So, replace slit wrists with standing in the center of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 around 8:15 looking up at the sky.
All right, that’s more difficult. So are you sure that there’s no way, miraculous or non-miraculous, to keep existing in that situation?
In your example it is possible to observe the classical result from the double-slit experiment, so I don’t know why you think it’s not falsifiable.
You would have to run the experiment very many times to see the classical result even once. In practice it’s not possible to test it. And what if my claim is not true—how would you show that?
Your default assumption regarding the classical result in a double-slit experiment seems to be that it is actually allowed by the formalism of quantum mechanics. So why does your default assumption seems to be that the formalism of quantum mechanics says that the angel thing is impossible?
So are you sure that there’s no way, miraculous or non-miraculous, to keep existing in that situation?
Divine intervention can solve ALL problems.
So why does your default assumption seems to be that the formalism of quantum mechanics says that the angel thing is impossible?
That is not my assumption and QM says nothing about angelic beings. My problem is that deux ex machina, in the form of an angel or not, is the answer to absolutely everything and so is useless.
As to why the “angel thing” is unlikely, let me introduce you to Bertrand Russel. You see, he had a teapot...
That is not my assumption and QM says nothing about angelic beings. My problem is that deux ex machina, in the form of an angel or not, is the answer to absolutely everything and so is useless.
Maybe you misunderstand my point. I’m not proposing the angel thing as an answer to anything. I’d rather say that I’m trying to present a problem, actually.
Unfortunately, I don’t understand the math of QM enough to make a convincing argument here. But basically my logic is this: the probability that instead of an angel, a disembodied brain will materialize in front of me is apparently non-zero according to our current knowledge, since the Boltzmann brain paradox is something that is taken seriously by physicists. I don’t see any fundamental difference between this and a blonde guy dressed in white with wings (perhaps made of cardboard) who’s very skilled at treating slit wrists materializing instead, so I assume that also has a small but non-zero probability. (Also, the probability that I would survive a nuclear explosion by tunneling to a safe distance is non-zero, I believe, by the same logic that the probability of me tunneling to the room next door is non-zero, which I’ve also heard physicists say.)
Now, the possible existence of Boltzmann brains is actually generally considered a problem, but scientists who work on that problem, as far as I know, usually don’t deny that our current understanding of physics says that Boltzmann brains are a real thing; instead, they think that it either shows a flaw in the theories that predict them, or that our understanding of those theories is incomplete in some way (Sean Carroll has written about this). I don’t know, but I suppose it’s also possible that the world simply really is a weird place.
basically my logic is this: the probability that instead of an angel, a disembodied brain will materialize in front of me is apparently non-zero according to our current knowledge
You are basically arguing that “the probability of X is non-zero for all X”. That is true (or unfalsifiable) in the same sense that solipsism is true (or unfalsifiable). No one can prove to you that it ain’t so, but it’s an entirely uninteresting and useless position to hold.
It’s not non-zero for all X. If I claim that “according to QM, there’s a non-zero probability two entangled particles have the same spin”, one could just produce the math necessary to show that this claim is false. Likewise, if my claim about QM saying that the probability of an angel appearing is non-zero, I’m sure it’s possible to do that (it might be difficult, though). The same with those Boltzmann brains, but physicists seem to think that their probability really is non-zero. Solipsism, on the other hand, is completely immune to such attacks.
The important thing here is really whether what I’m claiming follows from the math of quantum mechanics or not. Physicists don’t try to falsify every single prediction that quantum mechanics makes, because they already think there’s enough evidence (well, most do) that the theory is correct. There obviously is no such evidence for solipsism.
The probability of our current understanding of QM to be false is non-zero, too.
Things that QM forbids might be allowed by the next theory that follows it (what does Newtonian physics say about quantum tunneling? Absolutely impossible.)
You are granting QM the status of absolute, final truth and I see no reason for that. There is non-zero probability that it is mistaken :-P
I tried to be careful about this. In an earlier post, I said: “But do not that I’m not saying that the angelic being will in fact appear somewhere! That one would follow from quantum mechanics being a complete theory and MWI (or QIT) being a correct interpretation, both of which are surely debatable (and even then it would only happen in a very small minority of all worlds).”
That said, I think it’s quite a radical position to assign much probability to the possibility that QM is wrong. So far it’s consistent with all the evidence that we have, and there’s no evidence to support any of the competing theories or modifications, like objective-collapse theories. Because of this, a hypothetical improved theory might also contain all the weird stuff that QM does, plus some more.
On the other hand, I sometimes wonder if the people working on these theories would be more inclined to question them if they thought more about all the absurd implications they potentially have. (They might not: I recall reading a statement somewhere by Steven Weinberg who thought that eternal inflation or some other multiverse-predicting theory is a miserable theory, but the best that there is and possibly correct.)
I think it’s quite a radical position to assign much probability to the possibility that QM is wrong.
I don’t think so, with the slight change from “QM is wrong” to “QM is limited in its applicability, just like Newtonian physics”.
But in any case, in this thread you operate in a black-and-white world of “zero probability” and “non-zero probability”. I am pointing out that the set of zero-probability events is empty.
I don’t think so, with the slight change from “QM is wrong” to “QM is limited in its applicability, just like Newtonian physics”.
Fair enough. I suppose one could say that the problems with combining QM and general relativity suggest that QM needs to be modified, but so far we don’t have experimental evidence for anything but pure QM, I believe.
But in any case, in this thread you operate in a black-and-white world of “zero probability” and “non-zero probability”. I am pointing out that the set of zero-probability events is empty.
