I think this is basically what you’re saying, though: you’re talking about qualities of experience/sensations, but to speak of qualities is to categorize things rather than just experience them, which means some part of experience is being made into a thing.
Whether or not they are explained, the import thing I’m pointing at is that they are of the same type, hence whether or not you find an explanation satisfying, it is aiming to explain the same kind of thing.
I can categorsise stones , and I can categorise flowers, but that doesn’t mean stones are flowers. In general, the ability to categorise things of type X doesn’t exhaustively describe them because they also have intrinsic properties. There is a theory of qualia according to which they don’t have any interesting properties other than bring different from each other, the GENSYM, theory, but I don’t know whether you’re be endorsing it.
I’ve never seen “qualia” defined that way.
I think this is basically what you’re saying, though: you’re talking about qualities of experience/sensations, but to speak of qualities is to categorize things rather than just experience them, which means some part of experience is being made into a thing.
I don’t think you can explain qualities just by explaining categorisation. If that’s what you are saying.
Whether or not they are explained, the import thing I’m pointing at is that they are of the same type, hence whether or not you find an explanation satisfying, it is aiming to explain the same kind of thing.
I can categorsise stones , and I can categorise flowers, but that doesn’t mean stones are flowers. In general, the ability to categorise things of type X doesn’t exhaustively describe them because they also have intrinsic properties. There is a theory of qualia according to which they don’t have any interesting properties other than bring different from each other, the GENSYM, theory, but I don’t know whether you’re be endorsing it.