and I understand why it does), but not for Bostrom’s original formulation. In that version the mugger claims to have magic powers and will give Pascal quadrillions of utility if he hands over his wallet. This means that the mugger avoids the rule “ignore all threats of blackmail but accept postiive-sum trades.” That’s why it looks so much like cryonics to me, and therein lies the problem.
Sounding unsure of your position when arguing against LW norms gets you disproportionately large amounts of karma. Game the system!
Will do! I obviously don’t want to sound obnoxious; there’s no reason to be rude about rationality.
In that version the mugger claims to have magic powers and will give Pascal quadrillions of utility if he hands over his wallet.
Oh, sorry! In that case all my talk was egregious. That sounds like a much better problem whose answer isn’t immediately obvious to me. I shall think about it.
That sounds like a much better problem whose answer isn’t immediately obvious to me.
Yep, that’s the problem I’ve been struggling with. Like I said, it would help if Pascal’s disbelief in the mugger’s powers scaled with the utility the mugger promises him, but there’s not always a reason for that to be so. In any case, it might help to look at Bostrom’s version. And do let me know if you come up with anything, since this one really bothers me.
In any case, it might help to look at Bostrom’s version. And do let me know if you come up with anything, since this one really bothers me.
Thanks for pointing this out, I’m shocked I hadn’t heard of it. I’ll let you know if I think up something. If I can’t, I’ll ask a decision theory veteran, they’re sure to know.
That works for the LW version of the problem (and I understand why it does), but not for Bostrom’s original formulation. In that version the mugger claims to have magic powers and will give Pascal quadrillions of utility if he hands over his wallet. This means that the mugger avoids the rule “ignore all threats of blackmail but accept postiive-sum trades.” That’s why it looks so much like cryonics to me, and therein lies the problem.
Will do! I obviously don’t want to sound obnoxious; there’s no reason to be rude about rationality.
Oh, sorry! In that case all my talk was egregious. That sounds like a much better problem whose answer isn’t immediately obvious to me. I shall think about it.
Yep, that’s the problem I’ve been struggling with. Like I said, it would help if Pascal’s disbelief in the mugger’s powers scaled with the utility the mugger promises him, but there’s not always a reason for that to be so. In any case, it might help to look at Bostrom’s version. And do let me know if you come up with anything, since this one really bothers me.
Thanks for pointing this out, I’m shocked I hadn’t heard of it. I’ll let you know if I think up something. If I can’t, I’ll ask a decision theory veteran, they’re sure to know.
I’m not so sure, but I certainly hope someone knows.