I agree; I don’t see a significant difference between thinking that I ought to value other human beings equally but failing to do so, and actually viewing them equally and not acting accordingly. If I accept either (1) or (2) it’s still a moral failure, and it is one that I should act to correct. In either case, what matters is the actions that I ought to take as a result (i.e. effective altruism), and I think the implications are the same in both cases.
That being said, I guess the methods that I would use to correct the problem would be different in either hypothetical. If it’s (1) then there may be ways of thinking about it that would result in a better valuation of other people, or perhaps to correct for the inaccuracy of the care-o-meter as per the original post.
If it’s (2), then the issue is one of akrasia, and there are plenty of psychological tools or rationalist techniques that could help.
Of course, (1) and (2) aren’t the only possibilities here; there’s at least two more that are important.
You seem to be agreeing by not really agreeing. What does it even mean to say “I value other people equally but I don’t act on that”? Your actions imply a valuation, and in that implied valuation you clearly value yourself more than other people. It’s like saying “I prefer chocolate over vanilla ice cream, but if you give me them I’ll always pick the vanilla”. Then you don’t really prefer chocolate over vanilla, because that’s what it means to prefer something.
My actions alone don’t necessarily imply a valuation, or at least not one that makes any sense.
There are a few different levels at which one can talk about what it means to value something, and revealed preference is not the only one that makes sense.
I agree; I don’t see a significant difference between thinking that I ought to value other human beings equally but failing to do so, and actually viewing them equally and not acting accordingly. If I accept either (1) or (2) it’s still a moral failure, and it is one that I should act to correct. In either case, what matters is the actions that I ought to take as a result (i.e. effective altruism), and I think the implications are the same in both cases.
That being said, I guess the methods that I would use to correct the problem would be different in either hypothetical. If it’s (1) then there may be ways of thinking about it that would result in a better valuation of other people, or perhaps to correct for the inaccuracy of the care-o-meter as per the original post.
If it’s (2), then the issue is one of akrasia, and there are plenty of psychological tools or rationalist techniques that could help.
Of course, (1) and (2) aren’t the only possibilities here; there’s at least two more that are important.
You seem to be agreeing by not really agreeing. What does it even mean to say “I value other people equally but I don’t act on that”? Your actions imply a valuation, and in that implied valuation you clearly value yourself more than other people. It’s like saying “I prefer chocolate over vanilla ice cream, but if you give me them I’ll always pick the vanilla”. Then you don’t really prefer chocolate over vanilla, because that’s what it means to prefer something.
My actions alone don’t necessarily imply a valuation, or at least not one that makes any sense.
There are a few different levels at which one can talk about what it means to value something, and revealed preference is not the only one that makes sense.
Is this basically another way of saying that you’re not the king of your brain, or something else?
That’s one way to put it, yes.