Understanding the actual abstract reasons for agents’ decisions (such as decisions about agreeing with a given argument) seems to me a promising idea, I’m trying to make progress on that (agents’ decisions don’t need to be correct or well-defined on most inputs for the reasons behind their more well-defined behaviors to lead the way to figuring out what to do in other situations or what should be done where the agents err). Note that if you postulate an algorithm that makes use of humans as its elements, you’d still have the problems of failure modes, regret for bad design decisions and of the capability to answer humanly incomprehensible questions, and these problems need to be already solved before you start the thing up.
Interesting, if I understand correctly the idea is to find a theoretically correct basis for deciding on a course of action given existing knowledge and then to make this calculation efficient and then direct towards a formally defined objective.
As distinct from a system which potentially sub optimally, attempts solutions and tries to learn improved strategies. i.e. one in which the theoretical basis for decision making is ultimately discovered by the agent over time (e.g. as we have done with the development of probability theory). I think the perspective I’m advocating is to produce a system that is more like an advanced altruistic human (with a lot of evolutionary motivations removed) than a provably correct machine. Ideally such a system could itself propose solutions to the FAI problem that would be convincing, as a result of an increasingly sophisticated understanding of human reasoning and motivations.
I realise there is a fear that such a system could develop convincing yet manipulative solutions. However the output need only be more trustworthy than a human’s response to be legitimate (for example based on an analysis of its reasoning algorithm it appears to lack a Machiavellian capability, unlike humans).
Or put another way, can a robot Vladimir (Eliezer etc.) be made that solves the problem faster than their human counterparts do. And is there any reason to think this process is less safe (particularly when AI developments will continue regardless)?
Interesting, if I understand correctly the idea is to find a theoretically correct basis for deciding on a course of action given existing knowledge and then to make this calculation efficient and then direct towards a formally defined objective.
Yes, but there is only one top-level objective, to do the right thing, so one doesn’t need to define an objective separately from the goal system itself (and improving state of knowledge is just another thing one can do to accomplish the goal, so again not a separate issue).
FAI really stands for a method of efficient production of goodness, as we would want it produced, and there are many landmines on this path, in particular humanity in its current form doesn’t seem to be able to retain its optimization goal in the long run, and the same applies to most obvious hacks that don’t have explicit notions of preference, such as upload societies. It’s not just a question of speed, but also of ability to retain the original goal after quadrillions of incompletely understood self-modifications.
The current approach is to have a number of human intelligences continue to explore this problem until they enter a mental state C (for convinced they have the answer to FAI). The next stage is to implement it.
We have no other route to knowledge other than to use our internal sense of being convinced. I.e. no oracle to tell us if we are right or not.
So what if we formally define what this mental state C consists of and then construct a GAI which provably pursues only the objective of creating this state. The advantage being that we now have a means of judging our progress because we have a formally defined measurable criteria for success. (In fact this process is a valuable goal regardless of the use of AI but it now makes it possible to use AI techniques to solve it).
Understanding the actual abstract reasons for agents’ decisions (such as decisions about agreeing with a given argument) seems to me a promising idea, I’m trying to make progress on that (agents’ decisions don’t need to be correct or well-defined on most inputs for the reasons behind their more well-defined behaviors to lead the way to figuring out what to do in other situations or what should be done where the agents err). Note that if you postulate an algorithm that makes use of humans as its elements, you’d still have the problems of failure modes, regret for bad design decisions and of the capability to answer humanly incomprehensible questions, and these problems need to be already solved before you start the thing up.
Interesting, if I understand correctly the idea is to find a theoretically correct basis for deciding on a course of action given existing knowledge and then to make this calculation efficient and then direct towards a formally defined objective.
As distinct from a system which potentially sub optimally, attempts solutions and tries to learn improved strategies. i.e. one in which the theoretical basis for decision making is ultimately discovered by the agent over time (e.g. as we have done with the development of probability theory). I think the perspective I’m advocating is to produce a system that is more like an advanced altruistic human (with a lot of evolutionary motivations removed) than a provably correct machine. Ideally such a system could itself propose solutions to the FAI problem that would be convincing, as a result of an increasingly sophisticated understanding of human reasoning and motivations.
I realise there is a fear that such a system could develop convincing yet manipulative solutions. However the output need only be more trustworthy than a human’s response to be legitimate (for example based on an analysis of its reasoning algorithm it appears to lack a Machiavellian capability, unlike humans).
Or put another way, can a robot Vladimir (Eliezer etc.) be made that solves the problem faster than their human counterparts do. And is there any reason to think this process is less safe (particularly when AI developments will continue regardless)?
Yes, but there is only one top-level objective, to do the right thing, so one doesn’t need to define an objective separately from the goal system itself (and improving state of knowledge is just another thing one can do to accomplish the goal, so again not a separate issue).
FAI really stands for a method of efficient production of goodness, as we would want it produced, and there are many landmines on this path, in particular humanity in its current form doesn’t seem to be able to retain its optimization goal in the long run, and the same applies to most obvious hacks that don’t have explicit notions of preference, such as upload societies. It’s not just a question of speed, but also of ability to retain the original goal after quadrillions of incompletely understood self-modifications.
Ok, so how about this work around.
The current approach is to have a number of human intelligences continue to explore this problem until they enter a mental state C (for convinced they have the answer to FAI). The next stage is to implement it.
We have no other route to knowledge other than to use our internal sense of being convinced. I.e. no oracle to tell us if we are right or not.
So what if we formally define what this mental state C consists of and then construct a GAI which provably pursues only the objective of creating this state. The advantage being that we now have a means of judging our progress because we have a formally defined measurable criteria for success. (In fact this process is a valuable goal regardless of the use of AI but it now makes it possible to use AI techniques to solve it).