Consider the following regions in the landscape of possible minds:
(1) All possible human minds
(2) All human minds that have ever existed
(3) All human minds that currently exist
(4) All currently existing human minds that participate in science
It should be clear that (1) is a miniscule patch of dirt in the vast mindscape, as (2) is of (1), and so forth. What scientifically productive regions of the mindscape (i.e. minds that could usefully contribute to scientific research) are found in (1), (2), or (3) but not (4)? What factors are limiting the diversity of scientific minds?
That 1) is but a minuscule fraction of mindspace sounds reasonable, if we define mindspace to be different than human minds (which should be possible IMO). But that doesn’t seem true of the inclusion of 3) in 2) for example. Based on the estimates of 2) I found in the wikipedia page (from 100 to 110 billions), that makes 3) a fraction of between 6 and 7% of 2). Not the majority, but hardly a minuscule fraction. The statement seems valid 4) to 3) (Numbers from this UNESCO report give something like 0.1%)
What scientifically productive regions of the mindscape (i.e. minds that could usefully contribute to scientific research) are found in (1), (2), or (3) but not (4)? What factors are limiting the diversity of scientific minds?
My initial intuition said that you were confused here, as only people in 3) can participate in 4). But I think you want to point towards trends and thought pattern of potentially dead humans that might be valuable to incorporate in the scientific landscape and education.
That being said, I feel your point is more about the uniformity of 4) than it’s size, isn’t it? After all, there would be diminishing returns if half the population did science, and I don’t think it’s an especially good idea.
I can’t shake of the impression that you’re missing an intermediary category between 3) and 4), of the human minds that could be excited about exploring and thinking about the world. It’s if this category is significantly more heterogeneous than 4) that there would be a possible problem along the lines you describe, right?
One point of confusion that I think is running through your comments (and this is my fault for not being clear enough) is how I am conceiving of “mind”. In my conception, a mind is the genetics and all of the environment/past experiences but also the current context of the mind. So for example, yes you would still have the same mind in one sense whether you were doing science in a university or were just an independent scientist, but in another sense no because the thoughts you are willing and able to think would be different because you are facing very different constraints/incentives. Hope this helps.
In my conception, a mind is the genetics and all of the environment/past experiences but also the current context of the mind.
Hum, okay. But thinking about the equivalent classes of such minds would be more relevant, no? Like if two different combinations leads to basically thinking the same ideas, we would want to mix them. Then the crux of this debate would be whether almost all modern scientists where in the same equivalence class, and if science could benefit from the inclusion of more equivalence classes.
So for example, yes you would still have the same mind in one sense whether you were doing science in a university or were just an independent scientist, but in another sense no because the thoughts you are willing and able to think would be different because you are facing very different constraints/incentives.
If this hypothetical scientist was able to actually get a job in a university, I would expect next to no difference between the two. First because it’s still a job, but also just because science is not a random personal exploration, it’s a shared endeavor. And so you care about communities or specific people finding your work interesting and/or important. That’s the most relevant incentive IMO, and I don’t see how it changes between these two settings.
Re: possible minds
That 1) is but a minuscule fraction of mindspace sounds reasonable, if we define mindspace to be different than human minds (which should be possible IMO). But that doesn’t seem true of the inclusion of 3) in 2) for example. Based on the estimates of 2) I found in the wikipedia page (from 100 to 110 billions), that makes 3) a fraction of between 6 and 7% of 2). Not the majority, but hardly a minuscule fraction. The statement seems valid 4) to 3) (Numbers from this UNESCO report give something like 0.1%)
My initial intuition said that you were confused here, as only people in 3) can participate in 4). But I think you want to point towards trends and thought pattern of potentially dead humans that might be valuable to incorporate in the scientific landscape and education.
That being said, I feel your point is more about the uniformity of 4) than it’s size, isn’t it? After all, there would be diminishing returns if half the population did science, and I don’t think it’s an especially good idea.
I can’t shake of the impression that you’re missing an intermediary category between 3) and 4), of the human minds that could be excited about exploring and thinking about the world. It’s if this category is significantly more heterogeneous than 4) that there would be a possible problem along the lines you describe, right?
One point of confusion that I think is running through your comments (and this is my fault for not being clear enough) is how I am conceiving of “mind”. In my conception, a mind is the genetics and all of the environment/past experiences but also the current context of the mind. So for example, yes you would still have the same mind in one sense whether you were doing science in a university or were just an independent scientist, but in another sense no because the thoughts you are willing and able to think would be different because you are facing very different constraints/incentives. Hope this helps.
Hum, okay. But thinking about the equivalent classes of such minds would be more relevant, no? Like if two different combinations leads to basically thinking the same ideas, we would want to mix them. Then the crux of this debate would be whether almost all modern scientists where in the same equivalence class, and if science could benefit from the inclusion of more equivalence classes.
If this hypothetical scientist was able to actually get a job in a university, I would expect next to no difference between the two. First because it’s still a job, but also just because science is not a random personal exploration, it’s a shared endeavor. And so you care about communities or specific people finding your work interesting and/or important. That’s the most relevant incentive IMO, and I don’t see how it changes between these two settings.