Well, our discussion spun off from a comment where lisper claimed that surely there are situations where death is inevitable. I countered by saying that as far as I know, there’s always some way to survive that has a non-zero probability according to quantum mechanics, so that’s where the emphasis on zero vs non-zero probability originally came. Note that the view advocated in the original post views the formalism of quantum mechanics as an accurate description at all scales and also says that all events with a non-zero probability will happen (but that the ones we end up not observing are not something we should care about).
So, replace slit wrists with standing in the center of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 around 8:15 looking up at the sky.
In the usual way: is it possible to observe an empirical result which will either prove of disprove the claim in question?
In your example it is possible to observe the classical result from the double-slit experiment, so I don’t know why you think it’s not falsifiable.
All right, that’s more difficult. So are you sure that there’s no way, miraculous or non-miraculous, to keep existing in that situation?
You would have to run the experiment very many times to see the classical result even once. In practice it’s not possible to test it. And what if my claim is not true—how would you show that?
Your default assumption regarding the classical result in a double-slit experiment seems to be that it is actually allowed by the formalism of quantum mechanics. So why does your default assumption seems to be that the formalism of quantum mechanics says that the angel thing is impossible?
Divine intervention can solve ALL problems.
That is not my assumption and QM says nothing about angelic beings. My problem is that deux ex machina, in the form of an angel or not, is the answer to absolutely everything and so is useless.
As to why the “angel thing” is unlikely, let me introduce you to Bertrand Russel. You see, he had a teapot...
Maybe you misunderstand my point. I’m not proposing the angel thing as an answer to anything. I’d rather say that I’m trying to present a problem, actually.
Unfortunately, I don’t understand the math of QM enough to make a convincing argument here. But basically my logic is this: the probability that instead of an angel, a disembodied brain will materialize in front of me is apparently non-zero according to our current knowledge, since the Boltzmann brain paradox is something that is taken seriously by physicists. I don’t see any fundamental difference between this and a blonde guy dressed in white with wings (perhaps made of cardboard) who’s very skilled at treating slit wrists materializing instead, so I assume that also has a small but non-zero probability. (Also, the probability that I would survive a nuclear explosion by tunneling to a safe distance is non-zero, I believe, by the same logic that the probability of me tunneling to the room next door is non-zero, which I’ve also heard physicists say.)
Now, the possible existence of Boltzmann brains is actually generally considered a problem, but scientists who work on that problem, as far as I know, usually don’t deny that our current understanding of physics says that Boltzmann brains are a real thing; instead, they think that it either shows a flaw in the theories that predict them, or that our understanding of those theories is incomplete in some way (Sean Carroll has written about this). I don’t know, but I suppose it’s also possible that the world simply really is a weird place.
You are basically arguing that “the probability of X is non-zero for all X”. That is true (or unfalsifiable) in the same sense that solipsism is true (or unfalsifiable). No one can prove to you that it ain’t so, but it’s an entirely uninteresting and useless position to hold.
It’s not non-zero for all X. If I claim that “according to QM, there’s a non-zero probability two entangled particles have the same spin”, one could just produce the math necessary to show that this claim is false. Likewise, if my claim about QM saying that the probability of an angel appearing is non-zero, I’m sure it’s possible to do that (it might be difficult, though). The same with those Boltzmann brains, but physicists seem to think that their probability really is non-zero. Solipsism, on the other hand, is completely immune to such attacks.
The important thing here is really whether what I’m claiming follows from the math of quantum mechanics or not. Physicists don’t try to falsify every single prediction that quantum mechanics makes, because they already think there’s enough evidence (well, most do) that the theory is correct. There obviously is no such evidence for solipsism.
The probability of our current understanding of QM to be false is non-zero, too.
Things that QM forbids might be allowed by the next theory that follows it (what does Newtonian physics say about quantum tunneling? Absolutely impossible.)
You are granting QM the status of absolute, final truth and I see no reason for that. There is non-zero probability that it is mistaken :-P
I tried to be careful about this. In an earlier post, I said: “But do not that I’m not saying that the angelic being will in fact appear somewhere! That one would follow from quantum mechanics being a complete theory and MWI (or QIT) being a correct interpretation, both of which are surely debatable (and even then it would only happen in a very small minority of all worlds).”
That said, I think it’s quite a radical position to assign much probability to the possibility that QM is wrong. So far it’s consistent with all the evidence that we have, and there’s no evidence to support any of the competing theories or modifications, like objective-collapse theories. Because of this, a hypothetical improved theory might also contain all the weird stuff that QM does, plus some more.
On the other hand, I sometimes wonder if the people working on these theories would be more inclined to question them if they thought more about all the absurd implications they potentially have. (They might not: I recall reading a statement somewhere by Steven Weinberg who thought that eternal inflation or some other multiverse-predicting theory is a miserable theory, but the best that there is and possibly correct.)
I don’t think so, with the slight change from “QM is wrong” to “QM is limited in its applicability, just like Newtonian physics”.
But in any case, in this thread you operate in a black-and-white world of “zero probability” and “non-zero probability”. I am pointing out that the set of zero-probability events is empty.
Fair enough. I suppose one could say that the problems with combining QM and general relativity suggest that QM needs to be modified, but so far we don’t have experimental evidence for anything but pure QM, I believe.
Well, our discussion spun off from a comment where lisper claimed that surely there are situations where death is inevitable. I countered by saying that as far as I know, there’s always some way to survive that has a non-zero probability according to quantum mechanics, so that’s where the emphasis on zero vs non-zero probability originally came. Note that the view advocated in the original post views the formalism of quantum mechanics as an accurate description at all scales and also says that all events with a non-zero probability will happen (but that the ones we end up not observing are not something we should care about).