Definitely not, because they do not start out with equal priors. That’s just Bayes. Every conjunctive detail can only decrease the prior probability, which is the principle known as Occam’s Razor. The God in question is a highly conjunctive claim with lots of burdensome details.
Note also that “The Orthodox Christian God” may have a similar prior to other monotheist’s Gods, when taken individually, but it can’t really be bigger than the set of monotheistic Gods as a whole, which can’t be bigger than the set of gods as a whole, or the set of supernatural creatures as a whole, or the set of unspecified supernatural forces as a whole, as each successive set contains the former set. And if we cut out the burdensome detail of “the supernatural”, then we’re left with natural higher powers like alien teenagers, which is still plenty unlikely on priors, but is at least known to be possible based on established science. We haven’t even established that the supernatural exists at all.
I think in your treatment between different monotheistic gods there would be evidence that would favour one god over another even if both start similarly dysmally low. However if you had two gods and they are indistinguishable from aliens then they should not be distinguishable from each other. I guess there are two senses in that in “evidence we currently have” vs “evidence that could ever exist”. Like I would think that god hypothesis would not have increased probability for flying saucers. But if god doesn’t raise the expectation of saucers does god raise the expectation of anything? If it doesn’t raise the expectation of anything then there is nothing to disagree about because we don’t mean anything.
Definitely not, because they do not start out with equal priors. That’s just Bayes. Every conjunctive detail can only decrease the prior probability, which is the principle known as Occam’s Razor. The God in question is a highly conjunctive claim with lots of burdensome details.
Note also that “The Orthodox Christian God” may have a similar prior to other monotheist’s Gods, when taken individually, but it can’t really be bigger than the set of monotheistic Gods as a whole, which can’t be bigger than the set of gods as a whole, or the set of supernatural creatures as a whole, or the set of unspecified supernatural forces as a whole, as each successive set contains the former set. And if we cut out the burdensome detail of “the supernatural”, then we’re left with natural higher powers like alien teenagers, which is still plenty unlikely on priors, but is at least known to be possible based on established science. We haven’t even established that the supernatural exists at all.
I think in your treatment between different monotheistic gods there would be evidence that would favour one god over another even if both start similarly dysmally low. However if you had two gods and they are indistinguishable from aliens then they should not be distinguishable from each other. I guess there are two senses in that in “evidence we currently have” vs “evidence that could ever exist”. Like I would think that god hypothesis would not have increased probability for flying saucers. But if god doesn’t raise the expectation of saucers does god raise the expectation of anything? If it doesn’t raise the expectation of anything then there is nothing to disagree about because we don’t mean anything.