The part that you quoted doesn’t define anything, it’s just 3 examples, which together may be just as well defined simply as “sensations”.
No, they are about the quality of sensations. You keep trying to pull the subject towards “explaining sensation” because you actually can explain sensation, absent the qualities of sensation. But if the HP were really about explaining sensation in that way it wouldn’t be hard. You should be using the famous hardness of the HP as a guide to understanding it … If it seems easy , you’ve got it wrong.
And the Wikipedia article itself lists a number of different, not equivalent definitions none of which is anything I’d called rigorous
But that might be an isolated demand for rigour.
FYI, there is no precise and universally accepted definition of “matter”.
(e.g. Ramachandran and Hirstein say that qualia could be communicated
Note that not everything that is true of qualia (or anything else) needs to be in the definition.
Now you say that you think qualia is well-defined
I didn’t say that.
I can’t answer you whether I think I or Clark or Graziano or whoever else solved the hard problem if I don’t understand what do you mean by the hard problem
I’m not using an idiosyncratic defintion.
So do you feel like your definition allows you to answer this question?
I would not expect a definition alone to answer every possible question. I once read a paper arguing that unseen qualia are a coherent idea, but I forget the details.
I’m not trying to pull the subject towards anything, I’m just genuinely trying to understand your position, and I’d appreciate a little bit of cooperation on your part in this. Such as, answering any of the questions I asked. And “I don’t know” is a perfectly valid answer, I have no intention to “gotcha” you or anything like this, and by your own admission the problem is hard. So I’d ask you to not interpret any of my words above or below as an attack, quite the opposite I’m doing my best to see your point.
You should be using the famous hardness of the HP as a guide to understanding it … If it seems easy , you’ve got it wrong.
With all due respect, that sounds to me like you’re insisting that the answer to a mysterious question should be itself mysterious, which it shouldn’t. Sorry if I misinterpret your words, in that case again I’d appreciate you being a bit more clear about what you’re trying to say.
FYI, there is no precise and universally accepted definition of “matter”.
Exactly, and that is why using Wikipedia article for definition in such debates is not a good idea. Ideally, I’d ask you (or try myself in an identical situation) to taboo the words “qualia” and “hard problem” and try to explain what exactly question(s) do you think remains unanswered by the theory. But failing that, we can at least agree on the definition on qualia.
And even if we insist on using Wiki as the source of truth, here’s the direct quote: “Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Consequently, the nature and existence of various definitions of qualia remain controversial because they are not verifiable.” To me it sounds at odds with, again direct quote: “Qualia are sufficiently well defined to enable us to tell that you have not solved the hard problem”. If nature and even existence something depends on the definition, it’s not sufficiently well defined to tell whether theory X explains it (which is all not to say that you’re wrong and wikipedia is right, I don’t think it’s the highest authority on such matters. Just that you seem to have some different, narrower definition in mind so we can’t use reference to wiki as the source of truth)
Note that not everything that is true of qualia (or anything else) needs to be in the definition.
Yeah, I kinda hoped that I don’t need to spell it out, but okay, there we go. You’re correct, not everything that’s true of qualia needs to be in the definition. However I would insist that a reasonable definition doesn’t directly contradict any important true facts. Whereas one of the definitions in that wiki article (by Dennett) says that qualia is “private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.”
I would not expect a definition alone to answer every possible question.
Again, totally agree, that’s why I started with specific questions rather than definitions. So, considering that “I don’t know” is a perfectly reasonable answer, could you maybe try answering them? Or, if that’s seems like a better option to you, give an example of a question which you think proves Graziano/my theory isn’t sufficient to solve the hard problem?
With all due respect, that sounds to me like you’re insisting that the answer to a mysterious question should be itself mysterious,
I’m not saying that. But answeers to questions should relevant.
Exactly, and that is why using Wikipedia article for definition in such debates is not a good idea. Ideally, I’d ask you (or try myself in an identical situation) to taboo the words “qualia” and “hard problem
I’ve already done that. I can replace “qualia” with *sensory qualities”, and point out that you are not solving the hard problem because you are no explaining sensory qualities.
And even if we insist on using Wiki as the source of truth, here’s the direct quote: “Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Consequently, the nature and existence of various definitions of qualia remain controversial because they are not verifiable.” To me it sounds at odds with, again direct quote: “Qualia are sufficiently well defined to enable us to tell that you have not solved the hard problem”.
