Morality is about how to save babies, not eat them, everyone knows that and they happen to be right. If we could get past difficulties of the translation, the babyeaters would agree with us about what is moral, we would agree with them about what is babyeating, and we would agree about the physical fact that we find different sorts of logical facts to be compelling.
This simply pushes the problem back one level, by making the word “morality” descriptive instead of normative. Morality is X and babyeating is Y. But how should one choose between morality and babyeating? Now, instead of a moral anti-realist, I’m a moral realist, a babyeating realist, and normative judgement anti-realist.
But how should one choose between morality and babyeating?
Channeling my inner Eliezer, the answer is obviously that you should choose morality (since “should” is just “morality” as a verb).
Now, instead of a moral anti-realist, I’m a moral realist, a babyeating realist, and normative judgement anti-realist.
No, because normative judgement = morality.
This is almost starting to make sense, except… Suppose I say this to a babyeater: “We should sign a treaty banning the development and use of antimatter weapons.” What could that possibly mean? Or if one murderer says to another “We should dump the body in the river.” he is simply stating a factual falsehood?
I wonder if this is a good summary of our disagreement with Eliezer:
His proposed definitions of “morality” and especially “should” and “ought” are objectionable. They are just not what we mean when we use those words.
He classifies his metaethics as realism whereas we would classify it as anti-realism.
Out of these two, 1 is clearly both a bigger problem and where Eliezer is more obviously wrong. I really don’t understand why he sticks to his position there.
This is almost starting to make sense, except… Suppose I say this to a babyeater: “We should sign a treaty banning the development and use of antimatter weapons.” What could that possibly mean?
Supposedly the acceptable plan would both be the right thing to do and the babyeating thing to do at the same time: right given the presence and influence of babyeaters, and babyeating given the presence and influence of humans. So, when it is said, “Let us sign this treaty.”, humans sign it, because it should be done, and babyeaters also do so, because it’s a babyeating thing to do. The contract is chosen to compel both parties.
I agree with your explanation of the intended semantics of the sentence, which is also my explanation. What I disagree with is the suggestion that we denote that meaning using “Let us sign this treaty.” instead of “We should sign this treaty.” I believe the intended meaning is more naturally expressed using the second sentence, and trying to redefine the word “should” so that the second sentence means something else and we’re forced to use the first sentence to express the same meaning, is wrong.
Also, since the first sentence is imperative instead of declarative, I’m not sure that it doesn’t mean something else already, so that now you’re hijacking two words instead of one.
There can be a separable sense of “should” that indicates rationality. Thus, “we should sign the treaty” can be an interesting truth for both parties when the “should” is that of rationality, and true for both parties but only interesting from the human side when the “should” is a moral should.
This commits one to what philosophers call moral externalism, namely, the view that what is morally required is not necessarily rationally required. Which is not a reason to reject the view, but I expect it will be criticized.
He characterizes his metaethics as realism whereas we would characterize it as anti-realism.
Where does he characterize it as realism? When he chooses the word, he always chooses “cognitivism”; if someone else says “realism,” he doesn’t object, but he makes sure to define it to match cognitivism and indicates that there other notions of realism that he doesn’t endorse.
Should has many meanings. Which moral system I believe in is meta level, not object level and probably implies an epistemic-should or rational-should rather than moral-should.
Likewise, not all normative judgement is morality. What you should do to maximise personal pleasure, .lor make money, or “win” in some way , is generally not what you morally-should.
This simply pushes the problem back one level, by making the word “morality” descriptive instead of normative. Morality is X and babyeating is Y. But how should one choose between morality and babyeating? Now, instead of a moral anti-realist, I’m a moral realist, a babyeating realist, and normative judgement anti-realist.
Channeling my inner Eliezer, the answer is obviously that you should choose morality (since “should” is just “morality” as a verb).
No, because normative judgement = morality.
This is almost starting to make sense, except… Suppose I say this to a babyeater: “We should sign a treaty banning the development and use of antimatter weapons.” What could that possibly mean? Or if one murderer says to another “We should dump the body in the river.” he is simply stating a factual falsehood?
I wonder if this is a good summary of our disagreement with Eliezer:
His proposed definitions of “morality” and especially “should” and “ought” are objectionable. They are just not what we mean when we use those words.
He classifies his metaethics as realism whereas we would classify it as anti-realism.
Out of these two, 1 is clearly both a bigger problem and where Eliezer is more obviously wrong. I really don’t understand why he sticks to his position there.
Supposedly the acceptable plan would both be the right thing to do and the babyeating thing to do at the same time: right given the presence and influence of babyeaters, and babyeating given the presence and influence of humans. So, when it is said, “Let us sign this treaty.”, humans sign it, because it should be done, and babyeaters also do so, because it’s a babyeating thing to do. The contract is chosen to compel both parties.
I agree with your explanation of the intended semantics of the sentence, which is also my explanation. What I disagree with is the suggestion that we denote that meaning using “Let us sign this treaty.” instead of “We should sign this treaty.” I believe the intended meaning is more naturally expressed using the second sentence, and trying to redefine the word “should” so that the second sentence means something else and we’re forced to use the first sentence to express the same meaning, is wrong.
Also, since the first sentence is imperative instead of declarative, I’m not sure that it doesn’t mean something else already, so that now you’re hijacking two words instead of one.
There can be a separable sense of “should” that indicates rationality. Thus, “we should sign the treaty” can be an interesting truth for both parties when the “should” is that of rationality, and true for both parties but only interesting from the human side when the “should” is a moral should.
This commits one to what philosophers call moral externalism, namely, the view that what is morally required is not necessarily rationally required. Which is not a reason to reject the view, but I expect it will be criticized.
Where does he characterize it as realism? When he chooses the word, he always chooses “cognitivism”; if someone else says “realism,” he doesn’t object, but he makes sure to define it to match cognitivism and indicates that there other notions of realism that he doesn’t endorse.
Thanks for pointing out the error. I changed it to “classify”.
Should has many meanings. Which moral system I believe in is meta level, not object level and probably implies an epistemic-should or rational-should rather than moral-should.
Likewise, not all normative judgement is morality. What you should do to maximise personal pleasure, .lor make money, or “win” in some way , is generally not what you morally-should.