there’s no agreement about what sensory qualities are.
They’re things like the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. ”
I don’t believe that’s difficult to understand.
How do you tell that a certain solution can or can’t predict “sensory qualities”?
How do you tell that a putative explanation can predict something? You make a theoretical prediction, and you perform an experiment to confirm it.
Otherwise, non -predictiveness is the default.
So, a solution to the HP needs to be able make a theoretical prediction: there needs to be some gizmo were you input a brain state and get a predicted quale as output.
Sure, I wasn’t claiming at any point to provide a precise mathematical model let alone implementation, if that’s what you’re talking about. What I was saying is that I have guesses as to what that mathematical model should be computing. In order to tell whether the person experiences a quale of X (in the sense of them perceiving this sensation), you’d want to see whether the sensory input from the eyes corresponding to the red sky is propagated all the way up to the top level of predictive cascade—the level capable of modeling itself to a degree—and whether this top level’s state is altered in a way to reflect itself observing the red sky.
And admittedly what I’m saying is super high level, but I’ve just finished reading a much more detailed and I think fully compatible account of this in this article that Kaj linked. In their sense, I think the answer to your question is that the qualia (perceived sensation) arises when both attention and awareness are focused on the input—see the article for specific definitions.
The situation where the input reaches the top level and affects it, but is not registered subjectively, corresponds to attention without awareness in their terms (or to the information having propagated to the top level, but the corresponding change in the top level state not being reflected in itself). It’s observed in people with blindsight, and also was recreated experimentally.
Looking at your debate both with me and with Gordon below, it seems like your side of the argument mostly consists of telling the opponent “no you’re wrong” without providing any evidence to that claim. I honestly did my best to raise the sanity waterline a little, but to no success, so I don’t see much sense in continuing.
They’re things like the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. ”
I don’t believe that’s difficult to understand.
How do you tell that a putative explanation can predict something? You make a theoretical prediction, and you perform an experiment to confirm it.
Otherwise, non -predictiveness is the default.
So, a solution to the HP needs to be able make a theoretical prediction: there needs to be some gizmo were you input a brain state and get a predicted quale as output.
Sure, I wasn’t claiming at any point to provide a precise mathematical model let alone implementation, if that’s what you’re talking about. What I was saying is that I have guesses as to what that mathematical model should be computing. In order to tell whether the person experiences a quale of X (in the sense of them perceiving this sensation), you’d want to see whether the sensory input from the eyes corresponding to the red sky is propagated all the way up to the top level of predictive cascade—the level capable of modeling itself to a degree—and whether this top level’s state is altered in a way to reflect itself observing the red sky.
And admittedly what I’m saying is super high level, but I’ve just finished reading a much more detailed and I think fully compatible account of this in this article that Kaj linked. In their sense, I think the answer to your question is that the qualia (perceived sensation) arises when both attention and awareness are focused on the input—see the article for specific definitions.
The situation where the input reaches the top level and affects it, but is not registered subjectively, corresponds to attention without awareness in their terms (or to the information having propagated to the top level, but the corresponding change in the top level state not being reflected in itself). It’s observed in people with blindsight, and also was recreated experimentally.
Only you define “quale” in terms of experiencing versus not experiencing.
Looking at your debate both with me and with Gordon below, it seems like your side of the argument mostly consists of telling the opponent “no you’re wrong” without providing any evidence to that claim. I honestly did my best to raise the sanity waterline a little, but to no success, so I don’t see much sense in continuing.
We’re mostly arguing about the definition of qualia. I’ve quoted Wikipedia , you haven’t quoted anybody.