Theres no real contradiction. Even though there is disagreement about some features of qualia ,there can still be agreement that they in some sense about sensory qualities. I used a simple, almost naive , definition , consisting of a few examples, for a reason.
Or, if that’s seems like a better option to you, give an example of a question which you think proves Graziano/my theory isn’t sufficient to solve the hard problem?
I’ve said s already, haven’t I? A solution to the HP would allow you to predict sensory qualities from detailed brain scans, in the way that Mary can’t.
Replacing it with another word of which you then use identically isn’t the same as tabooing, that’s kind of defeats the purpose.
there can still be agreement that they in some sense about sensory qualities.
There may be, but then it seems there’s no agreement about what sensory qualities are.
I’ve said s already, haven’t I? A solution to the HP would allow you to predict sensory qualities from detailed brain scans, in the way that Mary can’t.
No, you have not, in fact in all your comments you haven’t mentioned “predict” or “mary” or “brain” ever once. But now we’re getting somewhere! How do you tell that a certain solution can or can’t predict “sensory qualities”? Or better, when you say “predict qualities from the brain scans” do you mean “feel/imagine them yourself as if you’ve experienced those sensory inputs firsthand”, or do you mean something else?
there’s no agreement about what sensory qualities are.
They’re things like the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. ”
I don’t believe that’s difficult to understand.
How do you tell that a certain solution can or can’t predict “sensory qualities”?
How do you tell that a putative explanation can predict something? You make a theoretical prediction, and you perform an experiment to confirm it.
Otherwise, non -predictiveness is the default.
So, a solution to the HP needs to be able make a theoretical prediction: there needs to be some gizmo were you input a brain state and get a predicted quale as output.
Sure, I wasn’t claiming at any point to provide a precise mathematical model let alone implementation, if that’s what you’re talking about. What I was saying is that I have guesses as to what that mathematical model should be computing. In order to tell whether the person experiences a quale of X (in the sense of them perceiving this sensation), you’d want to see whether the sensory input from the eyes corresponding to the red sky is propagated all the way up to the top level of predictive cascade—the level capable of modeling itself to a degree—and whether this top level’s state is altered in a way to reflect itself observing the red sky.
And admittedly what I’m saying is super high level, but I’ve just finished reading a much more detailed and I think fully compatible account of this in this article that Kaj linked. In their sense, I think the answer to your question is that the qualia (perceived sensation) arises when both attention and awareness are focused on the input—see the article for specific definitions.
The situation where the input reaches the top level and affects it, but is not registered subjectively, corresponds to attention without awareness in their terms (or to the information having propagated to the top level, but the corresponding change in the top level state not being reflected in itself). It’s observed in people with blindsight, and also was recreated experimentally.
Looking at your debate both with me and with Gordon below, it seems like your side of the argument mostly consists of telling the opponent “no you’re wrong” without providing any evidence to that claim. I honestly did my best to raise the sanity waterline a little, but to no success, so I don’t see much sense in continuing.
No, they are about the quality of sensations. You keep trying to pull the subject towards “explaining sensation” because you actually can explain sensation, absent the qualities of sensation. But if the HP were really about explaining sensation in that way it wouldn’t be hard. You should be using the famous hardness of the HP as a guide to understanding it … If it seems easy , you’ve got it wrong.
But that might be an isolated demand for rigour.
FYI, there is no precise and universally accepted definition of “matter”.
Note that not everything that is true of qualia (or anything else) needs to be in the definition.
I didn’t say that.
I’m not using an idiosyncratic defintion.
I would not expect a definition alone to answer every possible question. I once read a paper arguing that unseen qualia are a coherent idea, but I forget the details.
I’m not trying to pull the subject towards anything, I’m just genuinely trying to understand your position, and I’d appreciate a little bit of cooperation on your part in this. Such as, answering any of the questions I asked. And “I don’t know” is a perfectly valid answer, I have no intention to “gotcha” you or anything like this, and by your own admission the problem is hard. So I’d ask you to not interpret any of my words above or below as an attack, quite the opposite I’m doing my best to see your point.
With all due respect, that sounds to me like you’re insisting that the answer to a mysterious question should be itself mysterious, which it shouldn’t. Sorry if I misinterpret your words, in that case again I’d appreciate you being a bit more clear about what you’re trying to say.
Exactly, and that is why using Wikipedia article for definition in such debates is not a good idea. Ideally, I’d ask you (or try myself in an identical situation) to taboo the words “qualia” and “hard problem” and try to explain what exactly question(s) do you think remains unanswered by the theory. But failing that, we can at least agree on the definition on qualia.
And even if we insist on using Wiki as the source of truth, here’s the direct quote: “Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Consequently, the nature and existence of various definitions of qualia remain controversial because they are not verifiable.” To me it sounds at odds with, again direct quote: “Qualia are sufficiently well defined to enable us to tell that you have not solved the hard problem”. If nature and even existence something depends on the definition, it’s not sufficiently well defined to tell whether theory X explains it (which is all not to say that you’re wrong and wikipedia is right, I don’t think it’s the highest authority on such matters. Just that you seem to have some different, narrower definition in mind so we can’t use reference to wiki as the source of truth)
Yeah, I kinda hoped that I don’t need to spell it out, but okay, there we go. You’re correct, not everything that’s true of qualia needs to be in the definition. However I would insist that a reasonable definition doesn’t directly contradict any important true facts. Whereas one of the definitions in that wiki article (by Dennett) says that qualia is “private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.”
Again, totally agree, that’s why I started with specific questions rather than definitions. So, considering that “I don’t know” is a perfectly reasonable answer, could you maybe try answering them? Or, if that’s seems like a better option to you, give an example of a question which you think proves Graziano/my theory isn’t sufficient to solve the hard problem?
I’m not saying that. But answeers to questions should relevant.
I’ve already done that. I can replace “qualia” with *sensory qualities”, and point out that you are not solving the hard problem because you are no explaining sensory qualities.
Theres no real contradiction. Even though there is disagreement about some features of qualia ,there can still be agreement that they in some sense about sensory qualities. I used a simple, almost naive , definition , consisting of a few examples, for a reason.
I’ve said s already, haven’t I? A solution to the HP would allow you to predict sensory qualities from detailed brain scans, in the way that Mary can’t.
Replacing it with another word of which you then use identically isn’t the same as tabooing, that’s kind of defeats the purpose.
There may be, but then it seems there’s no agreement about what sensory qualities are.
No, you have not, in fact in all your comments you haven’t mentioned “predict” or “mary” or “brain” ever once. But now we’re getting somewhere! How do you tell that a certain solution can or can’t predict “sensory qualities”? Or better, when you say “predict qualities from the brain scans” do you mean “feel/imagine them yourself as if you’ve experienced those sensory inputs firsthand”, or do you mean something else?
They’re things like the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. ”
I don’t believe that’s difficult to understand.
How do you tell that a putative explanation can predict something? You make a theoretical prediction, and you perform an experiment to confirm it.
Otherwise, non -predictiveness is the default.
So, a solution to the HP needs to be able make a theoretical prediction: there needs to be some gizmo were you input a brain state and get a predicted quale as output.
Sure, I wasn’t claiming at any point to provide a precise mathematical model let alone implementation, if that’s what you’re talking about. What I was saying is that I have guesses as to what that mathematical model should be computing. In order to tell whether the person experiences a quale of X (in the sense of them perceiving this sensation), you’d want to see whether the sensory input from the eyes corresponding to the red sky is propagated all the way up to the top level of predictive cascade—the level capable of modeling itself to a degree—and whether this top level’s state is altered in a way to reflect itself observing the red sky.
And admittedly what I’m saying is super high level, but I’ve just finished reading a much more detailed and I think fully compatible account of this in this article that Kaj linked. In their sense, I think the answer to your question is that the qualia (perceived sensation) arises when both attention and awareness are focused on the input—see the article for specific definitions.
The situation where the input reaches the top level and affects it, but is not registered subjectively, corresponds to attention without awareness in their terms (or to the information having propagated to the top level, but the corresponding change in the top level state not being reflected in itself). It’s observed in people with blindsight, and also was recreated experimentally.
Only you define “quale” in terms of experiencing versus not experiencing.
Looking at your debate both with me and with Gordon below, it seems like your side of the argument mostly consists of telling the opponent “no you’re wrong” without providing any evidence to that claim. I honestly did my best to raise the sanity waterline a little, but to no success, so I don’t see much sense in continuing.
We’re mostly arguing about the definition of qualia. I’ve quoted Wikipedia , you haven’t quoted anybody.